Armenia-Türkiye Relations

The Armenian and Turkish people have lived together for centuries in the same geography under various regime types and within various political forms. As countries, Armenia and Türkiye initially established diplomatic relations during the brief period of the first Armenian republic, which corresponded to the nascent years of the Republic of Türkiye. The absorption of Armenia into the Soviet Union put an end to this initial phase. It was only after Armenia regained its independence, in the context of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, that conditions enabling the renewal of state‑to‑state ties were again established.

This essay provides an account of this complicated journey, which has not yet reached its destination.

This essay provides an account of this complicated journey, which has not yet reached its destination. It is intended to serve as an analytic contribution to ongoing efforts by Ankara and Yerevan to normalize bilateral relations within the framework of the Armenia‑Azerbaijan peace process, with which it remains politically preconditioned. This essay also carries an oftentimes implicit subtext—no less important in a certain sense—namely, the role played by Azerbaijan in general and Heydar Aliyev in particular (2023 marks the centenary of his birth and the vigenary of his death) in influencing the development of the Armenia‑Türkiye relationship. 

The Ter‑Petrosyan Period

Armenia regained independence from the Soviet Union with a referendum held on 21 September 1991, with Türkiye recognized the country’s independence on 16 December 1991—one of the first countries to do so. Türkiye even invited Armenia to be a founding member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) with an agreement signed at a summit held in Istanbul on 25 June 1992.

Indeed, months before Yerevan’s declaration of independence, Soviet Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Ashot Yeghiazarian attended the first founding conference of the Black Sea Cooperation Organization held in Ankara in December 1990. Yeghiazarian met with Volkan Vural, Türkiye’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union, during which they discussed the situation in the South Caucasus. Yeghiazarian also invited Vural to visit Armenia, which he accepted: the visit took place in April 1991. 

Vural thus became the first Turkish ambassador to visit Armenia. He described that visit in an article he wrote in 2021 for the Global Relations Forum website, characterizing the country’s foreign minister, Raffi Hovannisian, a U.S. citizen, as being “unlike any other Armenian” he had met. Vural’s account continued thusly:

_{Even at the beginning of our conversation, his cold demeanor had not escaped my attention. He was in a state of questioning why I was visiting Armenia in American English. It was not hard not to feel that he was suspicious of the relations between the two countries and was looking for bad intentions behind them. Upon this situation, I cut the meeting short and said goodbye to him without entering into a possibly bitter argument.} 

After this meeting with Hovannisian, Vural met with Armenian President Levon Ter‑Petrosyan. The Turkish diplomat writes that Ter‑Petrosyan welcomed him in a friendlier way and spoke openly about how the normalization of Armenia‑Türkiye relations would contribute to the solution of many problems between the two neighboring countries:

_{Ter‑Petrosyan got up from his desk and looked towards the balcony and said to me: ‘Please take a look, there is the Alican border gate 25‑30 kilometers away. This door is closed to us. However, if it is opened, there will be direct trade between the two countries and the economy will revive. We have to cut the power for 5‑6 hours every day,’ gesturing to the light fixtures in his office. ‘If we can get electricity from you, our life and industry will be much better.’} 

At the end of 1991, Türkiye recognized the independence of Azerbaijan first and then other countries that had left the Soviet Union, including Armenia. Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel sent a letter to Ter‑Petrosyan on 24 December 1991, which contained the following passage:

_{While recognizing the independence of the Republic of Armenia, our government has acted with the understanding that in its relations with the Republic of Türkiye and other neighbors, Armenia will adhere to the basic principles of international law, especially respect for its territorial integrity and the principle of immutability, fulfill all the requirements of good neighborly relations, and act in this direction. I believe that relations between the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Armenia will be established and developed on the basis of respect for these fundamental principles and mutual benefit.}

Although Türkiye established diplomatic relations with the other former Soviet republics, it did not with Armenia. One of the reasons for this was the inclusion of language in the Declaration of Independence of Armenia that presented claims against Türkiye’s territorial integrity (this document was signed by Ter‑Petrosyan and the Secretary of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Ara Sahakyan on 23 August 1990). Specifically, Article 11 of this text, which sets out the principles on which the independent state will be based, referred to Eastern Anatolia as Western Armenia. This was interpreted in Ankara as an indirect territorial claim by Armenia against Türkiye. 

