Pivotal States, Not Swing States

Mohammed Soliman

Mohammed Soliman is the Director of the Strategic Technologies and Cyber Security Program at the Middle East Institute. He is also a member of McLarty Associates, a Visiting Fellow at Third Way, and a David Rockefeller Fellow of the Trilateral Commission. He currently serves on the Board of Advisors for Ideas Beyond Border and the Advisory Council of the Indian Society of Artificial Intelligence and Law (ISAIL). The views expressed in this essay are his own.

The United States, in particular, is grappling with the challenges posed by the emerging multipolar order and the need to secure a favorable position in this evolving global landscape. As part of this contemplation, there is a growing recognition of the significance of “swing states” like India, Türkiye, Indonesia, Vietnam, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia in shaping the outcome of the postCold War order and the broader global system. However, framing these consequential states as “swing states” in and of itself carries significant risk, as it implies that the only choice they have is a binary one: pick the U.S.‑led West or the China and Russia axis. In reality, their strategic posture is far away from choosing one side over the other; at the same time, they are not behaving similarly to the Cold War‑era non‑aligned movement that was inherently anti‑Western and leaned towards the Soviet‑led block under the disguise of anti‑colonialism solidarity.

The appropriate strategic name for this growing list of countries in the present‑day is “pivotal states,” and includes Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, chosen for their strategic geography, demography, and overall strength. Alongside these, there are other pivotal states with unique roles, such as Vietnam due to its position in the global supply chain and Egypt as a maritime bottleneck between the East and West.

It is now widely acknowledged that international stability and the outcome of the U.S.‑China neo‑Cold War are influenced by factors beyond the behavior of Russia and China. But one crucial factor that remains underappreciated is that the behavior of pivotal states— which are determined to chart an independent course—will play vital roles in shaping the future of the international system. It is essential to recognize that these pivotal states inherently reject the bipolarity and “Cold War 2.0” framing that dominates the perspectives of, for example, Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo. 

Criteria

Jared Cohen, the President of Global Affairs and Co‑Head of the Office of Applied Innovation at Goldman Sachs, has defined these pivotal states as having several advantageous characteristics: a strong position in global supply chains; suitability for nearshoring, offshoring, or friendshoring; substantial capital resources and the willingness to deploy this capital worldwide; and leaders who nurture global visions while operating within certain constraints. Cohen should be applauded for putting pen to paper and coming up with a framework that could include more countries in the future as their position strengthens in any of these four categories. According to Cohen, “geopolitical swing states” (his chosen term of use)—akin to the role of swing states in shaping U.S. domestic politics—possess the ability to impact the global balance of power. The “geopolitical swing states” have their independent global agendas and strategically utilize their stability and economic advantages to bolster their influence. They demonstrate heightened dynamism and strategic thinking and often opt for multi‑alignment, positioning themselves as crucial and unpredictable actors in the future of globalization and the ongoing U.S.‑China strategic competition.

Similarly, the  C h a i r m a n of Eurasia Group, Cliff Kupchan, highlights the significance of the six prominent middle powers in the global south: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye. According to Kupchan, these “swing states” (the term used by the author) in the Global South are not completely aligned with any particular superpower, granting them the freedom to shape new power dynamics.

Similar to Cohen, Kupchan provides criteria that explain why the growing importance of these six states can be attributed to long‑term historical developments and recent global trends. Since the end of the Cold War, he argues, these states have gained more influence in international relations as the strict division into opposing blocs drew them in. The current Sino‑U.S. bipolarity is weaker, allowing middle powers greater freedom of movement. Additionally, the process of deglobalization over the past two decades has led to the emergence of new regional relationships. These swing states, as regional leaders, are becoming increasingly significant as power devolves to their respective regions, which enables them to have more agency today than ever before. Near‑shoring and friendshoring are gradually redirecting firms and trade away from China to other regions, particularly the Global South. Consequently, certain swing states in the global south will evolve into busier trade hubs.

