The Rising Significance of the Middle Corridor
The Russo‑Ukrainian war has affected global container traffic flows more profoundly than any other recent crisis. A series of West‑led sanctions and export restrictions imposed on Moscow has forced logistics companies to avoid shipping consignments via Russia’s Northern Corridor. At the same time, the disruption of operations through the Trans‑Siberian transit line has opened up new avenues for wide‑ranging cooperation along the emerging Trans‑Eurasian transport and trade corridors.
The current geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe gives an additional impetus to what countries like Türkiye officially call the Trans‑Caspian East‑West‑Middle Corridor Initiative as well as to a set of containerized rail freight transport networks that traverse Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Anatolia whilst circumventing Russian territory. This alternative multimodal cross‑regional path—widely known as the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route (TITR)— could help ease current logistics woes and begin a new chapter in terms of interconnectivity across the Euro‑Asian transportation networks, as global freight flows struggle to pick up speed in the wake of heavy economic sanctions on Kremlin.
The Russo‑Ukrainian war has affected global container traffic flows more profoundly than any other recent crisis.
The major actors of the region— particularly Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan—have striven lately to foster solid commercial and economic ties within the wider framework of the Middle Corridor, thereby aiming to attract more transit and foreign trade cargo to this supply route. Under the stated initiative, a series of important intergovernmental deals have already been inked to enhance the capacity of the Trans‑Caspian route in order to stimulate the container flows from Chinese provinces to European countries and vice versa. The multinational consortiums that facilitate multilateral institutional development among involved states appear to strongly contribute to the long‑term potential and sustainability of the Middle Corridor’s development pathway.
The idea of redirecting the containerized cargo flows away from the northern route to the southerly direction is not a new notion at all; in fact, it predates the onset of the conflict over Ukraine by a couple of decades.
The idea of redirecting the containerized cargo flows away from the northern route to the southerly direction is not a new notion at all; in fact, it predates the onset of the conflict over Ukraine by a couple of decades. Thanks to substantive financial support and extensive technical assistance provided by the EU‑led Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) program (established in 1993), leading regional actors have constantly devoted significant attention to the establishment of alternative overland commercial connections. This has led to the development of functional, integrated freight railway networks between Europe and Asia beyond the territory of the Russian Federation.
In light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, transnational cooperation in the transportation and logistics sectors has become more important than ever. Indeed, prior to the war, attempts by Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan at staking a place in the ambitious, China‑led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has allowed the Middle Corridor to increasingly gain momentum, giving it the potential for more collaborative initiatives. Even though relatively little progress has been achieved in the harmonization and simplification of customs documentation and procedures via the aforementioned initiatives, the optimization of this multimodal transit corridor as a viable passageway has become one of the top foreign policy priorities for all relevant actors in light of Russia’s increasing isolation due to the imposition of the West‑led sanctions and export restrictions regime.
However, despite a set of strategic opportunities and some positive developments, major stakeholders of this connectivity and logistics channel have an urgent task before them: to devise comprehensive strategies to effectively overcome political, economic, technical, financial, and security challenges at both domestic and international levels.
Baku’s Role
Azerbaijan has persistently focused on developing the trade potential of the Trans‑Caspian route by constructing sophisticated logistics and transport facilities such as railway lines, highways, and seaports in the wake of massive development efforts both domestically and internationally. In the context of the restoration of the historic Silk Road, the immense development of trade and transportation links—particularly rail and maritime connections that promote intercontinental trade along the east‑west dimension—is a key component of Baku’s long‑term socio‑economic development strategy.
Needless to say, the Azerbaijani government proactively seeks to diversify its economy in order to minimize the country’s heavy reliance on income generated by its hydrocarbon industry. It is doing this by concentrating on increasing the country’s transit capacity in managing trans‑Eurasian rail shipments.
Over the past couple of years, Baku has been looking for areas of cooperation in a manner that could improve the interconnectivity of the country to catalyze its non‑hydrocarbon sector development. Based on multilateral treaties, various transportation and logistics projects across the country have previously been technically and financially supported by numerous international financial institutions (IFI), such as the Asian D e v e l o p m e n t Bank (ADB), The World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Beyond these IFIs, the $40 billion Silk Road Fund—a Chinese financial institution dedicated to providing financing to infrastructure projects in the countries located along BRI’s economic corridors—has lately indicated its intention to invest primarily in the transportation sector across Azerbaijan.
