Unpacking ‘One Nation, Two States’

The exceptional, privileged, and special relationship between Azerbaijan and Türkiye is well known. The two countries are not only friendly allies but also strategic partners whose foreign policy priorities and strategic and economic interests overlap. The leaders of both countries enjoy their partnership as statespersons and friends dating back to when President Heydar Aliyev led Azerbaijan and President Süleyman Demirel led Türkiye. 

Both they and their respective successors have frequently referred to their brotherhood in the eyes of their respective publics and when addressing other audiences around the world. Thus, the same pattern has also been embraced by the current presidents of the two states, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ilham Aliyev, who both underline and highlight the motto of “one nation, two states” on almost all occasions related to foreign policy, peace, and security building in the Silk Road region, fostering economic ties, and constructing an energy and transportation hub and connectivity network in the region. 

This motto is not only a reflection of the policies and priorities of the two states but is also a result of the societal perceptions, popular support, and meanings attributed to each other by their respective public opinions. The social dimension of bilateral relations constitutes the backbone of the preferences and priorities of the leaders of both countries. Linguistic and cultural affinity facilitates communication between ordinary citizens, who greet each other with a warm welcome, resulting in “feeling like at home” in each other’s countries. 

Simply put, traveling to Türkiye for an ordinary Azerbaijani citizen does not really feel like going abroad: from the early years of restored independence, there was a pre‑assumption of kinship with Anatolian Turks. For an ordinary citizen of Türkiye, who was much less literate on Azerbaijani culture and its people than his/her typical Azerbaijani counterpart, it was a sweet surprise to meet with people who speak (more or less) the same language. It was even more surprising to see how he/she was treated like “one of their own” in Azerbaijan, regardless of the occasion—whether due to a government visit, business trip, or to engage in trade (since Azerbaijan was not, until recently, a tourist destination for an ordinary citizen of Türkiye). 

The framework adopted by Demirel and Heydar Aliyev has been significantly filled‑in, adopted, reconstructed, and fortified by numerous groups and initiatives originating in the two societies themselves. 

Indeed, various types of social encounters have made both ordinary Azerbaijanis and ordinary Turks see how similar they are to each other. In the more than thirty years since Azerbaijan regained its independence in 1991, societal interaction and people‑to‑people contact have increased extensively through official visits, commercial relations, educational programs, civil societal initiatives, and intermarriages. One can thus argue that the framework adopted by Demirel and Heydar Aliyev has been significantly filled‑in, adopted, reconstructed, and fortified by numerous groups and initiatives originating in the two societies themselves. 

As a researcher who started her academic career specializing in Azerbaijan, I have personally enjoyed time and again the feeling of “how similar, or even the same, we are.” During the early 1990s, I found myself “surprised again” by any new instances that reaffirmed Azerbaijani perceptions about Türkiye and Turks. One can easily guess the scarcity of academic literature and resources on any post‑Soviet country at that time, and information was extremely limited for a young researcher wanting to conduct fieldwork. 

I departed from Ankara to Baku with a name and phone number of an English‑speaking contact person, who would supposedly help me while doing my research, and who I, of course, never met. I landed in this unknown city in the middle of the night, and the next day, the journey that has lasted until today began. I considered myself a total foreigner, and in the process of becoming “our girl,” I experienced how exceptional was the social dimension of the bilateral relationship. Cultural affinities reflected themselves in the care shown by my landladies and their families to convert me from a renter into the equivalent of their daughter, in the enormous support and help provided by my Azerbaijani colleagues who later became lifelong friends, in other post‑graduate students who became like sisters to me, and in my respondents who showed their respect and appreciation for a young, female, and Turkish researcher who came all alone to conduct research and understand their country. Not only was my journey exceptional, but so too were the perceptions of Azerbaijanis about Turks and Türkiye and, more importantly, about the meaning attributed to special and privileged bilateral relations. “One nation, two states,” indeed.

The bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Türkiye are subject to numerous analyses. The particular focus is on foreign policy, energy politics, strategic partnership, transportation projects, Türkiye’s stance on the conflict over Karabakh, evolving relations during and after the Second Karabakh War, and regional cooperation with other Turkic states. Most academic and analytic writings refer to the motto “one nation, two states,” but few examine its meaning. In other words, researchers often take this motto for granted without focusing on the construction of its meaning through attributes of public opinion and public perceptions. 

Inspired by an academic researcher’s personal account, this essay builds upon two previous ones published in earlier editions of Baku Dialogues that also discusses at length related aspects of “one nation, two states.” This contribution particularly aims to analyze the social dimension of Azerbaijani‑Turkish relations. Three cases will drive my argument: the Great Student Project (later titled Turkish Scholarships), the Second Karabakh War, and the natural disaster in Türkiye in February 2023. 