Terminology Matters

Cohen and Kupchan have devoted significant efforts to developing concrete criteria that could assist scholars, investors, and policymakers in identifying the significant states that will become even more significant as the world becomes increasingly multipolar and oriented towards the East. However, the term “swing states” itself creates a sense of detachment from these states, as it portrays Western engagement with them through the lens of great power competition, which is already being rejected. India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar exemplified this perspective during remarks he delivered at the GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum in June 2022. When asked about India’s position in the current U.S.‑China Cold War, he stated, “Europe has to move away from the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, while the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.” He further emphasized, “Although a connection is being made between China, India, and the events in Ukraine, it is important to recognize that the circumstances involving China and India existed long before the situation in Ukraine unfolded.”

The terminology used to categorize or discuss countries is crucial as it sets the tone for diplomatic discourse and political engagement. Many of these terms in the international relations lexicon are rooted in twentieth‑century (and even nineteenth‑century) Westerncentric visions of the world and are being interpreted as a lack of interest in understanding the political realities of the Global South.

Hence the potential advantage of the “keystone states” concept that Nikolas Gvosdev of the U.S. Naval War College first put forward in 2015. Summarizing this concept in a previous edition of Baku Dialogues, Damjan Krnjević Mišković has written that

keystone states are understood to be trusted interlocutors, reliable intermediaries, and critical mediators that can act as buffers between major power centers. This integrative power is supplemented by the fact that an effective keystone state can serve as a pressure‑release valve in a system of world order, particularly as the transition to conditions of non‑polarity continues, by acting as a buffer and reducing the potential for conflict between major power centers. (Nonpolarity, as Gvosdev has noted, is an active approach in which constant engagement with all the major stakeholders is a sine qua non. The concept of non‑polarity is thus predicated on the assumption that no major power can establish and guarantee absolute security or impose a uniform set of preferences; and that no current or aspirant keystone state should choose to align itself exclusively with one major power—to do so, he has pointed out, increases rather than reduces insecurity, by incentivizing one or more of the major powers to take action detrimental to a keystone state’s ability to pursue its national interests along the lines outlined above.)

Bearing in mind the potential advantage of the “keystone states” concept, Western and non‑Western academics and policymakers can also open up an intellectual space that is more reflective of the textured and manifold histories and geopolitical aims of these countries by referring to the countries highlighted previously as “pivotal states” instead of “swing states.” Nurturing this intellectual space will help put the West on the right track toward developing long‑term foreign policy frameworks appropriate for this dynamic age.

Technology Matters

A major component of the ongoing great power competition between the U.S. and the Russia‑China Axis—a competition that pivotal states seek to evade—is the increasing role of technology. As the world enters the second half of the 2020s, it is impossible to deny the enormous influence of technology—not only over economies and societies, but on geopolitics more broadly. Once concentrated in the hands of a few states (mostly those in the West, such as America), technological prowess is becoming more dispersed across the world as emerging powers harness the transformational power of technology to boost economic and geopolitical might.

As I have argued in a recent Foreign Policy Research Institute article, the world has entered “the technological pivot of history,” which means that global dynamics now hinge on a country’s ability to harness disruptive technological innovation, not just geographical control. This fundamentally reshapes the criteria for geopolitical influence. The U.S.‑China tech Cold War exemplifies this, with states locked in an all‑out race for technological supremacy. This competition draws new geopolitical lines around the control of artificial intelligence and data flows. Pivotal states (unlike some keystone states) are scrambling to develop their own technology doctrines, further disrupting the global technology landscape.

Pivotal states (unlike some keystone states) are scrambling to develop their own technology doctrines, further disrupting the global technology landscape

Many pivotal states, such as India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, are pouring billions of dollars into initiatives aimed at advancing capabilities in areas such as artificial intelligence, cloud computing, unmanned systems, and high‑tech manufacturing. As China and the United States remain locked in fierce competition fueled by technology interests, these pivotal states are offering the world alternative avenues that do not involve alignment with one side of the rivalry or the other.

With the rise of the pivotal states in prominence in the global technology landscape, they are enjoying an associated increase in geopolitical clout that is inextricably linked to their attractively non‑aligned position in the world, high economic growth potential, and the immense amount of worldwide interest in the products and capabilities that they are developing. In short, this race for technological supremacy will define the new hierarchies of power, forcing countries—chief among them, pivotal states—to adapt to the transformative forces of technology.