That being said, the Azerbaijani government had already commenced developing nationwide infrastructure projects even before receiving international attention. Indeed, the accommodation of growing transit traffic from various markets needs large‑scale advanced facilities. Consequently, the state leadership utilized multilateral transport projects involving more foreign countries and attracting investments.
Notably, the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Kars railway (BTK) and the Port of Baku, located on the Caspian Sea coast (also referred as the Port of Alat or the Baku International Sea Trade Port), can be presented as an indication of transportation and logistics infrastructure development in the region.
In collaboration with Türkiye and Georgia, the long‑awaited BTK became operational in 2017, thereby establishing a new transit linkage along the Silk Road region’s Middle Corridor via Azerbaijan. This region‑wide line is designed to carry an initial annual volume of 6.5 million tons and one million passengers, setting a long‑term target of 17 million tons of freight and three million passengers annually in the next stage of its operation. Stretching over 800 kilometers, the intra‑regional project is intended to further integrate the region’s countries and open up new direct, land‑based transit channels between the EU and China.
Another prominent project is the Port of Baku, inaugurated in 2016 and located at the western end of the trans‑Caspian segment of the TITR, having an annual capacity of 15 million tons of cargo, including up to 100,000 containers per year. When fully completed, it will have an annual throughput capacity to process up to 25 million tons of general cargo and 1 million containers in total.
To achieve the expansion of transit opportunities, Baku has made tremendous efforts to transform the Port of Baku into a multi‑purpose international seaport in the wider Caspian basin by building proper supportive facilities to enlarge container handling ability and establishing a free trade zone next to it in order to facilitate operations for individual importers, exporters, and freight forwarders. The first roll‑on/ roll‑off (ro‑ro) cargo terminal was put in service in 2018. Apart from that, the Port of Baku’s authorities have already reached a consensus with the executives of transportation agencies from Kazakhstan and Türkiye to jointly develop its transshipment terminal facilities and enhance the cargo storage capacity of the largest and most promising seaport in the Caspian Sea, as part of the cooperation efforts undertaken within the context of the Middle Corridor.
In collaboration with partner countries, the Port of Baku also plans to launch new logistics bases for conducting multiple operations simultaneously. For instance, the construction of parking lots for trucks (TIR park) together with containerization facilities, as well as new terminals for accumulating bulk cargo and warehouses for handling mineral fertilizer, will be completed by the end of 2022.
All in all, Azerbaijan hopes to increase the strategic significance of the Port of Baku in the world of international shipping through an immense, government‑backed modernization and development strategy.
The Alat Free Economic Zone (AFEZ), currently under development, is another case in point. The establishment of AFEZ is projected to create an investor‑friendly business environment to largely meet the needs and requirements of overseas firms based on international standards and practices. The construction of critical infrastructure that will contribute to the optimization of this economic zone’s management and operations is in full swing.
However, Azerbaijan is not the only transit state initiating transportation and logistics projects in the Caspian basin that intends to attract international cargo shipments. While the Caspian Sea is becoming more containerized, other Caspian littoral states like Russia (the ports of Makhachkala, Astrakhan, Olya, and Lagan), Kazakhstan (the ports of Kuryk and Aktau), and Turkmenistan (Turkmenbashi International Seaport) are energetically working on either constructing new transportation ports or upgrading existing terminal facilities to improve the transshipment capacity. As a result, several Chinese and Iranian companies have already indicated an interest in investing in Caspian seaports.
There is a further promising intra‑regional transit infrastructure project on the horizon: the Zangezur Corridor, which came to light as a consequence of the terms that ended the Second Karabakh War. This overland linkage is a part of a package of transport projects that is meant to uninterruptedly reconnect mainland Azerbaijan to its decades‑long isolated Nakhchivan exclave and thence on to Türkiye by traversing the Syunik province in southern Armenia.
The concrete idea of unblocking the previously terminated Soviet‑era rail lines by implementing the Zangezur Corridor initiative dates back to late 2020. As a condition of the 10 November 2020 agreement, all economic and transport links in the region are to be restored. Despite some skepticism about the realization of this plan due to Yerevan’s ambiguous position on opening it up, the realization of the Zangezur Corridor would create competitive advantages for interconnectivity across the Middle Corridor. Furthermore, considering its potential economic significance within the regional political configuration, the development of such a new trade and communications link, and its subsequent integration into mainstream global trade networks, would greatly contribute to the formation of a more peaceful regional security environment in the postwar period.