Another Article in the same document (on the “Armenian Genocide”) also prevented the establishment of diplomatic relations between the newly‑independent Armenia and Türkiye. This was a second reason why it was ultimately impossible for Türkiye to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia. 

But the main reason why diplomatic relations between Armenia and Türkiye were not established, and why the border between the two states remains closed, was the Armenian occupation of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) and the seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan—a period that was characterized by campaigns of ethnic cleansing, the ultimate consequence of which was that not a single ethnic‑Azerbaijani (and only 50 other non‑ethnic‑Armenians, out of a total recorded population of 145,053) inhabited the occupied lands in 2015 (the year the last census was published by the occupation forces). The single‑worst massacre of civilians during the First Karabakh War, which took place in Khojaly in February 1992, had a particular impact: it left a deep impression on the people of Türkiye and made the normalization process between Ankara and Yerevan even more difficult.

In 1992, during the First Karabakh War, the border between Armenia and Türkiye was not officially closed, with the Alican‑Margara and Kars‑Gyumri border crossings sometimes remaining open (the Abkhaz Railway line, which connected Armenia with the outside world, was also unusable due to the civil war in Georgia). As a result, Armenia was left to fend for itself in its food crisis, which peaked in August 1992—with the supply of wheat being a particularly acute problem. 

In this context, Ter‑Petrosyan contacted Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin in connection with the possible transportation of wheat through Türkiye. In his letter to Demirel, the Armenian president wrote the following: “You and I have the opportunity to prove to our peoples that we can cooperate. Let’s try not to miss this opportunity.” Before formulating his response, Demirel told Çetin to discuss this humanitarian issue with the Azerbaijani authorities, whose representatives indicated that they had no objection to the provision of Turkish assistance.

Demirel then wrote the following reply to Ter‑Petrosyan: “We are ready to host your delegation in Ankara to discuss wheat transportation issues, quantities, and conditions. We hope that our region will be an island of stability, harmony, and cooperation. Türkiye will continue its constructive activities in this area.”

Thus, wheat aid was provided to Armenia through Türkiye via the Kars‑Gyumri railway in 1992‑1993. Gerard Libaridian, who was Ter‑Petrosyan’s chief adviser from 1991‑1997, recalls those days as follows: ‘‘Even when the grain from Europe didn’t arrive in time, Türkiye would send from their own supplies. Thus, this is a great argument against the idea Türkiye would do anything to annihilate us.”

Armenia’s Attack on Nakhchivan

Armenian armed forces attacked Nakhchivan on 18 May 1992. Then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, Heydar Aliyev, held a telephone conversation with Ter‑Petrosyan to stop the fighting, with Ter‑Petrosyan saying that the forces in Sederek were not under his control. At the end of the six‑hour battle, the Armenian forces advanced in the direction of Sederek and captured the strategically important Mil hill and three heights.

Heydar Aliyev, who held a press conference to announce the seriousness of the situation to the world, told the Reuters news agency that six people were killed and 54 people were injured: “The situation is very difficult, the Armenians have captured three hills, they are still attacking Sederek.”

 At the same press conference, when asked by a Turkish reporter, “What is your message to Ankara in accordance with the provisions of the Kars Treaty?,” Heydar Aliyev replied: “Türkiye should fulfill its commitments.”

Returning to Ankara from Budapest on 18 May 1992, Demirel convened a meeting of the Council of Ministers late in the night. Its published conclusion held Armenia responsible for the attacks and concluded that “Türkiye’s balanced policy towards achieving peace through negotiations will inevitably be seriously affected in the face of the latest attacks by the Armenians.” 

The next day, Deputy Prime Minister Erdal İnönü was even more explicit, stating that Türkiye will not accept any forced change of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan: “The consequences of the attacks on Nakhchivan will be severe.”

İnönü also called Hovannisian and warned Armenia to stop the attacks on Nakhchivan with all deliberate speed. On 19‑20 May 1992, representatives of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and Armenia met at the border, but no agreement could be reached on a ceasefire.

On 23 May 1992, the Nakhchivan self‑defense forces recaptured the occupied areas, and on 28 May, a ceasefire was reached between Nakhchivan and Armenia. Coincidentally, that day also marked an important milestone in Turkish‑Azerbaijani relations, with Demirel traveling to Nakhchivan to meet with Heydar Aliyev so that they could jointly open the Umut‑Hasret bridge, which spans the Aras River border between the two countries. Demirel spoke to the people there and expressed his support for Nakhchivan: “We are here to tell you that you are not alone. Whoever tries to gain territory by using force should know that there is someone stronger than him.”