Constrained Maneuver‑ability

As valuable as these new discussions surrounding “pivotal states” are, it is imperative to refrain from incorporating countries that act as U.S. force multipliers—e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, Canada, Mexico—into the pantheon of “pivotal states.” These states, deeply embedded within the U.S.‑led system of Western alliances, find their maneuverability on the international stage constrained, as their positioning within the global political and economic order is inextricably intertwined with the centrality of U.S. security guarantees. These states serve as force multipliers— with varying degrees—for the maintenance of America’s global position vis‑a‑vis China and Russia.

The United States, however, displays a notable blind spot when it comes to engaging with the aforementioned “pivotal states.” By reducing them to the label of mere swing states, the United States fails to grasp the true significance and agency these countries possess. Thus, the distinction between swing states and pivotal states is far from inconsequential. Pivotal states, using their degree of autonomy and assertiveness, chart their own discourse and exhibit a resolute refusal to succumb to the coercive dictates of the U.S.‑China Cold War 2.0 imperative thrust upon them.

At the present moment, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye are considered to be among the most prominent and notable pivotal states on the geopolitical stage. A whole crop of others (among them Egypt, Nigeria, Taiwan, and Vietnam) hold the potential to acquire the level of international importance and characteristics of pivotal states.

At the present moment, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye are considered to be among the most prominent and notable pivotal states on the geopolitical stage. As will be described in greater detail below, each of these pivotal states share similar characteristics in terms of their relative importance to global commerce and supply chains, power projection and military capabilities, and commitment to balancing relations between the U.S. and the West, on the one hand, and the ChinaRussia axis, on the other hand. Moreover, their growing contributions to technological progress and innovation are cementing their role as states of critical importance well into the future.

India

Among the emerging powers, India stands out due to its position in the broader Silk Road region (the preferred editorial term of this journal, in contradistinction to “Eurasia,” which is a term preferred by both Russian and Western sources for reasons not unrelated to my argument) as a bridge between the Global North and the Global South. This is based on its demographics, economic size and growth, geographical location between the IndoPacific and West Asia, membership in the elite nuclear club, and, most importantly, its political transformation from non‑alignment to multi‑alignment. Delhi maintains robust ties with Moscow while also advancing and, indeed, strengthening strategic partnerships with Washington, Paris, Rome, London, and Brussels—India even maintains an amicable relationship with Kiev. In West Asia, Indian foreign policy has pivoted towards gradually building mutual interest‑based alignment with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE while also maintaining communication and cooperation with Iran.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2007 address to the Indian Parliament, titled “Confluence of the Two Seas,” proved a prescient articulation of a nascent Asian dynamic. Inspired by the historical resonances of Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh’s work, Abe envisioned a strategic convergence—a “dynamic coupling”—between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This, he argued, would forge a broader Asian order, one transcending historical divisions. Although he did not refer to the “Asian values” concept that had been developed in the 1990s by the likes of Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad (in part responding to Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis), one could certainly not ignore that it was “in the air,” so to speak.

Speculation aside, what is clear is that India—by virtue of its unique geopolitical position and enduring historical ties—now occupies a pivotal role in this emerging architecture. It serves as a linchpin, a point of convergence, between the burgeoning Indo‑Pacific and the countries of West Asia, bound by their shared geoeconomic interests and historical heritage. This nascent alignment suggests the potential for the establishment of a broader Asian order—a subject about which I have written in detail elsewhere— where India serves as the main strategic cornerstone of the “Eurasian rimland” (to borrow the term coined by America’s “godfather of containment,” Nicholas Spykman). This unique Indian position has brought geoeconomic dividends for Delhi, as major powers are seeking partnerships with India that span security, energy, trade, and digital infrastructure.

While there is a focus on India’s rising role in the Indo‑Pacific amid the intensifying great power competition between the United States and China (see, for example, Ashley Tellis’s recent Foreign Affairs essay), Delhi’s engagement in West Asia has been transformed, with India now a member of the I2U2 alongside Israel, the U.S., and the UAE—a concrete manifestation of what I had advocated in the summer of 2021, namely the establishment of an “Indo‑Abrahamic alliance.” At the September 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi, India, alongside the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the EU and its member states Germany, France, and Italy, introduced the India‑Middle East‑Europe Corridor (IMEC). This initiative aims to reshape power dynamics across much of the world by connecting the Indo‑Pacific to Europe and West Asia through strategic connectivity projects. IMEC comprises two main routes: an eastern route linking India to the Gulf via sea lanes and a northern route connecting Saudi Arabia to Europe through Jordan and Israel, primarily using railways. IMEC puts Delhi at the forefront of a major geoeconomic alignment across the “Eurasian rimland.” India’s rising geopolitical significance, coupled with its status as the world’s most populous country, its increasingly influential (and growing) diaspora, and a strong domestic push for industrialization, alongside remarkable economic growth, has positioned Delhi as an emerging industrial global economy. Major companies like Apple and Google are eyeing the region for their production facilities.

