Spotlight on Normalization

More than half a year has passed since the end of the Second Karabakh War and the signing of the Mos­cow‑brokered trilateral statement by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, and the President of the Russian Federation on a complete ceasefire and a ces­sation of all hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno‑Karabakh conflict.

These developments have ended the almost 30‑year‑long illegal Armenian occupation, restoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. They have also contributed to the ultimate implementation of nu­merous decisions and resolutions adopted by various international organizations, including four resolutions of the UN Security Council (822, 853, 874, and 884) demanding the immediate, com­plete, and unconditional with­drawal of Armenian armed forces from the occupied Azerbaijani ter­ritories. At the same time, a new political reality has emerged in the region as a result of the war. This has brought about at least seven implications:

First, for the first time, an occupation was brought to an end through a combination of mili­tary and political means in one of the protracted ethno‑territorial conflicts in the post‑Soviet space.

Second, for the first time, a peace­keeping operation was initiated in this conflict zone. According to the terms of the aforementioned November 10th, 2020, trilateral statement, 1,960 Russian peace­keepers are deployed for at least five years along the contact line in Nagorno‑Karabakh and along the Lachin corridor route to pro­vide security arrangements for the Armenian minority residing in the mountainous part of Karabakh.

Third, Turkey and Russia, repre­senting two different intergovern­mental military alliances—namely, NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)— for the first time formalized coopera­tion anywhere in the post‑Soviet space through the establishment of a joint Turkish‑Russian Center for control over the ceasefire and the cessation of all hostilities in the Nagorno‑Karabakh conflict area, in compliance with a memorandum signed by the defense chiefs of both countries on November 11th, 2020.

Fourth, by signing a second tri­lateral statement on January 11th, 2021, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Min­ister of the Republic of Armenia, and the President of the Russian Federation paved the way for the development of cross‑border trans­portation routes and boosting eco­nomic growth to benefit the overall region.

Fifth, today, consistent work by Azerbaijan towards post‑con­flict reconstruction is ongoing in the liberated territories. This is an extremely important process for the future return, in the coming years, of Azerbaijani internally dis­placed persons (IDPs)—originally from the Jabrayil, Fuzuli, Zangilan, Gubadli, Agdam, Kalbajar, and Lachin districts, as well as from the territory of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO)—to their perma­nent places of residence that were occupied by Armenian armed forces. The UNHCR has been as­signed to oversee this task. At the same time, Armenians from the Nagorno‑Karabakh conflict area who fled to Armenia during the Second Karabakh War have also been gradu­ally returning to their homes.

Sixth, there is now a window of opportunity for the normalization of Armenian‑Azerbaijani relations if Armenia concentrates on its own internationally recognized sover­eign territory and withdraws ter­ritorial claims against Azerbaijan. After recognizing one another’s territorial integrity, Armenia and Azerbaijan can, in the future, sign a formal peace treaty.

Seventh, Armenia and Turkey could also normalize their bilateral relations if Armenia withdraws its territorial claims against Turkey and both countries find common ground relating to the tragic events of 1915. The reconciliation of these two nations could also, eventu­ally, become very beneficial for the further development of the South Caucasus.

If the processes of normal­ization between Armenia and Azerbaijan and be­tween Armenia and Turkey take place, these could lead not only to the opening of the bor­ders between them but also contribute to region­al stability and develop­ment as well as lead to trans‑regional cooper­ation among the three South Caucasian states and the wider region.

Thus, if the processes of normal­ization between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Armenia and Turkey take place, these could lead not only to the opening of the bor­ders between them but also contribute to regional stability and development as well as lead to trans‑regional co­operation among the three South Caucasian states and the wider re­gion. At the same time, it would create an enabling environment that could be more con­ducive for future dialogue and in­teractions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, on the one hand, and Armenians and Turks, on the other.

However, today there are certain thorny issues that create obstacles to moving from war rhetoric into a peace agenda, which are closely intertwined with the different post‑conflict environments estab­lished in Azerbaijan and Armenia after the Second Karabakh War.

On the one hand, there is a common understanding in Azerbaijan that the Armenia‑ Azerbaijan conflict in and around the Karabakh re­gion has been re­solved. “Now we need to look into the future. Despite 30 years of occupa­tion and large‑scale destruction and devastation on the liberated territo­ries, Azerbaijan is ready to look to the future—to plan its future as part of an integrated South Caucasus region,” stated Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during an online discussion organized by the Nizami Ganjavi International Center on May 20th, 2021.