My argument is that Azerbaijani perceptions about Türkiye and the Turks are historically rooted, dating back to the early twentieth century, and thus have a powerful memory dimension. Some of this is no doubt due to the fact that at the same moment in their respective histories, and with some notable examples of intellectual and even political cross‑pollination, as it were, Azerbaijan and Türkiye opted for relatively similar progressive, secular, and parliamentary approaches to national governance. The Turkish journey has continued without a fundamental break ever since; Azerbaijan’s first attempt was cut down after only a few years, with the violent imposition of the Bolshevik regime. It is thus all the more remarkable that this historical appreciation was well‑preserved during the more than seven decades of Soviet rule—during which, it should be noted, ordinary Azerbaijanis and ordinary Turks were largely kept apart—and, in fact, revitalized and then expanded in more recent years thanks in large part to Türkiye’s unconditional support for Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia over Karabakh and related issues. 

The initial foreign policy initiatives and early encounters with actual Turks reinforced Azerbaijanis’ presupposed perceptions of Türkiye. Moreover, Turkish policymakers consciously prioritized relations with Azerbaijan, starting in the early years of the post‑Soviet period and continuing into the present. The end of the conflict over Karabakh, which came about thanks to Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War, has been considered the precondition for building up Türkiye’s diplomatic relations with Armenia. As for the Turkish public, sympathy and empathy with Azerbaijanis was more intuitional than substantiated, since Turks’ encounters and their knowledge of Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis were extremely limited. Shared emotions were based on the animosity exhibited by a common foe. Turkish perceptions of Azerbaijanis were built up and constructed only after actual interactions began to took place; although these have increased over time, they still remain relatively limited. Nonetheless, the bond continues to grow stronger. 

Turkish Scholarships

The Great Student Project, initiated in 1992, was a significant tool to establish and increase the soft power of Türkiye in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states. It is one of the major initiatives in bridge‑building between Türkiye and the Silk Road region, and has had a generational impact on the social, economic, and political transformation of these post‑Soviet countries.

The project provides students with scholarships to obtain degrees from Turkish universities. The instrumentalization of higher education as a Turkish foreign policy tool provides graduates with a quality education and the necessary skills for a professional career, resulting in the formation of an important segment of the intellectual and professional elite of the target countries. Today, Azerbaijan has a significantly large group of professionals educated in Türkiye. 

Azerbaijan’s opening up to the world was facilitated through Türkiye.

Particularly during the early years of independence, when Azerbaijan was in grave political, social, and economic turmoil, the Project provided a major opportunity to acquire an education at international standards. Azerbaijan’s opening up to the world was facilitated through Türkiye. It contributed to the formation of qualified personnel, raised awareness of Türkiye, provided on‑site knowledge of Turkish society and politics, and established a critical mass of pro‑Turkish professionals. Perhaps Türkiye was not considered as a model as such but rather presented a successful example of secular and democratic nation‑state building while also constituting a source of inspiration for the construction of a new social, economic, and political order. 

The spirit of brotherhood embedded in the historical memory of both states is a source of trust and solidarity. My previous research shows Azerbaijani students “felt at home” while studying in Türkiye. They are welcome, “feet protected and not excluded,” and are never treated as “foreigners.” Getting an education in Türkiye means “learning at international standards,” “a door to get to know the world,” “a tool for rising living standards,” and “a guarantee for a good profession and a position.” In other words, Azerbaijani students experience the internationalization of higher education in what can be called a semi‑national context, and some used this opportunity as a stepping stone or bridge to move on to Western institutions. 

It should be noted that in the past 30 years, Azerbaijani citizens have increasingly had occasions to travel to and learn about Türkiye. The country is a popular tourist destination, Turkish television channels and programs are watched, the products of its popular culture are widespread, and partnerships in trade and joint ventures are increasing. 

The knowledge and awareness of Türkiye by Azerbaijani citizens is more updated than that of Turkish citizens of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani students now have opportunities to study abroad in places other than Türkiye. Yet Azerbaijani alumni of Turkish universities still play a remarkable role in maintaining institutionalized bilateral relations in various sectors and remain committed to further strengthening existing networks. In this respect, it can be argued that the Great Student Project has almost completed its mission of creating a Turkish brand in Azerbaijan. Under its new name, Turkish Scholarship, the Turkish government still provides opportunities to younger generations. Moreover, strengthening ties with Turkish alumni could pave the way for new institutionalization and opportunities for further collaboration at the societal level.

The Aftermath of Victory

The Second Karabakh War itself, and Azerbaijan’s victory therein, have changed the geopolitical and geo‑strategic context of the South Caucasus and, in fact, the entire Silk Road region. More than ever before, Azerbaijan is now a confident actor with a consolidated nation thanks to having restored its territorial integrity and undertaking the swift reconstruction of its liberated lands. Meanwhile, Türkiye has re‑defined its status as a regional power with a proactive position prior to, during, and after the war. 