In addition to strategic investments in its land and sea‑based robust physical infrastructure, Azerbaijan has been continuously investing in digital infrastructure and emerging technologies to enhance the variety of logistics services, upgrade domestic communication infrastructure, eliminate the digital barriers to cross‑border data flows, and develop better measures of the digital economy and trade. By embracing all aspects of digitalization, Azerbaijan intends to accelerate the process of transforming itself into a transnational digital hub along the Asia‑European telecommunication corridor.
Along with hard infrastructure, the digitalization and automation of the entire transport route is key for the sustainable implementation of the Middle Corridor.
Along with hard infrastructure, the digitalization and automation of the entire transport route is key for the sustainable implementation of the Middle Corridor. The widespread diffusion of adequate technologies that are designed to integrate multiple services to automate tasks and workflows throughout that trade route can highly contribute to building more connected, optimized, synchronized, secure, and digitized border crossings and customs ecosystems. In this regard, in 2019, Azerbaijan’s State Customs Committee reached an agreement with Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei over the modernization and automation of its entire customs system through the implementation of a “single window” system. In addition, on 22 July 2022 Azerbaijan officially launched a unified center for transit freight management designed to simplify and digitalize border crossing procedures and transit operations through the application of a “single dispatch” method. All this is part and parcel of Baku’s extensive efforts to optimize the Middle Corridor.
The aforementioned projects are expected to translate into a knowledge‑based and internationally competitive economy as well as boost transregional trade, investment, and cultural interactivity. These will undoubtedly have implications for the overall development of the region. In this respect, Azerbaijan and several other regional countries are already engaged constructively under Middle Corridor deals that tend to firmly stimulate regional market connectivity and commercial cooperation.
Considering the significance of transport projects, the construction of multiple large‑scale logistics and transit facilities along the corridor should help usher in a new era of transregional transportation and close the gap in market connectivity.
Moreover, Baku has been planning to integrate all its freight transportation projects with the Belt and Road Initiative. Following BRI’s launch in 2013, both bilateral cooperation and regional integration processes between China and Azerbaijan have accelerated dramatically. Specifically, several official visits by President Ilham Aliyev to Beijing have turned out to be quite productive, resulting in several high‑profile follow up meetings.
Most importantly, besides cementing friendly political and commercial ties, the parties have agreed to put their extensive efforts into systematically developing BRI’s inland routes by signing a Memorandum of Understanding on the Economic Belt of the Silk Road in 2015. This, in turn, resulted in the signing of several crucially important documents between the two countries’ various ministries setting up broad terms for transnational cooperation in numerous fields during the Second Belt and Road International Forum held in Beijing in 2019. During this event, a document to create an Asia‑Europe telecommunications corridor within the framework of the Azerbaijan Digital Hub program was also signed between AzerTelecom and China Telecom. Its aim is to maximize opportunities to foster cooperation and coordination in dealing with cross‑border internet traffic as well as to develop a digital telecommunications corridor between the continents.
Hence, Baku’s multilateral transportation policy focuses extensively on expanding multinational cooperation in the transportation and logistics spheres, opening new long‑term opportunities for the development of the Trans‑Caspian route in the immediate future.
Integration, Construction, Optimization
Over the past decade, regional actors (i.e., Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) have been actively involved in the process of developing and becoming key political and economic actors in the formation of an alternative land‑based connections between China and the EU. Accordingly, in November 2013, the railway authorities of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan signed a document establishing a Coordination Committee for the development of TITR. Stretching from China to Europe, TITR is a 6,500‑kilometer‑long transport and trade route comprising intermodal transit and logistics networks that are expected to facilitate cross‑continental container traffic from east to west.
Three years later, the initiators of this project came to a consensus on establishing the International Association of the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route in Baku, offering an economically viable alternative passage for the global commercial network. Several months later, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Ukraine consented to implement a competitive tariff policy for cargo shipping to reduce freight costs and increase the number of rail services for international logistics companies shipping via this transport channel by signing a quadrilateral declaration. The multinational consortiums brought together shipping companies from the aforementioned transit states in order to make transportation cheaper, easier, and faster via the Trans‑Caspian route by improving freight forwarding services. Türkiye’s decision to align itself with TITR in 2018 was hailed as a prominent milestone in the implementation of the Middle Corridor.