On the other hand, the situation is in stark contrast in post‑con­flict Armenia. The humiliating de­feat of this country in the Second Karabakh War not only shattered the myth of the invincibility of the Armenian Army but also caused political turmoil and plunged the country into a political crisis amid the apathy of the population.

Such a reaction from Armenian so­ciety is unsurprising because, over the years, the Azerbaijani territories occu­pied during the First Karabakh War were presented in Armenia as a return of “historical lands” and a restoration of historical justice. In fact, by mytholo­gizing the past, Ar­menia’s ideologists tried to establish Armenian ethno‑na­tionalism. However, the people who utilize such mytho­logical manipulation subsequently become the victims of their own con­struct, losing touch with reality as a result. Incidentally, in a November 2020 interview with the BBC, Gerard Libaridian, who served as an adviser to the first president of Armenia, Levon Ter‑Petrosian, touched upon the main reasons behind the defeat of Armenia and underlined that the origins of Armenia’s current problems are con­nected with the fact that the elite—in the interview he uses the pronoun “we”— gave the people incorrect informa­tion and erroneous analysis, offered unrealistic scenarios as possible solutions, and pushed nationalism instead of statehood.

Unfortunately, the pro­cess of serious reflection on the causes of Arme­nia’s failure in the Second Karabakh War has not yet begun in Armenia.

Unfortunately, the process of se­rious reflection on the causes of Armenia’s failure in the Second Karabakh War has not yet begun in Armenia because, for such recogni­tion to occur, it is necessary first to destroy many fundamental myths that underlie modern Armenian statehood.

Following the resignation of the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, a snap parliamentary elec­tion will take place on June 20th, 2021 (this essay was fi­nalized in the days before this election). However, the situation in Armenia is unstable, and a struggle for political leader­ship is currently under way.

There are also questions re­garding the future role of the OSCE Minsk Group, which has been involved in the medi­ation process of the Armenia‑ Azerbaijan conflict in and around the Karabakh region since 1992. After the Second Karabakh War, the role this institution could play going forward seems rather uncertain. Today, it is mainly Russia that is ac­tive in the region as a peacekeeper and mediator of the various issues breaking out between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is very likely that this dissatisfies the two other Co‑chairs of the Minsk Group, namely France and the United States: presumably, they too would like to be engaged in these processes. However, on the one hand, after the Second Karabakh War France’s support for Armenia’s position to a certain degree jeopardizes its impartiality as a Co‑chair of the OSCE Minsk Group. On the other hand, the recognition in April 2021 by U.S. President Joe Biden of the 1915 events as a “genocide” could also have a negative impact on the nor­malization of the Armenian‑Turkish relationship and could also compli­cate relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Thus, despite the (so‑far) near‑complete implementation of both the November 10th, 2020, and January 11th, 2021, trilat­eral statements, certain pressing issues and concerns still remain unresolved, which complicate the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In the short term, Armenia’s re­fusal to provide information about minefield locations, complications in the delineation of the Armenian‑Azerbaijani interna­tional border, misinterpretation by Armenia of the situation with respect to the Armenian detainees remaining in Azerbaijan’s custody, politicization of protection of religious and cultural heritage, im­pediments to opening of transport and economic communications, and raising the question of the so‑called issue of Karabakh’s “status” by Armenia, and a divergence of opinion on the future role of the OSCE Minsk Group are among the most contested subjects. Mean­while, in the mid‑to‑long term, the reintegration of both Azerbaijanis and Armenians into Azerbaijan’s newly rebuilt Karabakh region should be considered.

Security Challenges

In the period between the First and Second Karabakh Wars, only ethnic‑Armenians lived in the decimated Azerbaijani towns and villages of the former NKAO and the seven occupied Azerbaijani districts adjacent to it. During this period, Armenia “exercise[d] effective control” over the entirety of the then‑occupied territory, as the Eu­ropean Court of Human Rights’ judgment in Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (2015) made clear. Only after the Second Karabakh War and the November 10th, 2020, tri­lateral statement is there now a prospect of visiting these territories and grasping the full scope of the reality hidden from the Azerbaijani people’s eyes for almost three decades.

To date, the negative effects of the Armenian occupation have only started to come to light. The facts on the ground are heartbreaking, owing to the enormous extent of the destruction committed by Armenians in the occupied Azerbaijani territories. Although there was some information from books written by foreign authors and video footage from interna­tional media sources on Karabakh, the dawning of the reality is nev­ertheless almost beyond compre­hension. Not only were virtually all the homes of around 700,000 Azerbaijani IDPs destroyed, but in complete ruin also lie public build­ings, schools, hospitals, mosques, cultural and historical monu­ments, and cemeteries in the liber­ated territories.