After the Nakhchivan crisis was resolved, relations between Armenia and Türkiye became more tense. On 10 September 1992, Hovannisian gave a speech in Istanbul at a Council of Europe conference in which he said that although Armenia is willing to establish relations with Türkiye and that Ter‑Petrosyan is actively working in this direction, Türkiye refuses to open its borders and establish diplomatic relations: “Turkey could not maintain its neutrality on the Nagorno‑Karabakh issue. There are Turkish military advisers and officers in Azerbaijan.”

At the same event, Hovannisian also touched upon the Kurdish and Cyprus issues, further escalating bilateral tensions. In response, Çetin stated that Hovannisian’s allegations were unfounded and that such an offensive speech will not be beneficial for the establishment of good neighborly relations with Türkiye. One month after this incident, Hovannisian announced his resignation, which had been requested by Ter‑Petrosyan. In a statement made years later, Ter‑Petrosyan said that the reason for Hovannisian’s resignation was the speech he gave in Istanbul.

On 2 April 1993, the Kalbajar region of Azerbaijan was occupied by Armenian forces. This, too, caused a great reaction in Turkish public and political circles. In a next‑day statement on this subject, the Turkish Foreign Ministry said that the Armenia‑Türkiye border was closed, that rail and air connections with Armenia were cut, and that transit trade to Armenia via Türkiye was also stopped. The Foreign Ministry also sent a protest note to Armenia that demanded that “all Armenian forces immediately withdraw from Azerbaijani territory.”

Only days later, on 17 April 1993, Turkish President Turgut Özal passed away. Ter‑Petrosyan accepted an invitation to attend the funeral.

The Armenian delegation also consisted of the new foreign minister, Vahan Papazyan, and Libaridian. On 20 April 1993, Libaridian was received by Demirel in Ankara. According to Libaridian’s subsequent account, Demirel took out a map from the drawer, pointed to the Kalbajar region, said that it stood outside of the former NKAO, and indicated that the Armenian forces should withdraw from there as soon as possible. During this visit, a meeting was also held between Demirel, Ter‑Petrosyan, and Azerbaijan’s President Abulfaz Elchibey. Although a protocol was drawn up to resolve the problem, no conclusion was reached. A month after Özal’s death, Demirel became the ninth president of Türkiye.

After the 9 May 1994 ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Bishkek that ended the First Karabakh War, the issue of opening the airspace between Armenia and Türkiye came to the fore: in April 1995, representatives of the two countries signed an agreement on the opening of their airspace. 

Although this agreement was realized as a result of Armenia‑Türkiye diplomatic contacts, it is also possible to say that pressure by the EU Civil Aviation Conference had an effect. As a result of the agreement, Yerevan‑Istanbul charter flights started.

On 22 September 1996, Armenia held its second presidential elections since independence. Ter‑Petrosyan was reelected by the narrowest of margins. Three days later, tens of thousands of Armenian citizens came out in Yerevan to protest the election results, storming the parliament building and beating up the Speaker (Babken Ararktsyan) and Deputy Speaker (Ara Sahakyan). The government sent tanks and troops to enforce the ban on rallies and demonstrations. One contemporaneous media report put it this way: “In Yerevan, tanks with escorts of special riot police patrolled the streets and throughout the country security forces arrested hundreds of opposition activists.” 

In September 1997, Levon Ter‑Petrosyan declared that he was ready to accept an international plan finally to settle the Karabakh conflict. The plan foresaw the return of the occupied regions of Azerbaijan, including the return of Azerbaijani IDPs, as a precondition for negotiations on the final status of the former NKAO. Several senior members of the Ter‑Petrosyan Administration, including Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan, Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, and Interior Minister Serzh Sargsyan, refused to accept this plan. Partly as a result of these resignations, Ter‑Petrosyan himself resigned in February 1998, saying that that he was doing so to avoid destabilizing the country.

It is fitting to end this section by reproducing one of Ter‑Petrosyan’s most succinct statements on the foregoing matters, which he made during the eighth congress of the Armenian National Movement Party on 8 June 1996: “I believe that the existence of Armenia as an independent country will be under question without improving our relations with our two neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan.” 