Türkiye

Another pivotal state is Türkiye, which occupies an unmatched geostrategic position at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. This unique location endows Türkiye with a multifaceted identity, as it straddles the boundaries of both European and Asian spheres. One of Türkiye’s most significant roles lies in its stewardship of critical waterways, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, which connect the Aegean and Mediterranean seas to the Black Sea and the broader geoeconomic space of the Silk Road region. By safeguarding these strategic passages, Türkiye plays a crucial role in ensuring both the flow of commerce to the heart of Eurasia and energy to Europe.

The U.S.‑led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent power vacuum in that country opened opportunities for Türkiye in northern Iraq, while the Assad regime’s suppression of protests in Syria in 2011 triggered a prolonged conflict that is still ongoing. Türkiye capitalized on these dynamics by expanding its influence into Syria, establishing a buffer zone against Kurdish groups to hinder the possibility of a future Kurdish state. With its position secured in Syria and Iraq, Türkiye extended its reach to Libya, Somalia, and Sahel states, elevating its status to a transregional power. In the meantime, Ankara built a formidable indigenous defense industry, enabling Türkiye to act independently from NATO consensus. As a drone superpower, Türkiye leveraged drones to alter battlefield dynamics in Libya, Ethiopia, and the conflict over Karabakh between its ally Azerbaijan and Armenia.

As a NATO member state and despite condemning the Russian invasion and supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, Ankara has also sought to maintain a balanced relationship with Moscow. This balancing act is evident in the ways Türkiye has supported Ukraine with armed drones, which had proven effective against Russian forces previously in Syria. However, Türkiye has also avoided actions that could severely antagonize Russia, such as implementing the Western sanctions regime. This approach allows Türkiye to maintain its economic ties with Russia and potentially act as a mediator in the future. Türkiye’s détente with Russia, despite NATO criticism, underscores Ankara’s strategic foresight. As Russia’s influence weakens in Ukraine and Eastern Europe, Türkiye sees an opportunity, along with China, to expand its influence in the Silk Road region. Evidence of this shift includes Türkiye’s support for Azerbaijan and the envisioned “Zangezur Corridor” extending to Azerbaijan, laying the groundwork for pan‑Turkic geoeconomic integration via the Middle Corridor connectivity mega‑project. In 2009, Türkiye, alongside Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, founded the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. Hungary and Turkmenistan participate as fully‑fledged observer states.

Furthermore, Türkiye’s hybrid political regime, which combines democracy and elements of a civilization state, adds another layer of uniqueness to its standing in a global system. Türkiye emerges as a pivotal state able to straddle the divide between Western liberal democracies and Eastern civilization states, positioning itself as a key player in shaping the trajectory of the multipolar world order.

Brazil

Home to over 200 million people, Brazil stands as the most populous country in South America, representing over half of the continent’s total population. With a GDP exceeding $1.9 trillion, Brazil ranks as the world’s ninth‑largest economy, serving as a crucial commercial link between South America and Atlantic states. Since it transitioned from military to civilian rule in 1985, Brazil has assumed a regional leadership role and gained influence as a global power. Regionally, Brazil has expanded the Mercosur customs union beyond its original members, supported the establishment of the Union of South American Nations, led UN peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, and bolstered integration with neighboring countries through infrastructure investments. On the global stage, Brazil has pursued a more prominent role by advocating for permanent membership in the UN Security Council, demonstrating leadership within the G20 (with Rio de Janeiro slated to host the summit in November 2024), and actively engaging in WTO activities. Additionally, Brazil has participated in nuclear talks with Iran and promoted annual meetings for emerging powers, including BRICS and the IBSA Forum (comprising India, Brazil, and South Africa). Home to the Amazon rainforest that is often dubbed the “lungs of the planet,” Brazil plays an indisputable role in environmental conservation and biodiversity, contributing significantly to global environmental discussions. Brazil is a leading voice among Global South countries and has opted not to fully align with the United States in its broader Eurasian competition with China and Russia. Indeed, Brazil, alongside India, demonstrated notable independence by eschewing alignment with the West against Russia in the context of the conflict over Ukraine. This stance reflects a strategic effort to sidestep costly entanglements beyond their immediate geopolitical sphere with major powers.

