Transport and Transit Policy of Kazakhstan and the Silk Road Region
Since the emergence of independent states in the post‑Soviet space, it has been predicted that the Silk Road region (i.e., what is usually called core or central Eurasia) could become a global strategic hub, due to both geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions. The region’s mid‑continental position offers great opportunities for its core countries—particularly those located on its Central Asian side. Concomitantly, the region has attracted the attention of various centers of power—both regional and global.
Furthermore, the development of trans‑regional transport networks remains a hot topic, and the issue of communication development is on the agenda of almost all high‑level international meetings. The already popular C5+1 format, in which various regional and world powers offer their cooperation to the Central Asian Five, also contains aspects of transport corridor development.
The success and sustainability of the Middle Corridor is only possible through the development of “strategic knowledge”—i.e., the establishment of an international mechanism for exchanging technologies and ideas among countries of the region.
Indeed, land transport corridors crossing the Silk Road region could create a new reality in the future. Modern logistics and transportation technologies make it possible to connect regions across the continent quickly and reliably. At the same time, states will seek to reduce the effect of non‑physical barriers. This, in turn, will affect the relationship and security of all participants along the these corridors and beyond.
Unlocking Kazakhstan’s Potential
Some countries, like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, occupy a rather advantageous geographic position. Kazakhstan, for instance, borders and is connected by sea routes through the Caspian Sea with major countries and large regional markets. China and Central Asian countries’ bilateral trade has reached $70 billion in 2022, a 40 percent increase compared to 2021. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s multi‑vector policy, aimed at balancing international relations, is clearly justified, both on account of national and regional interests. Only under these conditions will it be possible to rightly determine its future.
Aware of this role, Kazakhstan has taken steps to overcome its once dependent and isolated position. The first of them was the construction of several railroads in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such as: Aksu‑Degelen, Khromtau‑Altynsarino, and Shar‑Ust‑Kamenogorsk. While each of them was designed for internal purposes, all of them had a link to external relations as well. At the same time, Kazakhstan adopted its Concept of State Transport Policy in 2011.
The Aksu‑Degelen railway line connects the country’s north with its eastern regions, linking the regional centers of Pavlodar and Semey. Its launch in 2001 was characterized as a revival of the national economy and the beginning of the establishment of its closed national railway system. Then, with the construction of the Khromtau‑Altynsarino railway in December 2004, a direct connection was established between the Aktobe and Kostanay regions and, in general, between the western and northern regions of Kazakhstan.
This railway line also updated maritime logistics on the east coast of the Caspian Sea in a new way, as transportation via this body of water reduces the cost of exporting Kazakhstani products, such as wheat, to international markets. The costs of transporting ore and minerals from the northern and central regions of Kazakhstan to the port of Aktau were also reduced, allowing direct deliveries to the western regions of the republic.
The commissioning of the Shar‑Ust‑Kamenogorsk railway in 2008 significantly increased the country’s export potential. This railroad line concluded the Kazakhstani national railway network in the northeastern part of the country and produced the shortest exit to the other Central Asian countries, Iran, and Afghanistan. Notably, all of these railway projects were made without crossing into Russian territory.
In 2012, two other railway lines were built in Kazakhstan: in the west from Uzen to the Turkmen border and in the south from Zhetygen to the Chinese border. In 2014, with the completion of the Arkalyk‑Shubarkol and Zhezkazgan‑Beineu lines, the idea of forming an integral North‑South and East‑West railway network was finally realized.
Highways were also developed simultaneously with the railway infrastructure construction. One of the largest projects was the Western Europe‑Western China project. In 2008, Russia and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum on the development of this corridor. In 2015, the highway’s construction became an integral part of the China‑led Belt and Road Initiative. It should be noted that while the Chinese section was built in 2017, the Kazakh section will possibly be completed by 2024. We must also bear in mind that while in 2018 the Russian government approved its “Comprehensive Plan for the Modernization and Expansion of the Mainline Infrastructure” for a period up until 2024, two years later, the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation indicated construction was postponed until 2027.
Kazakhstan plays an important role in developing transport communications and logistics for the Silk Road region due to its geographical location.
As seen, since 2015, the development of land corridors has been integrated into the Nurly Zhol State Infrastructure Development Program. At this stage, the second five‑year plan is ongoing, with 112 infrastructure projects totaling around $14.4 billion to be implemented, of which public financing will account for 68 percent.
The Case of the Silk Road Region
Kazakhstan plays an important role in developing transport communications and logistics for the Silk Road region due to its geographical location. Bordering by land both Russia and China, and by sea both Azerbaijan and Iran, its territory is becoming a natural transit bridge between the major markets of the North, South, East, and West. Its transit opportunities also open up possibilities for neighboring states in Central Asia.
The implementation of land corridors across the Silk Road region exists in a multitude of initiatives put forward by major outside powers, but there is no unified and integrated policy for establishing a transcontinental infrastructure link in the region.
The implementation of land corridors across the Silk Road region exists in a multitude of initiatives put forward by major outside powers, but there is no unified and integrated policy for establishing a transcontinental infrastructure link in the region. In many ways, logistics are localized and fragmented according to the interests of the outside major powers.