The Kocharyan Period

On 30 March 1998, Robert Kocharyan was elected President of Armenia. There were complaints that he was ineligible to run for this post under the Armenian constitution, which required candidates to have resided in Armenia for the previous ten years and to be Armenian citizens. Kocharyan did not meet these two requirements because he was born a citizen of the Azerbaijani SSR, and it was only in 1997 that he moved to Armenia to hold the post of Prime Minister until Ter‑Petrosyan’s resignation.

Be that as it may, Kocharyan’s candidacy was approved by the Armenian Central Electoral Commission. His justification for running in that election was, essentially, to enforce the 1 December 1989 decision of the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR and the NKAO Regional Council on the “reunification” of the NKAO with the Armenian SSR. Kocharyan was supported by Vazgen Sargsyan’s Republican Party and by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation‑Dashnaktsutyun (ARF‑D), which Ter‑Petrosyan had banned in December 1994 for what amounted to charges of sedition and planning acts of terror. 

In Kocharyan’s first term, his policy towards Türkiye was harsh and nationalistic, specifically focusing on having the events of 1915 that took place on the territory of the Ottoman Empire recognized as constituting “genocide.” Kocharyan’s “aggressive” posture towards Türkiye was made manifest in other fields, as well. For example, he was against holding an OSCE Summit in Istanbul. Since the OSCE is a consensus‑based regional organization, Armenia’s opposition produced a stalemate that was overcome only due to pressure from the great powers. The summit was ultimately held in Istanbul in November 1999.

On 5 June 1998, the first official meeting between Kocharyan and Demirel, now presidents of their respective countries, was held in Yalta thanks to the mediation of President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine. It took place on the margins of a BSEC summit that was taking place in that Crimean resort town. Demirel responded positively to Kocharyan’s offer to meet through Kuchma. The two leaders held a 35‑minute meeting, which started positively. Then Kocharyan brought up the topic of the events of 1915, stating that “there is a serious situation in our relations brought by history. We can only overcome this by discussing history.” Demirel’s response was as follows: “to bring out hostility from history creates a big problem. Let’s look at the future, not the past. Armenia’s well‑being depends on good relations with Turkey.”

Another subject of disagreement during the Demirel‑Kocharyan meeting at Yalta was the relationship between Azerbaijan and Türkiye. Demirel firmly told Kocharyan that it would not be possible for Türkiye to normalize its relations with Yerevan unless Armenia ended its occupation of Karabakh (the former NKAO plus the seven surrounding regions of Azerbaijan). Kocharyan opposed this approach and demanded that Armenia‑Türkiye relations be removed from the “mortgage of Azerbaijan,” stating that he was ready to open mutual diplomatic representations and develop economic relations with Ankara at any time. “You cannot expect Türkiye to change its position while the occupation continues,” Demirel replied. 

Although the meeting ended in a negative atmosphere, the leaders of both countries remained in contact, leaving the door open for dialogue. After the earthquake that took place in Türkiye in August 1999, causing the death of more than 17,000 people, Kocharyan sent a telegram to Demirel in which he indicated that Armenia would send a search and rescue team at Türkiye’s request. 

Demirel also sent a condolence letter to Kocharyan regarding the armed attack that took place in the Armenian parliament on 27 October 1999 that resulted in the murder of inter alia Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and Parliament Speaker Karen Demirchyan.

TARC Hopes, Erdoğan Opportunities

The formation of the Turkish‑Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was announced on 9 July 2001, following meetings held under the auspices of the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna. Its Armenian founding members were former Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Arzumanian, retired Ambassador David Hovhanissian, co‑chair of the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) Van Z. Krikorian, and prominent Russian‑Armenian foreign policy analyst and advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin Andranik Migranian. The Turkish founding members were retired ambassador Gündüz Aktan, retired ambassador and TESEV director Özdem Sanberk, former foreign affairs officer İlter Türkmen, retired general Şadi Ergüvenç, Prof. Dr. Üstün Ergüder, and Prof. Dr. Vamık Volkan.

Basically a Track II initiative, TARC was established to promote mutual understanding and goodwill between the two countries. Welcomed by the U.S. and some other Western states, TARC was described at the time and subsequently as the most serious attempt at dialogue between the two countries. TARC, however, excluded discussions on two of the most contentious issues: the events of 1915 and the conflict over Karabakh, both of which we judged too difficult to reconcile. Even so, ten political parties in Armenia released a joint statement on 31 July 2001 that declared their opposition to TARC. Kocharyan also stated that relations should be discussed at the level of states.