The state leaderships of the foregoing countries are still playing significant roles in supporting multimodal initiatives through multi‑party agreements to unlock TITR’s transit and trade potential. A further opportunity arose for them in early 2022, owing to the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine—namely,
Following the disruption of supply chains due to the onset of the West‑led sanctions and export restrictions regime against Russia, senior representatives of TITR members conducted a number of high‑level meetings aimed at leading the way to promote further cooperation in the transit sector along the Trans‑Caspian route. As a result, numerous international deals have been signed regarding increased cooperation in the context of Asia‑Europe connectivity, ranging from transportation and logistics to high‑tech development and physical investment.
For instance, on 10 March 2022, senior officials from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan announced the establishment of a joint venture to intensify cargo flows along the Trans‑Caspian Route under the long‑term development strategy of the Middle Corridor. Two days later, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia reached a similar agreement to boost the capacity and enhance the accuracy of TITR by bolstering the development of an integrated technological solution for the smooth transportation process through this supply route. In other words, this deal is meant to automate logistics services and facilitate effective border crossings, thus ensuring the more productive management of transit operations. Later that month, a quadrilateral declaration on the Trans‑Caspian East‑West Middle Corridor was inked by Georgia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Kazakhstan to strengthen their shared transit potential and stimulate their integration into the global transport system, ensuring stable growth in transit cargo flows along the given path.
Furthermore, a recent major agreement covering all aspects of technical improvements to the Port of Baku was signed with the Albayrak Group of Türkiye on 15 July 2022. The document sets to substantially improve the management and operational capabilities of the seaport to achieve efficient planning and control of cargo loading and unloading processes.
Similarly, on 12 April 2022, Kazakhstan Railways JSC and Azerbaijan Railways CJSC signed a bilateral document on cooperation in the field of logistics at a meeting in Baku, where the parties also conducted brief discussions on the systematic development of TITR through synchronized joint operations.
To this can be added the results of a recent meeting involving the Azerbaijani, Georgian, and Turkish ministers of transport, which took place in Tbilisi on 23 August 2022. There, talks took place on the formulation of a single tariff policy for the BTK and the further development of the Middle Corridor. The ministers also discussed an initial plan for launching a regular container block train between the Georgian Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi and the Port of Baku on the basis of a smooth schedules‑coordination plan and tariffs unification process.
All this recent activity is a positive reflection of the Middle Corridor countries’ well‑structured foreign policy decisions towards fostering joint strategic initiatives, sustaining the diplomatic and institutional mechanisms whilst paving the way for increased cooperation across the broader region.
Being one of the main initiators of the interconnectivity projects, Türkiye has been on the lookout for more cooperation with peripheral nations to fully exploit TITR’s export and transit potential as well as to develop eastward export outlets. As part of the revitalization of the historic Silk Road within its Caravanserai project that it introduced in 2008, Ankara has been trying to facilitate multilateral cooperation in transportation and trade spheres along the Middle Corridor.
Indeed, experiencing a debt and currency crisis with serious economic and social repercussions has prompted Türkiye to encourage the deepening of friendly ties in order to eliminate potential barriers, bureaucratic hurdles, and capacity limitations that are hindering communication between regional states. On 27 June 2022, at the initiative of Ankara, the foreign ministers and transport ministers of Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan agreed to forge long‑term trilateral cooperation over the development of such a route by signing a protocol to establish an intergovernmental working group in Baku. In addition to key agenda items, the importance of the implementation of the Zangezur Corridor was also pointedly underlined during this tripartite ministerial meeting.
The resulting Baku Declaration is projected to play a pivotal role in consolidating stronger diplomatic ties among these three major Turkic countries and therefore help cultivate intra‑regional economic bonds for the foreseeable future. Most importantly, on 11 May 2022, due to increased international demand for the Middle Corridor, representatives of the leading logistic agencies of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Kazakhstan, and Georgia gathered together in Ankara to provide adequate measures for maintaining close coordination and mutual communication within the scope of the Middle Corridor, exploring further possibilities for cooperation in the transportation sector. The quadrilateral meeting resulted in the initiation of a formal action plan for enhancing the competitiveness of this route in comparison with alternative trade corridors.
In fact, the growing involvement of Türkiye in the development of the Middle Corridor comes amid the context of increasingly friendly relations with the Asian countries under Ankara’s Asia Anew Initiative. By launching this multidimensional initiative, Ankara aims to diversify its diplomatic ties by coordinating institutional mechanisms to further promote the development of political, commercial, cultural, and educational bonds on a larger scale.