In this respect, the region faces several obstacles. The five core Central Asian countries are suboptimally interconnected, which affects their level of mutual trade exchange—their mutual railway connections are also limited.
In general, the existing transport infrastructure across the region is of poor quality and low capacity. Roadside service facilities are underdeveloped, and most of them do not meet the minimum quality of service requirements and cannot fully meet either international transit traffic or domestic demands.
The unlocking of the transport sector’s potential is also hampered by intra‑regional competition. Often, transport and logistics projects implemented by one country do not match the interests of all countries in the region, which must be recognized as counterproductive.
To achieve real benefits from international transportation and transit, coordinated and long‑term work between neighboring countries is required in order to expand the networks of roads, railroads, and air routes; building logistics and transport hubs or dry ports in key areas; and, eventually, the establishment of truly efficient and improved transport corridors.
In this regard, Kazakhstan and other states belonging to the Silk Road region continue seeking further trade and economic cooperation, whereby building an open transport policy is a priority. The region’s states are now in the process of agreeing on shared approaches in various multilateral platforms and establishing free trade and industrial zones at border crossings.
One of these will be the Central Asia International Center for Industrial Cooperation on the Kazakhstan‑Uzbekistan border, which accounts for about 80 percent of all trade in Central Asia. The Kazakh leadership supports alternative directions in the international transport routes of its neighbors and shows an economic interest in implementing railway projects like China‑Kazakhstan‑Uzbekistan and Mazari‑Sharif‑Kabul‑Peshawar.
The connectivity interests of Kazakhstan and the other core Silk Road region countries coincide.
Such an approach is conditioned by concerns with the region’s general development, whereby both the direct participation of investors and the increased capacity of national transport systems are envisaged. It should be mentioned that most of the Western Europe‑Western China highway crosses Kazakhstan’s southern regions, with its major cities located in territorial proximity to both Tashkent and Bishkek. Astana has also called on its partners to use the Kazakhstan‑Turkmenistan‑Iran railway more actively.
Thus, the connectivity interests of Kazakhstan and the other core Silk Road region countries coincide: these come together in a shared interest to integrate their economies into trans‑Eurasian transport corridors, harmonize their development agendas, and establish a stable and reliable transport and communication system to ensure regional security from potential external threats.
Trans‑Caspian Transit
Kazakhstan’s attention is particularly directed in the western direction, namely the transport and logistics opportunities of the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus. Such international processes include progress on the legal definition of the Caspian Sea and strengthening cooperation in the institutional context of the Organization of Turkic States, to which the EU’s economic rapprochement with the Silk Road region has also contributed.
Interest in and the development of the Silk Road region is evident. The South Caucasus has long attracted Central Asian countries—and not only due to the transit of raw materials and energy resources to Türkiye and the European continent. Cross‑regional ties are also seen as a single link in transcontinental West‑East corridors, particularly the Middle Corridor. However, until recent times, the complexity of multimodal transportation and political tensions did not give high competitiveness to the Caspian‑Caucasus route.
Now, the situation is changing. Qualitative changes are taking place in the South Caucasus region. The resolution of the longstanding conflict over Karabakh and the impending signature of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan constitute two sides of the same coin—a historic turning point that represent a gateway to sustainable development. The achievement of peace and the resulting stability will produce an opening of borders, which will in turn result in greater security and prosperity for the citizens of those two countries and perhaps beyond.
Nevertheless, the South Caucasus is becoming a crossroads for the competing interests of influential international actors: Russia, Türkiye, Iran, the United States, and the European Union. Therefore, the diversification of trans‑Caspian and trans‑Caucasian routes may face restrictions for a certain time due to geopolitics.
Movement along the trade corridors of the South Caucasus and Central Asia will gradually gain further momentum and, in the long term, will become the key artery of international exchange between the high‑capacity markets of Europe and Asia.
However, given the profitability of interregional ties, movement along the trade corridors of the South Caucasus and Central Asia will gradually gain further momentum and, in the long term, will become the key artery of international exchange between the high‑capacity markets of Europe and Asia.
Iran’s Motives
Iran is a very promising and, at the same time, quite difficult partner for the region’s countries. For decades, great hopes have been pinned on Iran becoming an economically strong state with developed communications system and extensive transit opportunities to the Middle East and South Asia. In 1996, the northern line of the Trans‑Asian Railway of the East‑West Transport Corridor opened through the Tejen‑Sarahs‑Mashhad railway section, and in 2014, the Kazakhstan‑Turkmenistan‑Iran railroad was put into operation.
However, railway and maritime communications are not fully utilized, even though there are no political contradictions between Tehran and the capitals of the Central Asian republics. The states are united by international organizations such as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). The governments of these countries have many opportunities to develop a constructive dialogue.
The reasons for weak trade and economic relations between Central Asia and West Asia is that these regions are situated in an area of acute global and regional confrontation, in which the interests of Iranian politics are closely intertwined. For a long time, Iran has been fully absorbed in the geopolitical struggle for regional leadership in the Middle East, while Central Asian countries have remained out of its orbit.