TARC held its second meeting on 23‑25 September 2001 in Istanbul, and its third meeting on 18‑21 November the same year in New York—its last meeting before being dissolved. The three‑day meetings focused mainly on reconciliation models.

The chairman of the meeting, mediator David L. Phillips, made a statement summarizing the results of the meeting without first discussing it with TARC’s Turkish members. This caused tension between the Armenian and Turkish members, with the Armenian members releasing a joint statement in December 2001 announcing that they were leaving the commission. Thus, the attempt to craft an environment of dialogue between representatives of the two nations came to an end.

Three Armenian members of TARC (Hovhanisyan, Arzumanyan, and Migranyan) stated that important results were obtained during this process. They indicated that the most important thing was that the International Court of Transitional Justice (ICTJ) was asked to investigate whether the 1948 UN Genocide Convention could be applied to the 1915 events.

Two years later, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan entered the Turkish parliament in a 9 March 2003 by‑election. Just five days later, he became the new Prime Minister of Türkiye just days later, after his political ally (the sitting prime minister, Abdullah Gül) submitted his resignation.

Erdoğan had co‑founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) on 14 August 2001 and was promptly elected party chairman. AKP stood in the November 2002 general election and entered the government, with Gül at its head—he was universally understood as a placeholder for Erdoğan, whose count‑ordered ban from politics was still in effect. Once this ban was lifted by parliamentary vote, Erdoğan took over the premiership and began taking steps to normalize relations with Armenia as well as strengthen good relations with Türkiye’s ethnic‑Armenian community. 

On 3 June 2003, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Türkiye, Abdullah Gül and Vardan Oskanian, met in Madrid during a NATO foreign ministerial summit. Later the same month, Turkish troops took part in a NATO military exercise in Armenia. Some Armenian groups voiced their concern at the prospect of Turkish soldiers arriving in Armenia, even under the auspices of the Atlantic Alliance.

In June 2004, Erdoğan invited Kocharyan to attend a NATO Summit in Istanbul, which the latter refused. Just before the summit was to take place, Kocharyan stated that Armenia could develop without Türkiye, but that Armenia does want to establish diplomatic relations without any preconditions, while blaming Türkiye for the deadlock. “We do not want to sever our ties with Armenia, even if they are tied to a thin thread,” Erdoğan commented on Kocharyan’s rejection. “But if Armenia is running, we will not run after them long.”

Still, a trilateral meeting between the foreign ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye did take place on that occasion, which was a promising development. Oskanian spoke positively about it, saying that in addition to the conflict over Karabakh, the development of Armenia‑Türkiye trade relations was also discussed.

On 15 April 2005, Erdoğan sent a letter to Kocharyan in which he formally conveyed a proposal to establish a joint commission to examine the context of the 1915 events (as well as the events themselves). Erdoğan noted that an initiative in this direction would not only shed light on a controversial historical chapter, but that it would also constitute a step that would serve to normalize relations between Armenia and Türkiye. If it was accepted, the letter indicated, Türkiye would be ready to discuss the details of any proposal.

Kocharyan rejected this offer, saying that the development of relations should not be left to historians as it “deflects from addressing the present and the future. It is the responsibility of governments to develop bilateral relations and we do not have the right to delegate that responsibility to historians. That is why we have proposed and propose again that, without pre‑conditions, we establish normal relations between our two countries.”

Although Kocharyan had taken a tougher stance towards Türkiye than his predecessor, Levon Ter‑Petrosyan, the small steps he took to improve relations demonstrated that he was also aware of the reality of Armenia’s geographic and geopolitical location. However, the lack of agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the conflict over Karabakh, Kocharyan’s close relations with the radical Armenian diaspora, who he believed would finance Armenia’s economic development to an extent that never happened, and the Dashnaks (some of whom affiliated with the ARF‑D) hindered normalization. 

In Türkiye, both the AKP‑led government and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) responded to the normalization steps positively.

The Sargsyan Period

Serzh Sargsyan was appointed prime minister by Kocharyan on 4 April in 2007, following the sudden death of Andranik Margaryan. Sargsyan was elected chairman of the largest part in the governing coalition (the Republican Party), a post that had been vacated after Markaryan’s death. Thus, he became the strongest candidate for the presidential elections scheduled to be held on 19 February 2008.