By maintaining this position, Brazil aims to preserve its strategic flexibility and autonomy, positioning itself as a significant bridge between the Global South and Global North in terms of geopolitics, climate issues, and economic interests, setting a pathway forward for a new multipolar world order.

Saudi Arabia

In the past decade, Saudi Arabia has undergone a remarkable transformation. Through its ambitious “Vision 2030” initiative, the kingdom has embarked on extensive economic diversification efforts and far‑reaching social reforms. These initiatives have attracted significant investments in tourism, entertainment, foreign investment, technology, and manufacturing, positioning Saudi Arabia as a leading global destination in these sectors. With a population of approximately 32 million, including a large number of young and well‑educated individuals alongside foreign workers, and boasting a GDP of $833.5 billion, this country is poised for substantial growth and a notable global ascent.

Geopolitically, Saudi Arabia’s economic growth, strategic location at the crossroads of the West and the East, and role as host of Islam’s holiest cities (Mecca and Medina) have afforded it a large degree of diplomatic clout both within the Middle East and beyond among majority‑Muslim countries in Africa and Asia. This explains Washington’s strong push for a normalization agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel, as the United States sees Saudi Arabia’s immense cultural and religious influence in the Islamic world.

Riyadh’s position as the world’s largest oil exporter within OPEC+—characterized by vast reserves and low production costs— makes it a critical player in shaping global energy policy and its impact on economic growth. The conflict over Ukraine disrupted oil export routes from Russia, another significant global producer, prompting a worldwide search for alternative sources and emphasizing the importance of Saudi Arabia’s extensive oil reserves. Western powers pressed Saudi Arabia to increase production and stabilize surging oil prices resulting from the conflict. However, Riyadh resisted these efforts and continued to collaborate with Moscow within OPEC+ to pursue its independent energy policy. The Ukraine war highlighted Saudi Arabia’s influence as a major oil producer, with its production decisions having significant implications for the global economy and the energy security of other countries.

Saudi Arabia, unlike the other countries on the list of pivotal states, still relies on U.S. security guarantees, and a potential normalization agreement with Israel could entail additional alliance‑like commitments. Nonetheless, this dependency is evolving as Riyadh develops its own domestic military capabilities and enhances its defense capabilities, with a budget of $69 billion in 2023. The war in Yemen served as a precursor to a more assertive Saudi stance regionally.

Indonesia

With a population exceeding 279 million and a GDP of $1.3 trillion, Indonesia ranks as Asia’s third‑largest economy. Moreover, its strategic positioning as a bridge between the Indian and Pacific Oceans further enhances its economic importance, wielding considerable geopolitical influence within Southeast Asia and the broader Asia‑Pacific region. Bolstered by a sizable military force comprising 400,000 active‑duty troops and backed by a budget of roughly $25 billion, Indonesia increasingly projects power regionally in a somewhat under‑the‑radar manner. Over the past few decades, Indonesia has enjoyed steady economic expansion propelled by factors such as escalating domestic consumption, infrastructural advancements, and the exportation of natural resources. Endowed with abundant natural resources, including oil, gas, coal, minerals, and agricultural products, Indonesia lays a sturdy foundation for economic development and international trade relations.

Geopolitically, Indonesia holds substantial significance within Southeast Asia due to its extensive archipelago connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This geographical advantage establishes Indonesia as a pivotal player in regional geopolitics and maritime trade routes. Actively engaging with regional and global partners, Indonesia participates in fora like ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the G20 and fosters partnerships with both China and America. These collaborations augment Indonesia’s balancing role in both regional and global affairs. Despite encountering challenges such as political transitions and regional tensions, Indonesia has maintained relative stability in recent years. Its commitment to democratic governance and peaceful transitions of power fosters investor confidence and ensures long‑term stability. Moreover, Indonesia’s burgeoning tech sector and increasing internet penetration are catalyzing innovation and economic opportunities, positioning the country as a burgeoning hub for technology and digital entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia and perhaps beyond.