In addition to the Asia Anew Initiative, the Turkic‑speaking countries maintain high‑level relations under the roof of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Ankara has been active in securing Middle Corridor‑related agreements with the relevant Turkic states through the OTS.
For instance, the transport ministers of OTS member states reached an agreement to sign a “Common Cooperation Protocol,” and they also established a Coordination Council to deliver practical solutions for problems that may arise between these countries in the field of transportation and logistics. Another example is the sister ports agreement made between the ports of Baku (Azerbaijan), Aktau (Kazakhstan), and Samsun (Türkiye), which is designed to encourage more trade and business opportunities between them. This tripartite deal includes putting in place a set of policies that would enable them to share with each other best practices and the latest industry developments on port planning and management.
Signing an agreement on what was termed “international combined freight transportation” within the OTS framework was also discussed during its summit held in Istanbul in November 2021. The resulting Istanbul Declaration qualified this agreement as an important step toward providing crucial measures for the simplification of administrative procedures and, in turn, the optimization of transport operations across the TITR.
Along with peripheral countries, Türkiye has cemented ties with Beijing as well. An important document in this context was signed in November 2015 during the G20 Summit in Antalya, titled “Memorandum of Understanding on Aligning the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor Initiative.”
All these initiatives envisage setting out a roadmap for stronger ties and creating favorable conditions to advance the macroeconomic interests of the states located along the Middle Corridor, in both the short and long run. Aside from pursuing dynamic foreign policy and soft power initiatives, Türkiye is also increasingly consolidating its pivotal role in terms of constructing multi‑purpose transportation infrastructure projects across the country.
In that sense, the intercontinental suspension bridges built over important waterways such as the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge in Istanbul (2016), the Osmangazi Bridge in Izmit (2016), the Dardanelles Bridge in Çanakkale (2022), and the Marmaray and Eurasia subsea tunnels, constructed underneath the strategically important juncture of the Bosporus strait in 2013 and 2016, respectively, are testaments to Ankara’s extensive efforts and ambitions to revive the ancient Silk Road.
A thorough modernization plan of the existing domestic railway system is also considered one of the core elements of Ankara’s development strategy, which targets the strengthening of its transportation and logistics sectors countrywide. To that end, negotiations have already been conducted with Siemens since 2018, with investments reportedly amounting to around $40 billion. Beyond that, the expansion of nationwide highspeed rail lines in Türkiye, relying heavily on Chinese infrastructure loans, has been coming to the table from time to time, making relatively little progress due to disagreement over the terms of the contract. Therefore, the Turkish government is also focusing on the enhancement of domestic coastal ports like Filyos (Black Sea), Çandarli (Aegean Sea), and Mersin (Mediterranean Sea) in order to unlock the maritime portion of the Middle Corridor towards European seaports.
All in all, the active engagement of Ankara is crucial for the realization of the Middle Corridor, given Türkiye’s geostrategic importance along the Trans‑Caspian route.
Since the beginning of the Russo‑Ukrainian war, avoiding transport shipping through sanctions‑battered Russia and prioritizing the development of the Trans‑Caspian route has been a particular concern for Kazakhstan, as well. The world’s largest landlocked country—with large proven hydrocarbon resources that are mainly exported to the EU, China, Russia, and Türkiye—has traditionally transported these and other commodities via its northern neighbor.
Following the adoption of the West‑led sanctions and export restrictions regime against Russia, Astana took immediate steps toward increasing the potential of the Trans‑Caspian route to safely deliver its crude oil and grain shipments to the global market. For its crude exports, Kazakhstan has looked to access the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), an international energy project that carries crude oil from Caspian oilfields across Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to the Mediterranean coastal ports. It accelerated its plans in reaction to the suspension of operations in the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, which is regularly used to export Kazakh oil to European markets via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), where Russian state‑owned company Transneft holds the biggest share.
As a consequence of changing dynamics, the past few months have seen an upsurge in the development of relationships involving Astana, Baku, and Ankara. Two examples suffice for present purposes. A two‑day official visit of incumbent Kazakh president Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev to Ankara in mid‑ May 2022 helped consolidate bilateral cooperative relations, allowing the parties to strengthen their transport and transit partnership and paving the way towards making better use of the potential of the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route. Also, while holding a phone call with the President of the European Council Charles Michel a few months ago, Tokayev called on the EU to pursue common strategic goals by forging cooperation over developing alternative transcontinental trade corridors, including TITR.