The plan worked: Sargsyan was elected president, receiving more than double the votes of his nearest opponent, Levon Ter‑Petrosyan, who had attempted a comeback. Supporters of Ter‑Petrosyan, who described the results as “shameful,” protested. The demonstrations that followed were eventually and violently dispersed on 1 March 2008, with 10 people fatalities. Kocharyan declared a national state of emergency. 

Kocharyan claimed that some protestors had firearms and grenades and that they were planning a coup d’état. The opposition rejected these accusations and said police attacked peaceful demonstrators. The protests only stopped after a message by Ter‑Petrosyan was read out in which he urged his supporters to return to their homes: “I do not want any victims and clashes between police and innocent people,” he was quoted as saying.

Dozens of opposition figures were arrested while the current Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, then a key ally of Ter‑Petrosyan, went into hiding until mid‑2009 when he was eventually jailed. Three days after Sargsyan’s election, Gül (having in the meantime become president) sent him a congratulatory message. It read thusly in part: “I hope your new position will permit the creation of the necessary environment for normalizing relations between the Turkish and Armenian peoples, who have proven over centuries they can live together in peace and concord.”

This message was considered to be an important gesture to the new administration. Emphasizing that both peoples had lived together for centuries, Gül also called on Sargsyan to take steps towards the normalization of bilateral relations. During his 2008 visit to Moscow, Sargsyan stated that he was willing to take the necessary steps to do so. He then invited Gül to visit Yerevan on the occasion of an Armenia‑Türkiye World Cup qualifier football match. At the same time, Sargsyan stated that he was not against Türkiye’s proposal to form a commission of Armenian and Turkish historians that would examine the 1915 events, but added that it should be formed only after Türkiye agrees unconditionally establish diplomatic relations and open its border with Armenia.

The Armenian National Congress (ANC), headed by Ter‑Petrosyan, released a statement and said that Sargsyan has become the first president of Armenia to officially agree to Türkiye’s proposal to question the “fact of the genocide.” The ANC document condemned “this dangerous statement of Serzh Sargsyan, which will be undoubtedly responded by the people of Armenia and Armenians of the whole world.” 

Despite the reaction from both the opposition, and particularly the Dashnaks, and the diaspora, Sargsyan wrote an article in the Wall Street Journal that reaffirmed his determination to normalize relations with Türkiye. In this essay, Sargsyan complained that the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Kars railway line bypassed Armenia and the railway line between Armenia and Türkiye remained inactive due to closed borders. 

He proposed a new beginning and noted that the first world leader to congratulate him on his election had been Gül. Establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries, he added, would enable the formation of a commission that would allow for the discussion of all the complex issues affecting the two countries.

Gül accepted Sargsyan’s invitation. His arrival on 6 September 2008 marked the first time a Turkish president had visited the country. Speaking at Ankara Esenboğa Airport upon his return, Gül said that the meeting had been constructive and sincere. It touched not only on Armenia‑Türkiye relations but also regional issues such as the conflict over Karabakh. Gul added that he had invited Sargsyan to the Armenia‑Türkiye football match to be held in Bursa the following year. Answering questions about Armenia’s “claims regarding the 1915 events,” Gül said, “they neither mentioned nor implied the so‑called genocide during the talks.”

Despite the apparent breakthrough, Gül’s visit to Armenia was criticized by Türkiye’s opposition party leaders. CHP head Deniz Baykal told media that the government should refrain from any action that would harm Azerbaijan. His counterpart at the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, called the visit “historical heedlessness.”

After Gül’s visit to Armenia, the ARF‑D issued a statement saying that the normalization of Armenia‑Türkiye relations was predicated on a recognition of the Armenian genocide, the making of reparations, and the non‑interference in the conflict over Karabakh. 

Although the Azerbaijani government did not react negatively to the visit, neither was it welcomed by the media or the public at large. Four days after his visit to Yerevan, Gül traveled to Baku and met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

The reason why Armenia‑Türkiye normalization was generally negatively received in Azerbaijan is that Armenia, whose isolation had deepened due to the conflict between Russia and Georgia, would reputedly benefit economically from this normalization, gain an important connection to Europe, and create more difficulties for Azerbaijan in the context of resolving the conflict over Karabakh (and, eventually, a peace treaty with Armenia itself).

U.S. President Barack Obama paid a visit to Türkiye to attend the Second Global Forum of the UN Alliance of Civilizations, which was held in İstanbul on 6‑7 April 2009. Shortly before Obama’s visit, news appeared in the Turkish media that Armenia and Türkiye would normalize relations and open borders. This news was received negatively by Aliyev, who at the last moment refused to participate in the event.