The Azerbaijani government has made it clear that the total material damage caused to the Azer­baijani territories when they were under Armenian occupation will be calculated with the participation of international institutions so that Armenia could be held account­able to pay compensation before international courts in the future.

At the same time, following the November 10th, 2020, trilateral statement, the Azerbaijani gov­ernment has started a process of reconstruction and restoration of all its conflict‑affected territo­ries. Thus, for the year 2021, $1.3 billion has been allocated for the restoration of infrastructure—in particular gas, water, electricity, and communications, as well as cultural and historical monuments. Work related to the finalization of a state program on “The Restoration and Sustainable Development of Territories of the Rpublic of Azerbaijan Liberated from Occupation for 2021‑2025” is also nearing completion.

It is envisaged that these territo­ries will be turned into a green en­ergy zone. In fact, the construction of “smart villages” and “smart cities” in the liberated Zangilan district has already been announced by the Azerbaijani government. The first “smart village” pilot project will cover three Aghali villages of the Zangilan district, where 200 indi­vidual houses are planned to be built initially. This project will be implemented within the following five components: housing, man­ufacturing, social services, “smart agriculture,” and alternative energy. Additionally, all residential houses, social facilities, and public catering facilities will be provided with alternative energy sources.

Concurrently, work has already begun on the construction of new highways, railways, and airports— precursors to developing master plans for rebuilding cities in the lib­erated areas in order to accelerate the process of the safe and digni­fied return of Azerbaijani IDPs to their places of origin. At the time of writing, approximately 600 km of roads in seven directions and 158 km of railways in two directions are being built; also, one airport is already being built in Fuzuli and two more airports will be built in Zangilan and Lachin districts in the time ahead. Here we can add that the master plan for the reconstruc­tion of the city of Agdam has already been developed and approved.

Minefields

However, there are certain pressing security challenges that need to be overcome in real­izing these goals. One of them is Armenia’s refusal to fully provide information about minefield loca­tions. The liberated Azerbaijani ter­ritories are one of the world’s most mine‑contaminated areas, containing numerous anti‑personnel and an­ti‑tank mines as well as unexploded ordinance (UXO). Hundreds of thousands of landmines were planted there by Armenian forces throughout the years of occupation and during the agreed withdrawal from these territories in the immediate wake of the Second Karabakh War.

Following the liberation of its territories, Azerbaijan has started to carry out operations to clear the mines, unexploded munitions, and other hazards left behind by Arme­nian forces. As of early June 2021, nearly 35,000 mines and UXOs have been cleared from over 9,106 hectares in the liberated territories.

Nevertheless, the provision of detailed and accurate information about the location of the mines is paramount to save human lives and accelerate the post‑conflict recon­struction process. Between the end of the Second Karabakh War and early June 2021, more than 120 Azerbai­janis, both servicemen and civilians, have been injured or killed in mine explosions in the liberated territories.

It is obvious that without this data, tragic deaths and injuries on the lib­erated territories will continue hap­pening. Just recently, on June 4th, 2021, a vehicle carrying a group of Azerbaijani journalists was struck by an anti‑tank mine in the liberated Kalbajar district. As a result, two journalists and one public servant were killed, and four others were hospitalized with various injuries.

But again, to reiterate: Ar­menia has, until now, refused to fully provide information about minefield locations to Azerbaijan. Over 15,000 people have signed a petition calling on Armenia to re­lease the location of mines and UXOs in the liberated territories, and this is one of the most signed petitions on the change.org website to date.

On February 22nd, 2021, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov wrote to UN Secretary‑General Antonio Gu­terres and requested that he urge Armenia to release the location of minefields in Azerbaijan’s liberated territories. In his letter, the min­ister stressed that “Armenia’s consis­tent disregard of our repeated appeals to release information on the location of the minefields seri­ously questions that country’s sincerity for a normalization of relations with Azerbaijan on the basis of mutual recognition of and respect for each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of international borders.”

Recently Azerbaijan also lodged its second interstate application against Armenia with the Euro­pean Court of Human Rights (ECHR), informing the Court that the continuing refusal by Armenia to hand over the location of the minefields in the liberated territories of Azerbaijan results in the gross violation of the rights and freedoms envisaged in the ECHR. Azerbaijan also requested that the Court urgently grant interim mea­sures and place an obligation on Armenia to submit the maps and all relevant information indicating the location of landmines.

Armenia’s refusal to ful­ly provide information about minefield locations creates a serious obsta­cle for effective demining and the prevention of fur­ther casualties.