South Africa

Despite the large‑scale political turmoil that has taken place in South Africa over the past decade, the country remains a very important player on the continent and the broader global stage. With a GDP of over $400 billion and a population of nearly 60 million people, the country is Africa’s most industrialized economy and is endowed with abundant natural resources, including some of the world’s largest reported reserves of gold, platinum group metals, titanium, chrome ore, and manganese ore. South Africa’s military of approximately 75,000 active‑duty personnel, backed by a $2.8 billion defense budget, is regarded as a well‑equipped and moderately capable force that has largely succeeded in preventing any instability in neighboring countries from seeping into its borders.

Although considered a strategic partner of the United States, South Africa maintains very close ties to the Russia‑China geopolitical camp and is a member of BRICS, regarded as the most significant non‑Western challenger to the U.S.‑led “rules‑based international liberal order.” Additionally, South Africa is a member of the G20, another minilateral format aiming to foster consensus among non‑Western powers alongside Western ones. This initiative is particularly relevant as the UN system faces increasing dysfunctionality, and the gap between the West and the Rest widens.

In short, South Africa and its fellow pivotal states seem to be successfully navigating our present era of disorder, in which, as I have written, the “Davos Man” who dominated the flat‑world, unipolar moment is being replaced by a new breed—the “Geopolitical Man,” who stands tall in the debris of fractured consensus, where free markets are becoming secondary to nationalism, populism, state conflict, industrial policy, national security concerns, ideological divides, pragmatism, and Realpolitik.

Future Pivotal States

The rise of pivotal states is not limited to just the countries described above—Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye. In fact, there is a whole crop of others—among them Egypt, Nigeria, Taiwan, and Vietnam—that are on the cusp of or hold the potential to acquire the level of international importance and characteristics of pivotal states. Their economies are either high‑functioning or possess the ingredients necessary to develop globally competitive industries, and their ambitions for prosperity and international prominence also lead them to take a balanced approach with respect to the ongoing great power competition.

With a population of 110 million, Egypt stands as the most populous state in the Arab world and the third most populous in Africa. However, despite its significant population, the Egyptian economy has faced challenges, including high unemployment, widespread poverty, and strains from population growth. Efforts are underway by the government to address these issues and improve the country’s GDP, which currently stands at approximately $476.7 billion— making the country the biggest economy in Africa.

In addition to its internal struggles, Egypt remains a crucial geopolitical player in the Middle East. It boasts a sizable military force of 450,000 active‑duty personnel capable of exerting influence across the region. Despite the emergence of Gulf powers, Cairo maintains an active role in areas such as Libya, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and the East Mediterranean. With a two‑sea navy and control over the strategic Suez Canal, Egypt holds a significant position in maritime geopolitics. The country is a central point in the emerging geoeconomic system across the Eurasian rimland from the Mediterranean to the Indo‑Pacific. Looking ahead, if Egypt undergoes political and economic reforms that stimulate growth, it is likely to pursue a foreign policy agenda akin to Türkiye’s approach. This could further elevate Egypt’s stature on the global stage. As I have argued elsewhere, “there is no Indo‑Pacific without Egypt.” Indeed, the country stands as an almost indispensable keystone state in this trans‑continental geostrategic project.

With a population of more than 218 million people, Nigeria is the largest in Africa. Its population growth rate is expected to remain high, with a predicted population of 392 million by 2050, making it the world’s fourth most populous country. Supported by vast oil reserves and thriving telecommunications, financial services, and industrial sectors, Nigeria’s economy boasts a GDP of $390 billion. As the largest economy in sub‑Saharan Africa, Nigeria holds significant sway over economic and political dynamics in West Africa. The Nigerian government is committed to diversifying the economy and reducing dependence on fossil fuels by investing in other high‑growth industries, such as those mentioned above.

However, Nigeria also faces challenges, including widespread corruption, human rights abuses, and armed conflicts with insurgent groups like Boko Haram. Economic downturns in Nigeria often lead to stagnation in other regional economies. Additionally, Nigeria’s security situation is closely tied to that of West Africa and the Sahel. The Nigerian military, tasked with combating such insurgencies and establishing stability, consists of 135,000 active‑duty troops with a budget of $3.11 billion. The military is undergoing a modernization program, with most newly purchased arms and equipment sourced from China and Russia.