Gül and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton each called Aliyev and tried to convince him to attend. Even though Clinton stated that Obama would be pleased to hold a bilateral meeting with him if he would make the trip to Istanbul, Aliyev did not back down from his decision.

Demirel, for his part, reminded the Turkish public that Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani lands was ongoing, and that Armenia should at least withdraw from the territory outside Karabakh. “When trying to solve one problem, you can create other problems,” Demirel said, implying that a step taken without considering Azerbaijan’s interests would harm relations.

One month later (on 13 May 2009), Erdoğan and five ministers paid a visit to Azerbaijan to put an end to all speculation in the media. “Even the pronouncement that Türkiye has given up on Karabakh is a great slander, and I reject this slander,” Erdoğan proclaimed in the Azerbaijani parliament. 

Holding a joint press conference with Aliyev, Erdoğan said that it was not possible to open the borders until the Armenian occupation ends. “The words of dear Prime Minister [Erdoğan], my dear brother, are the best answer to all questions,” Aliyev responded. “I am grateful for what he said. There can be no clearer answer than this. There is no room for doubt.”

The protocols aiming to start the normalization process between Armenia and Türkiye were signed in Zurich by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Armenian Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandyan on 10 October 2009—that is to say, five months after Erdoğan’s words were spoken in Baku. Hillary Clinton, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy‑Rey, and other high‑ranking officials were present at the signing ceremony, which took place three hours later than announced. 

According to information published by the media, the reason for this was that references to the conflict over Karabakh were included in Davutoğlu’s speech, to which the Armenian side objected. The Turkish side also found elements of Nalbadyan’s speech problematic. The crisis was overcome by a decision not to make speeches.

Four days after the signing of the protocols, Sargsyan came to the Armenia‑Türkiye football match in Bursa, as Gül’s guest. This informal visit reinforced the positive atmosphere created by the signing of the protocols, whose ratification lingered in the Armenian and Turkish parliaments for years, as each side waited for the other to take the first step. While Armenia demanded the opening of the Alican Border Gate before the ratification process, Türkiye stated that relations could not be normalized until the Karabakh issue was resolved.

On 16 February 2015, Sargsyan announced that he was withdrawing the documents from parliamentary consideration; on 1 March 2018, the Armenian side announced that the Zurich Protocols had been canceled following a meeting of the Armenian National Security Council.

On 27 December 2021 (just a bit over a year following Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War), Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu commented on a new Armenia‑Türkiye normalization process: “The [Zurich] Protocols have no meaning, the most important parts have been canceled by the Armenian Constitutional Court. These are now left behind. A new process has begun today.” 

After the Second Karabakh War

Following the Second Karabakh War, normalization steps were taken in Armenia‑Türkiye relations. In August 2021, Nikol Pashinyan, having become Prime Minister of Armenia, stated that Yerevan was now ready to normalize relations with Türkiye.

Türkiye responded positively to these messages from Armenia and both countries decided to appoint special representatives to establish a direct dialogue. “We will appoint mutual special representatives for normalization steps, we will act together with Azerbaijan at every step,” Çavuşoğlu declared. Serdar Kılıç, an experienced diplomat who previously served as Türkiye’s Ambassador to Beirut, Tokyo, and Washington, was appointed to that role.

Armenia, for its part, did not appoint an experienced diplomat. Instead, Pashinyan appointed a young 30‑year‑old politician, Ruben Rubinyan, who also served as Vice‑President of the Armenian National Assembly. Although Rubinyan’s appointment has been criticized by the Armenian opposition, Rubinyan is no stranger to Türkiye. Between 2017 and 2018, he had conducted academic research on the topic of the “impact of civil society organizations on the democratization process in Turkey” at Sabancı University Istanbul Policy Center as part of the Hrant Dink Foundation’s Armenia‑Türkiye Experience Exchange Project, residing in Türkiye during this time.

The first meeting of the special representatives took place on 14 January 2022 in Moscow. Political analysts interpreted its location as Russia’s positive approach to the normalization process. Azerbaijan also continued to send positive messages regarding this new process. “We fully support brotherly Türkiye’s efforts to normalize relations with Armenia,” Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov declared. “We appreciate Türkiye’s messages in this direction.”

As bilateral talks between the special representatives commenced, it was decided to resume direct flights between Istanbul and Yerevan on 2 February 2022. The same month, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Rubinyan were invited to the Second Antalya Diplomatic Forum. Mirzoyan announced that he would participate. 