Thus, Armenia’s refusal to fully provide information about minefield locations creates a se­rious obstacle for effective demining and the prevention of further casual­ties. As this edition of Baku Dialogues was going to press, a welcome development took place that appears to rep­resent a harbinger for a more con­structive approach on this and the related issue of detainees.

On June 12th, 2021, after ex­treme pressure was applied on Armenia by various countries and international organizations, the Armenian side agreed to transfer the maps of 97,000 anti‑tank and anti‑personnel mines planted during its occupation in the Agdam district of Azerbaijan in exchange for 15 Armenian detainees in Azerbaijan’s custody.

Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry expressed its appreciation for the support of the Georgian gov­ernment headed by the Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Garib­ashvili, for the implementation of this humanitarian action. It also acknowledged the media­tion role of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Reeker, the President of the Eu­ropean Council Charles Michel, and the Swedish Chairmanship of the OSCE for their respective contributions to the process.

Hopefully, this process will con­tinue and the Armenian side will fully provide information about minefield locations to prevent further civilian casualties.

Border Delineation

The second pressing secu­rity challenge currently is the delineation of the Armenian‑ Azerbaijani international border. Because of the Armenian occupa­tion, Azerbaijan was able to con­trol only partially its international border with Armenia. At the same time, neither delimitation nor demarcation processes have been implemented between these two states over the years.

After the Second Karabakh War and the subsequent Moscow‑brokered trilateral statement of November 10th, 2020, when the seven districts adjacent to former NKAO previously occupied by Armenia fell back under Azerbaijan’s control, this section of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan returned to its previous, Soviet geography. Thus, the Armenian‑ Azerbaijani international border now borders the Syunik, Vayots Dzor and Gegharkunik provinces of Armenia and the Zangilan, Gubadli, Lachin, and Kalbajar dis­tricts of Azerbaijan. However, it is still difficult for local Armenians to read­just to this new reality and reconcile themselves to this new landscape.

In fact, there have been recent tensions along the Armenian‑ Azerbaijani international border. The situation was exacerbated on May 12th, 2021, when the Arme­nian side accused Azerbaijan of de­ploying hundreds of troops on the eastern border of Armenia around the Karagol/Sev lake area; how­ever, the Azerbaijani side has de­nied crossing the border, stating that its forces were only defending their sovereign territory and that Azerbaijan was restoring its interna­tionally recognized borders.

Commenting on this border inci­dent, Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry spokesperson Leyla Abdullayeva has stressed that Azerbaijan merely con­tinues to strengthen its border pro­tection system within the framework of the country’s territorial integrity, adding that this process is performed based on maps defining the bor­derline between the two countries, which the Armenian side also has. Abdullayeva further noted that any disagreements between the parties on border issues should be resolved by political and diplomatic means.

However, for more than a month the Armenian side has tried to po­liticize these border tensions as well as aggravate the situation further by various provocative acts and statements. For example, on several occasions Pashinyan has appealed to the CSTO to hold consultations on this issue (in doing so, he cited Article 2 of the organization’s Treaty), as well as a number of other heads of state.

Interestingly, the CSTO’s re­sponse has been quite restrained: no support has so far been forth­coming to Yerevan’s position, notwithstanding the fact that Armenia, unlike Azerbaijan, is a member state of this military al­liance. On the other hand, countries such as France have called for Armenia’s territorial integrity to be respected and for Azerbaijan to pull back its troops.

In contrast, Russia had pro­posed setting up a joint Armenian‑ Azerbaijani commission on the delimitation and demarcation of borders, with the participation of Russia as a consultant or medi­ator. However, Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, has said that demar­cation work could not start until Azerbaijani troops leave what he termed Armenian territory. On the other hand, Azerbaijan backs Russia’s proposal to establish a trilateral commission on the de­limitation and demarcation of the Azerbaijani‑Armenian border, as Azerbaijan’s Prime Minister Ali Asadov made clear at the meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of Government that took place on May 28th, 2021, in Minsk.

One day earlier, the Azerbai­jani Defense Ministry an­nounced that it had detained six Armenian servicemen near the village of Yukhary Ayrim in the Kalbajar district. These soldiers stand accused of trying to mine supply routes leading to the po­sitions of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces deployed at the state border with Armenia. The Armenian Defense Ministry, in its turn, con­firmed that six of its soldiers had been taken prisoner, but empha­sized that they were trying to carry out engineering work in the border area of the Gegharkunik prov­ince of Armenia. At the same time, Pashinyan urged international ob­servers to be sent from Russia or other OSCE Minsk Group countries to this section of Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan.