But here, too, the situation has begun to turn towards the Silk Road region. Tehran, in its new “turn to the East” paradigm, is looking for measures to attract the attention of the Central Asian states (a one or two South Caucasus ones, as well), improve the security situation, intensify trade and economic relations, and open overland transit deep into the continent.
Particular attention is paid to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with an emphasis on the investment, transport, and communication potential of both countries. In turn, Iran can offer Central Asia its markets and transit opportunities. With the completion of the railway line through Iranian territory from Zahedan to the deep‑water port of Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman, the International Transport Corridor North‑South (INSTC), another branch of which traverses Azerbaijan, will become a very profitable destination and contribute to the development of the Silk Road region in general.
The Eastern Neighbor
China remains the most stable and complicated partner for the region. In addition to trade and economic cooperation, Beijing proposed its comprehensive development program—the Belt and Road Initiative, which has become quite attractive in some quarters.
With an eye on the Silk Road region, cooperation with China is seen as more than just trade and economic exchange. Pairing the Chinese strategic initiative with other global projects such as the Transport Corridor Europe‑Caucasus‑Asia (TRACECA) and the Middle Corridor promises considerable dividends.
The development of the Chinese vector for the countries of Central Asia is the realization of great opportunities. The China‑Central Asia summit held in May 2023 once again confirmed the consistency and safety of this direction. The priorities of cooperation were transport infrastructure, industry, including automotive, oil exports, agriculture, water resources, tourism, cultural exchanges, and regional stability.
The Kazakhstani‑Chinese dialogue has highlighted the key aspects that would activate the international transport corridor. These include the opening of a railway crossing on the Kazakh‑Chinese border, the construction of Kazakhstan’s logistics center in the dry port of Xi’an, which will become the main hub for sending direct container trains to the Silk Road region, Türkiye, the Western Balkans, and the European Union, and the launch of the Ayagoz‑Bakhty rail link in the direction of China.
The Northern Vector
The most developed and branched out transport communications network is the one that connects Kazakhstan with Russia—and its transit opportunities have been widely used to the Black Sea and Baltic ports, to Ukraine, Belarus, and EU member states. This situation was due to a shared history and modern relations within a number of economic integration structures.
However, the events of 2022 dramatically changed the development of this vector. The role and place of Russia in global processes is changing—as is its standing as one of the key political and economic partners of the Central Asian republics. International pressure, the threat of secondary sanctions, the practical cessation of transit traffic, and the disruption of trading, technological, and production chains appear to be long‑term trends.
At the same time, there is a reverse process, as Russia is looking for trade opportunities with Asian countries. In this regard, Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani transit becomes critically important. For example, the Russian leadership is working to develop a number of transport and communication initiatives, including laying a section of the Rasht‑Astara railroad, which would also boost Azerbaijan through the completion of its tranche of an important North‑South transport vector—i.e., a branch of INSTC.
If the situation stabilizes in the long term, the Silk Road region will take a special role in reanimating the economies of the conflicting states (i.e., in the Ukraine theater) in the post‑conflict period. Despite the current antagonism of their relations, common transport system, especially the railroads, will remain the main economic arteries in the vast space of the Silk Road region. This is a fact that cannot simply be ignored.
The Afghan Dilemma
The situation in Afghanistan remains critical due to the international non‑recognition of its new Taliban government. The citizens of Afghanistan are experiencing a humanitarian crisis, and political consultations within the international community and international organizations on a proposal to break the economic isolation of this country are necessary to help the country get on its feet again.
The Central Asian countries could propose the construction of a railway line from Mazari‑Sharif to Herat, which is the most economically rational route, given current conditions. This route would continue to the large Iranian administrative center of Mashhad and become part of INSTC. More could be said on this, but we leave it at that for the moment.
We have also not said anything about the upgraded C5+1 format, which now involves the heads of state of the five Central Asian countries and the U.S. president. The renewed interest for the region shown by its ultimate outside power will need to be taken up another time.
Conclusion
In general, the Silk Road region sees positive joint efforts, which includes closer regional cooperation, perhaps best illustrated by the increase in the number of topics covered by the Consultative Summits of Central Asian Leaders in September 2023, and the inclusion of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev as a guest of honor.
Kazakhstan is currently focusing on expanding cooperation with neighboring countries as a way to intensify the interaction between Asia’s macro‑regions to build a new architecture of connectivity against the backdrop of the current geopolitical situation.
According to recent statements by Kazakhstani officials, the notion of the “great game” is outdated, and instead the concept of the “great gain” should be adopted by all countries to amplify the future of mutually‑beneficial cooperation. This can be interpreted as Kazakhstan’s way of expressing its willingness to act together with the other core countries of the Silk Road region in the name of building a common sustainable future while maintaining balanced relations with all outside major powers.
For this reason, Kazakhstan welcomes any investment to further transform the Middle Corridor into a logistic and economic corridor. From the Central Asian perspective, the success and sustainability of the Middle Corridor is only possible through the development of “strategic knowledge”—i.e., the establishment of an international mechanism for exchanging technologies and ideas among countries of the region.