Like many pivotal states, Nigeria seeks balanced relations with the United States and the Russia‑China axis. While maintaining strong economic partnerships with Russia and China, particularly as an OPEC member, Nigeria also values its security partnership with the United States.

Another future pivotal state is Taiwan, a political entity that, notwithstanding the fact that it is not a UN member state, transcends being just a geopolitical flashpoint. With a population exceeding 23 million and a highly educated workforce, Taiwan hosts a globally significant economy. Boasting an impressive GDP nearing $791 billion, Taiwan’s economic backbone lies in its thriving information and communications technology (ICT) industry, which ranks among the world’s leading sectors. Notably, Taiwan is a major player in semiconductor manufacturing, exporting chips crucial for powering cutting‑edge technologies like data storage, critical infrastructure, military systems, and artificial intelligence. The global significance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry elevates its influence in the geopolitical landscape, particularly amidst the intense tech rivalry between the United States and China. However, it is the broader greatpower competition between the U.S. and China that poses the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

With staunch support from the United States, its main external security guarantor, Taiwan has developed a formidable military comprising 180,000 active‑duty troops and 120,000 reservists dedicated to defending the island from potential Chinese aggression. Backed by a $19 billion budget, approximately 2.6 percent of its GDP, Taiwan’s military is well‑equipped, extensively trained, and possesses modern weaponry. The combination of a robust military and a highly productive, advanced economy solidifies Taiwan’s emergence as a pivotal player in geopolitics.

In the decades since the end of its war with the United States in the 1970s, Vietnam has transformed from a U.S. adversary to a close partner, and from a faltering economy to a $408.8 billion GDP powerhouse. Its highly educated population of 98 million is the backbone of its economic growth, which has been buoyed by a very strong manufacturing sector. In recent years, manufacturing in Vietnam has received a boost from large corporations (including many from the U.S.) seeking to “de‑risk” U.S.‑China competition by diversifying their supply chains with countries like Vietnam. The People’s Army of Vietnam considered one of the strongest militaries in Southeast Asia, is backed by a $6.65 billion budget and comprises 450,000 active‑duty troops. Since the early 2000s, Hanoi has clearly prioritized improving the country’s defense capabilities, as evidenced by the 700 percent increase in military spending from 2003 to 2018.

Despite expanding security ties with the U.S. and heightened tensions with China regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Vietnam remains committed to fostering balanced relations with all camps in international politics. It has refused to downgrade its relationship with Russia (from which it has purchased the vast majority of its military equipment) notwithstanding the West’s entreaties to join its sanctions regime against Moscow, and continues to seek stronger political and security ties with China.

The Big Picture

The evolving global landscape in the face of an emerging multipolar order demands a more nuanced understanding of the role and significance of certain countries in shaping international  stability and power dynamics. The term “swing states,” though initially used to recognize the importance of countries like India, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia, falls short in accurately depicting their strategic posture and agency in the current geopolitical landscape. The “keystone states” concept— its advantages notwithstanding— does not devote sufficient weight to the homegrown technological innovation variable in determining the new global hierarchy of power.

But the concept of “pivotal states” does—one reason why it is more appropriate. It, too, acknowledges the strong position and autonomous decision‑making of countries like Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye, among others. These pivotal states possess advantageous characteristics and hold the potential to impact the global balance of power. However, it is essential to avoid the temptation of incorporating deeply embedded U.S. alliance system countries into this category, as their maneuverability is constrained by their close association with the United States.

In this ever‑changing landscape, acknowledging the true significance and autonomy of pivotal states is key to fostering constructive engagement and promoting a more balanced and inclusive approach to global affairs.

To navigate these complexities successfully, policymakers and academics should embrace more inclusive and representative terminology, recognizing the nuanced histories and geopolitical aims of these pivotal states. By doing so, Washington can develop long‑term foreign policy frameworks that align better with the dynamic age we are in, ultimately promoting a more stable and cooperative global order. In this ever‑changing landscape, acknowledging the true significance and autonomy of pivotal states is key to fostering constructive engagement and promoting a more balanced and inclusive approach to global affairs.