On June 1st, 2021, another provocation was prevented by Azerbaijani Armed Forces when about 40 Armenian soldiers pene­trated into Azerbaijan’s territory near the village Armudlu of the Kalbajar district. With no use of weaponry, they were immediately driven back from the territory of Azerbaijan.

These and similar developments showcase that, perhaps, there are certain political circles in Armenia that are interested in causing prov­ocations in the areas bordering Azerbaijan in order to increase tensions and internationalize the issue of delineating the Armenian‑ Azerbaijani border. At the same time, it is clear that this issue be­came even more complicated due to the electoral campaign in Armenia.

Here we can refer to a letter sent to UN Secretary‑General Guterres by Azerbaijan’s Permanent Represen­tative to the United Nations Yashar Aliyev on June 7th, 2021. Therein, the Azerbaijani diplomat indicates that Baku and Yerevan have been working to clarify the borderline between the two states based on relevant official maps. This process, he continued, is carried out through direct technical contacts between the parties and with the participation of border services, as a result of which border issues in the liberated Gubadli, Kalbajar, and Zangilan districts have been resolved. Furthermore, the letter goes on to say, even after the joint demarcation of the border in those geographies, Azerbaijan allows Armenian citizens to use the Goris‑Kafan highway, part of which passes through the territory of Azerbaijan. Against this background, it seems highly likely that Armenia’s provoca­tive campaign in the Karagol/Sev lake area is mainly aimed at fur­thering domestic political goals in Armenia’s pre‑election process.

Detainees

The third security challenge revolves around the situa­tion regarding Armenian detainees remaining in Azerbaijan’s custody. Unfortunately, due to the misrep­resentation and distortion of facts by the Armenian government, this issue has not been perceived clearly and objectively by the international community to date.

Article 8 of the Moscow‑brokered trilateral statement of November 10th, 2020, that ended the Second Karabakh War clearly states that the “exchange of prisoners of war and other detainees and bodies of the dead shall be carried out.” Since that time, in accordance with its obligations under this agreement, Azerbaijan has released and repatri­ated more than 70 Armenians in its custody who were entitled to POW status. Azerbaijan also found and handed over to the Armenian side the bodies of nearly 1,600 Arme­nian soldiers. However, Armenia has not yet released information on the whereabouts of close to 4,000 Azerbaijanis who went missing during the First Karabakh War.

On the other hand, in the period after the trilateral statement was signed, various Armenian sabotage groups have tried to cross illegally into Azerbaijan with the aim of engaging in sabotage and terrorist activities. One of such groups, consisting of 62 Armenian citizens, was detained on December 13th, 2020, as a re­sult of a joint anti‑terror operation conducted by Azerbaijan’s State Security Service and its Ministry of Defense. Prior to its capture, this group had been suspected of com­mitting a series of terrorist attacks against Azerbaijani military ser­vicemen and civilians in the coun­try’s Khojavend district, causing the deaths of four servicemen and inflicting serious injuries on one civilian. Of these 62 saboteurs, 14 were charged under the relevant articles of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan, and the indictment approved by the country’s Deputy Prosecutor General was sent to court for consideration. In addi­tion, a criminal investigation has been completed against 13 other suspected members of this illegal armed group and has also been sent to the court in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, as a humanitarian ges­ture, Azerbaijan released and repa­triated first ten then an additional four members of this group back to Armenia.

However, provocations along the Armenian‑Azerbaijani interna­tional border have continued: re­connaissance‑sabotage groups were sent to the territory of Azerbaijan by Armenia on May 27th, 2021, and then again on June 1st, 2021. While six Armenian servicemen from two reconnaissance‑sabotage groups were detained while planting mines on May 27th, 2021, 40 Armenian servicemen who were trying to in­filtrate into Azerbaijani territory were, as mentioned previously, immediately driven back by the Azerbaijani Army with no use of weaponry on June 1st, 2021.

In addition, the court convicted an ethnic‑Armenian citizen of Leb­anon who had been charged on three counts under the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan: participation of a mercenary in a military con­flict or military operation (article 114.3); terrorism by a group of per­sons, organized group or criminal organization (article 214.2.1); and illegal crossing of the state border (article 318.2). In imposing its 20‑ year sentence, the court indicated he will serve five years in prison before being transfered to a maxi­mum‑security correctional facility for the remainder of his incarcera­tion. Over the course of the inves­tigation it was revealed that the ac­cused had accepted to take part in military operations as a mercenary in the de‑occupied territories of Azerbaijan in exchange for $2,500, together with other mercenaries.