Astana’s attempts have also yielded fruitful results with respect to building friendly ties and securing agreements with the major Western logistics firms that operate along the east‑west dimension. Given the steady rise in demand, on 16 March 2022, the Finnish logistics company Nurminen Logistics consented to closely cooperate with Kazakhstan Railways by inking a document on realizing the rapid commercialization of the TITR. Under this new deal, the parties successfully conducted initial tests by launching rail wagons that traversed Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia before reaching Central Europe between April and June 2022. In September 2022, a revamped commercial rail service was launched, thereby intensifying solid cooperation on the Sino‑European route.
Against this backdrop, the Austrian‑backed international transport and logistics company Gebrüder Weissrganizes is also considering an expansion of the number of transport links to keep pace with skyrocketing demand along the Middle Corridor by prioritizing its Almaty Center as a main regional hub to handle cross‑border cargo traffic efficiently. Moreover, the Danish shipping company Maersk already started developing its own Trans‑Caspian logistics route in collaboration with its regional partners back in March 2022, while its first departure from China took place one month later. Other international shipping companies that offer integrated container logistics and supply chain services are presently raising the prospect of developing supply routes across the Middle Corridor, hoping to increase their revenues from east‑west cargo shipments.
The deepening of bilateral ties between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is another positive trend that is closely related to the further improvement of the Middle Corridor. In this regard, Tokayev’s recent state visit to Baku, undertaken at the invitation of his Azerbaijani counterpart Aliyev on 24 August 2022, illustrates the former’s concerted attempts to expand bilateral cooperation with its main western neighbor: Azerbaijan occupies a unique geostrategic position for Kazakhstan’s westward exports, in light of the growing value of the TITR. During this presidential visit, particular agreements were signed in the fields of transportation, energy, trade, railway, aerospace, and digital development. This was done within the framework of the “Comprehensive Program on the Development of Cooperation between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2022‑2026,” which the two presidents signed during Tokayev’s state visit to Baku.
The leaders of the region’s leading states have clearly grasped that the focal point of the Middle Corridor is the reinforcement of the development of competitive supply channels through close intergovernmental collaboration and commitment.
Strategically, Astana’s zeal in facilitating communications and building friendly ties with the directly concerned states of the Middle Corridor is based on the policy that longstanding multilateral alliances might be key for unlocking regional trade opportunities and transport connectivity of the Greater Caspian region. Constructing large‑scale, land‑based traffic networks that are intended to facilitate container and commodity transport from east to west throughout the implementation of the “Nurly Zhol State Infrastructure Development Program for 2020‑2025” is also a remarkable reflection of Kazakhstan’s political elites toward introducing well‑developed alternative transit gateways.
In short, the leaders of the region’s leading states have clearly grasped that the focal point of the Middle Corridor is the reinforcement of the development of competitive supply channels through close intergovernmental collaboration and commitment.
Apart from the intensified efforts of regional players, China has likewise shown growing interest to reinforce the capacity of alternative overland transit corridors. This predates any recent geopolitical tumults by several decades: the initial agreement between Baku and Beijing concerning interconnectivity was signed in the early 2000s, outlining plans to closely collaborate in the field of transportation.
Aliyev and his then‑Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, reached a bilateral agreement for rail network development during the former’s first state visit to China in 2005. Another notable deal was a memorandum of cooperation signed between the International Association of the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route, China Communications and Transportation Association, and the Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping CJSC on 14 June 2017. Later that year, during the Twelfth China International Logistics and Transportation Fair, China’s Shenzhen Logistics and Supply Chain Management Association and the International Association of Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route also inked a memorandum of understanding to foster commercial and economic cooperation to prioritize and facilitate the flow of cargos transported via TITR.
In addition to the aforementioned documents, Azerbaijan Railways’ bilateral agreement on container transportation with China’s Xi’an Continental Bridge International Logistics Company, which came into force in 2019, is anticipated to create a smoother operational environment along TITR within the framework of BRI. As noted earlier, Baku’s decision to manifest active support for Beijing’s BRI plans was seen as a significant commitment in the direction of deepening bilateral political and economic bonds, which in turn would improve the possibility of China’s potential involvement in developing the Trans‑Caspian route within BRI’s China‑Central Asia‑West Asia Economic Corridor (one of BRI’s six economic and transportation corridors).
Aside from such mutually‑beneficial commercial deals, China’s substantive financial allocations are commonly found in transportation infrastructure projects constructed along this cross‑regional path. These projects are also in line with Beijing’s decade‑long business and transport diversification policies.