Public opinion polls show that Azerbaijan is considered the best ally for Türkiye, whose citizens empathize and sympathize with their Azerbaijani counterparts largely due to the presence of a common foe seen as an ongoing threat—even though acquaintances with Azerbaijanis are occasional and limited. The support of Turkish public opinion during the Second Karabakh War is possibly exceptional in the history of Azerbaijan’s independence. The emotional attachment showed itself in the full coverage of the war in the news and the support messages of numerous social media accounts where the Azerbaijani and Turkish flags emojis were extensively shared. It can be argued that the Turkish public was very much engaged in following the news during the war. While Azerbaijanis greatly appreciated their friendly ally and strategic partnership because of the political and moral support provided by the Turkish state and leadership, they were also pleased and genuinely touched to witness an outpouring of public support. 

Possible scenarios for peacebuilding and discussions on regional cooperation mark the aftermath of the Second Karabakh War. Both countries are keen to engage in joint energy, trade, and transportation projects to contribute to region‑based economic development. A would‑be peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan would establish better grounds for regional cooperation. Azerbaijan’s consent and blessing for the normalization of relations between Armenia and Türkiye will also eventually contribute to such cooperation and security‑building in the region.

The 2023 Earthquake

Türkiye was hit by the biggest natural disaster in its history on 6 February 2023. The country was devastated by a massive earthquake in Kahramanmaras, Adana, Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Adıyaman, Osmaniye, Kilis, Malatya, and Elazğ. The estimated number of deaths is more than 50,000, and around 107,000 people were wounded. While the entire nation was experiencing a tremendous tragedy, the state, political parties, civil society, communities, various groups, and individuals were doing their best to reach the cities and provide rescue and help. Foreign countries, and international charities were quick to provide humanitarian aid, and quite a few states sent rescue teams. It was not surprising for the Turkish public to see Azerbaijani help as the first to reach the earthquake zone, when the whole country was in a despair with pain and deep sorrow. 

The solidarity exhibited by Azerbaijanis during this period fits into a broader pattern. As an observer of Azerbaijani society and politics for decades, I have witnessed myriad occasions in which the Azerbaijani public acted and reacted just like the Turkish one. These have included seeing people in the streets of Baku celebrating with Turkish flags when a Turkish sports team won an international game or tournament and supporting the Turkish representative in the Eurovision Song Contest. 

In my early years in Azerbaijan, it was striking to see how common both countries’ wedding and funeral traditions are and how family ties are similar. Therefore, it should not be striking to see the earthquake in Türkiye as a tragedy that was commonly felt and owned. The immediate reaction of Azerbaijani societal actors, families, groups, and individuals was to gather help, including sending goods and clothing to collection centers and asking for bank account numbers to send donations. Support messages were all over social media, and some even went to the earthquake zone. 

The Azerbaijani people reached out to Türkiye with all available means. Three photographs were circulated widely. One was a military truck with the Azerbaijani and Turkish flags displayed, symbolic of the official stance of both governments of signifying togetherness. Another was an old lady in the snow carrying her blankets to her neighbor in need. And the last was a driver with a very old car stuffed with duvets and the Turkish flag flying on the top. All three images are proof of a solidarity that goes far beyond interstate relations. The societal bonds between Azerbaijan and Türkiye are well established and strengthened beyond age, income, profession, and citizenship. These all help make the bilateral relationship truly exceptional. This is the great significance and undisputable veracity of the words spoken by Ilham Aliyev, with Erdogan at his side, during the opening ceremony of the Rize‑Artvin Airport on 14 May 2022: “we are the closest countries in the world.”

Intensification Ahead

The Azerbaijan‑Türkiye bilateral relationship goes beyond the preferences of the leadership. Süleyman Demirel and Heydar Aliyev are the founding fathers of the existing special and privileged ties that are strongly backed by broad and deep societal support. The glorified partnership and alliance is likely to keep evolving in the upcoming years. It appears that there will be an intensification of the web of relations in the future, since the political elite in both countries prioritize each other without exception and are committed to the mutual representation of economic and strategic interests. 

Still, the fact that both societies are bound to each other by emotions, sympathy, and friendship should not be taken for granted; this should be further institutionalized through the involvement of various groups—namely civil society and academia. 

Turkish civil society has significant experience in grassroots activism, the promotion of voluntarism, and has professionalized various types of advocacy. Turkish NGOs have also acquired skills and expertise in project‑based activities. They have working relations and collaboration with Western civil society groups and have internationalized in the last few decades. Türkiye is not a donor country for civil societal activity abroad, yet the transfer of know‑how and expertise could easily and safely be initiated with a reasonable amount of funding, backed by political will and agreement. 

The second sphere for the further institutionalization of inter‑societal cooperation is education. Most universities in Türkiye have signed multiple agreements with Azerbaijani universities, which are useful in declaring an interest in cooperation. Yet in all too many cases, these remain on paper instead of in practice. Greater exchanges of students and staff, and the initiation of more joint projects and programs (at both undergraduate and post‑graduate levels) would increase interaction. This would also contribute to the increased production of academic knowledge in both Azerbaijan and Türkiye and establish a scholarly community of intellectuals who can contribute to the scientific development of their respective countries. 

In short: so as not to underestimate the exceptional societal support provided by both countries, non‑state actors should be provided with further opportunities to contribute to the sustainability and endurance of bilateral relations.