This step was also welcomed by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and it announced that such mutual steps could be considered as confidence‑building measures to increase dialogue between the two countries in line with the goal of achieving full normalization.

Çavuşoğlu and Mirzoyan met in Antalya on 12 March 2022 and held a joint press conference afterwards. Çavuşoğlu evaluated it as “a very productive and constructive meeting,” adding that Azerbaijan was also satisfied. “We accepted the invitation positively. We said again that we will continue the process unconditionally to normalize it,” Mirzoyan remarked. “We have a decision to strive for peace in our region.”

More steps were to follow. For example, at a meeting in Vienna on 1 July 2022, Rubinyan and Kılıç reached an agreement to launch direct air cargo transportation between the two countries and open the borders to citizens of third countries. 

Although nearly a year has passed since this decision, neither part of the agreement has yet to be implemented. One of the reasons for this is the absence of an Armenia‑Azerbaijan peace treaty. 

Even so, during the European Political Community Summit meeting held in Prague on 6 October 2022, Erdoğan, Pashinyan, and Aliyev came together in the foyer and chatted for a while. They were accompanied by the foreign ministers of all three countries.

Later, a bilateral meeting was held between Erdoğan and Pashinyan. The special representatives of both countries were also present at the meeting. At a press conference held afterwards, Erdoğan said that the countries will achieve their shared goal of full normalization. Further steps towards this came about unexpectedly with the Kahramanmaraş earthquake.

In its immediate wake, Pashinyan and President Vahagn Khachaturyan each expressed their support for Türkiye on their respective social media accounts. Armenia quickly sent a 28‑person search and rescue team as well as more than 100 tons of humanitarian aid. The trucks passed through the Alican border gate, which has been closed for 30 years, on their way to the earthquake zone at Adıyaman.

On 15 February 2023, Mirzoyan made a surprise visit to Türkiye—a symbolic and significant step reminiscent of the time when Türkiye had sent humanitarian aid to Armenia following the 1988 earthquake in the Spitak region. The aid collected by the Turkish Red Crescent on that occasion had also been delivered to the earthquake zone through the Alican border gate.

During the visit, Mirzoyan was accompanied by Rubinyan and both Armenian officials were welcomed at Esenboğa Airport by Kılıç. After a short meeting of the two foreign ministers on 15 February 2023, a joint press conference was held during which Çavuşoğlu expressed gratitude for Armenia’s support: “Armenia provided a hand of solidarity in our difficult time.”

On 23 March 2023, Mirzoyan announced that the land border between the two countries will initially be opened only to diplomats and to the citizens of third countries by the beginning of the tourist season.

Although Armenia and Türkiye have decided to advance the normalization process without preconditions, the process appears to be clearly dependent on the Armenia and Azerbaijan peace process.

Although Armenia and Türkiye have decided to advance the normalization process without preconditions, the process appears to be clearly dependent on the Armenia and Azerbaijan peace process. Hopes that a peace treaty would be signed between Baku and Yerevan by the end of 2022 failed to see the light of day, especially after Aliyev stated in late November 2022 that he would not attend a meeting with Pashinyan facilitated by Charles Michel in Brussels due to the Armenian prime minister’s last‑minute, unexpected insistence that French President Emmanuel Macron would also need to be in attendance. 

Although the Armenian government often says that it is ready to sign a peace treaty, Pashinyan cannot be said to be consistent in this direction. According to political analysts who closely follow the ongoing peace process, tensions could increase between the two countries at any moment. And the Armenia‑Türkiye normalization process is unlikely to progress significantly unless there is similar progress between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

It is also unclear how the situation will develop in light of the too‑close‑to‑call presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in Türkiye in May 2023. Some Armenian and Western analysts speculate that if the opposition comes to power in Türkiye, its support for Azerbaijan will decrease and it will conduct the Armenia‑Türkiye normalization process without linking it to the Armenia‑Azerbaijan peace process. In some sense this was attempted in 2009, and we all remember how that turned out. 

In short, if the Armenian government is serious about normalizing relations with Türkiye, then it should also take the development of its relations with Azerbaijan seriously and not delay signing a peace treaty with Baku any longer. To do so is arguably the only hope for Armenia to escape from its regional isolation and finally to develop amicable relations with its two largest neighbors—so close, but yet so far.