For instance, China has, thus far, provided funding of around $70 million for the Port of Baku and delivered technical equipment worth about $2 million. Additionally, major Chinese international seaports such as those located in Guangzhou and Lianyungang, as well as China’s multinational conglomerate COSCO Shipping, separately inked documents in 2018 with the Port of Baku for expanding international cooperation. Moreover, up to 30 of its employees have already participated in government‑sponsored professional development programs by being involved in technical training and courses during study trips of various lengths in China.
Hence, in light of BRI deals, commercial partnerships and political ties involving China and Azerbaijan have been elevated to historically unprecedented levels. As Baku still believes it has more leeway to do deals with the Chinese, the scale of collaborative strategic initiatives is henceforth likely to grow exponentially. This is expected to significantly increase the levels of trade turnover along the Middle Corridor in the coming years. Rising Sino‑Azerbaijani relations will foster longstanding technical partnerships and constitute the core of transnational cooperation platforms as part of a broader assistance and investment strategy that China offers within the framework of BRI.
Similarly, the adaptation of TITR to new geo‑economic realities has become a first‑tier topic in EU policymaking circles. Historically, Brussels has been one of the main promoters of alternative intercontinental transit channels. It has thus embarked on various regional integration programs as a means to realize market integration and economic cooperation on its terms. Negotiations over the establishment of this new multimodal corridor date back to the early 1990s. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the EU‑backed TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia Program)—an international transport program involving the EU and 12 member states of the Eastern European, Caucasus, and Central Asian regions—laid the initial institutional and infrastructural foundation for this network of alternative transport arteries that were designed at the onset to bypass entirely Russian territory for international freight transportation.
Seeing the feasibility of such intermodal transportation routes, the EU allocated funds and delivered financial incentives for upgrading logistics distribution channels across the Middle Corridor. With TITR emerging as a reliable transit passageway across the Silk Road region, the EU’s continued engagement in the development of the corridor is vitally important to effectively tie international cargo shipments into EU transportation flows through this corridor.
Policymakers from the EU and its member states now attach great importance to the further development of their relations with their counterparts from Middle Corridor countries, demonstrating a common will to cooperate in the fields of transportation and logistics.
Policymakers from the EU and its member states now attach great importance to the further development of their relations with their counterparts from Middle Corridor countries, demonstrating a common will to cooperate in the fields of transportation and logistics. In this respect, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, speaking in Baku on 18 July 2022, stressed the importance of the Port of Baku as a logistic and transit hub connecting the littoral states of the Caspian Sea.
The further prospects of this alternative overland trade route were also the main subject of discussion on transport cooperation that was conducted in Brussels on 15 June 2022 between high‑ranking officials of the EU’s Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), Kazakhstan Railways JSC, and the International Association of the Trans‑Caspian International Transport Route. The attendance of representatives of prominent international organizations and financial institutions (UN, OSCE, EIB, EBRD, EBRD, OSJD, TMTM, TRACECA, WCO, and others) as well as EU railway associations (Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies, Railfreight, and FERRMED) at this meeting thus came as no surprise, since the multilateral international organizations dealing with transport issues have been eyeing to heighten cooperation with non‑EU partners in the transportation field across the TITR for years.
It thus appears that, in the context of greater geopolitical uncertainties, Brussels in alignment with its partners is keen to gradually and in an orderly manner push forward the development of an economically sustainable Middle Corridor, particularly within the broader framework of the EU Global Gateway strategy.
Unlocking the Potential of the Middle Corridor
For all the states involved— Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Georgia, Kazakhstan, China, plus the EU— the Middle Corridor offers an alternative intermodal transit route that eliminates Russia’s monopoly over east‑west trade. As relations between the West and Russia continue to sour, global demand for the Middle Corridor will rise dramatically, further feeding into other major international players’ urgency to switch transit dependence away from Moscow.
The Middle Corridor is the shortest, cheapest, easiest, and most reliable option for China’s trade with Europe in the wake of current geopolitical uncertainties.
The reorientation of trade and energy routes in order to bypass Russian territories has consistently been the dominant discourse in both Brussels and Beijing over past several decades. The Middle Corridor is the shortest, cheapest, easiest, and most reliable option for China’s trade with Europe in the wake of current geopolitical uncertainties. Consequently, this year has seen a huge volume of freight shipping traversing throughout this trade corridor. For example, a total of 266,300 tons of cargo were transshipped along this route in the first three months of 2022, an increase of over 120 percent compared with the first three months of 2021. Although the Middle Corridor only transports 5 percent of the overall rail cargo traded between China and the EU, there is growing optimism that this transit route might move up to 10 percent of that volume in the near to medium term. Cargo transshipment through TITR is anticipated to grow sixfold in 2022 compared to 2021.
However, despite the core participating states of the Middle Corridor—i.e., Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Kazakhstan, and Georgia—energetically displaying joint efforts to solve supply chain disruptions between Europe and China, there are still numerous difficulties and interrelated hurdles that need to be addressed. Undoubtedly, the Middle Corridor is a strong alternative to other transportation corridors in terms of security, cost, distance, and duration, but freight transportation through this route is, for now, logistically much more complex compared with Russian routes. It requires complex multimodal solutions that involve road, rail, and maritime transport simultaneously. Thus, the development of integrated logistics products and services along this supply route is crucial to enhancing competitiveness. After all, this corridor covers a vast distance and involves several countries: the simplification and streamlining of documentation through higher connectivity will help in raising compliance levels and lead to sustainably transporting growing volume
Compared to its rivals, the Middle Corridor is not a single inland traffic link: containers traveling via this multimodal channel need to cross the borders of up to six countries and cross two seas (the Caspian Sea and then either the Bosporus or the Black Sea), which involves slow and costly vessel services. Utilizing multiple modes of transportation increases the complexity of loading and unloading processes that might cause delays in the passage of consignments.
Considerable amounts of new investments in physical and digital infrastructure will have to be made before bottlenecks can be overcome and market needs can be met.
Despite TITR’s major stakeholders having persistently campaigned for this route, the sustainable integration of the Middle Corridor with the global trade network depends on multiple factors and include financial, technical, and geographical challenges. Considerable amounts of new investments in physical and digital infrastructure will have to be made before bottlenecks can be overcome and market needs can be met. Going forward, the littoral states of the Caspian Sea (particularly Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) still require substantial investment to be able to develop optimally their coastal ports for ensuring smooth cargo flows.
Moreover, the lack of infrastructure development at the Georgian and Turkish Black Sea ports poses considerable obstacles. Besides the question of investment, the successful implementation of the Trans‑Caspian route will also depend on the future political commitment of regional actors. Essentially, friendly bilateral relations among involved states are very relevant to the success of this complicated supply channel. From this perspective, all parties will need to work more collaboratively and continuously in order to achieve the construction of an integrated, cohesive, and efficient intermodal transit corridor.
The adoption of advanced cross‑border collaboration mechanisms, through improved cooperation among the major regional rail freight providers, is a critical process to resolve logistics and trade barriers, thereby achieving host countries’ trade facilitation goals. Moreover, the harmonization of tariffs along the corridor, heightened transparency of customs services, and the simplification and harmonization of regulatory and customs procedures for transit containers are vital to enable further practical measures to be taken for TITR’s further implementation. Therefore, applying an effective tariff policy and reducing the price of integrated services is the key to improving the effectiveness of carriages for foreign cargo forwarders. Indeed, all these require a connected international network and stronger institutional cooperation among the countries and stakeholders involved. Finally, the countries located along the route have to further increase intergovernmental working groups and platforms for enhancing coordination among numerous state institutions within the Middle Corridor framework.
Nevertheless, since the onset of the Russo‑Ukrainian War in February 2022, the initiators of the Trans‑Caspian route have maintained a positive posture for developing this politically reliable and economically viable transportation and trade corridor. Being located at the intersection of the Asian and European continents, the host economies of the Middle Corridor endeavor to position themselves strategically at the center of east‑west trade by exerting maximum efforts to ensure the full implementation of flagship transregional transportation projects.
Policymakers are becoming increasingly aware that they can boost the Middle Corridor’s role as a crucial passageway across the Eurasian land bridge by implementing long‑term incentive pro ‑ grams driven by wide‑ranging consensus and political cooperation. However, addressing the problems outlined above requires a joint effort from the leadership of the host nations of the corridor. Thereafter, it remains to be seen whether the Middle Corridor will be able to be ‑ come a functional alternative to the Northern Corridor in the long run.
Even with its current shortcomings and limitations, however, the Middle Corridor has the potential to serve as an optimal linkage for the Sino‑EU rail connections. While the volume of cargo transported through the Middle Corridor is growing every year, the development of the capacity and the optimization of rail cargo traffic is likely to remain a significant concern for all involved states in the years ahead.
