Central Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative

For us Central Asians, it is especially important to un­derstand what is happening seven years after the Belt and Road Initiative was first announced. During an official visit to Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, in early September 2013, China’s president Xi Jinping proposed that China and Central Asian countries build an “economic belt along the Silk Road,” thus sowing the seed of a trans‑Eur­asian project designed to deepen cooperation and expand development across the Silk Road region.

This essay will attempt answer a number of questions in this regard, including: How has it been received by the Central Asian countries? What has been the reaction of the external world to this initiative? What is happening in Central Asia in the context of BRI?

It is important, even funda­mental, that no one has ever of­ficially defined the scope of BRI’s geography. All the maps that have been published only present in­terpretations of official statements or documents. Most maps do not even show national borders, but rather various corridors, regions, and cities. Some are puzzled and keep asking when such a map will appear. But I believe the absence of any geographical allocation or asso­ciation with any territory was and remains the right approach.

China is moving fast. Since Xi’s announcement, thousands of BRI events have been organized all over China and several BRI‑spe­cific research institutes have been established all over the country. In March 2015, the government set up “special leading group” under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to oversee the coordination and implemen­tation of different projects under the BRI framework. To my mind, there are three main elements of this Initiative.

First, quite prominent emphasis is given to the inclusiveness of the initiative and the chance to create win‑win cooperation that is benefi­cial to all participating entities. The major goal is to strengthen trust and connectivity between the co­operating partners.

Second, the recommendations refer to many recently announced multilateral investment banks or funds like Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (formerly known as BRICS Development Bank), and the Silk Road Fund. Support is also organized through China’s own financial institutions like the Export‑Import Bank and the China Development Bank.

Third, BRI has a prominent do­mestic socio‑economic dimen­sion, with increasing focus being placed on China’s landlocked and borderland re­gions like Xinjiang, Fujian, Guangxi, and Yunnan, which should strengthen cooperation with their neighbors.

Even when they were announced, none of the three el­ements were new to Chinese politics. What was new was the fact that diverse areas of political activity (domestic, foreign, regional, etc.) were combined under a single hat and set within the overarching frame­work of a single flagship initiative.

Prospects, Challenges, Achievements

Without any doubt, the Belt and Road Initiative will be­come the global phenomenon of the modern world. Its very scale shows that this still‑new, China‑led frame­work for economic and political co­operation will be truly geopolitical, for BRI will form a huge network of highways, railways, airways, oil and gas pipelines, power grids, transmission, and communication networks. It is clear that along with all this connectivity infrastructure, various types of industrial clusters and services networks will also be developed. BRI’s ambition is clear: to form an inte­grated land area stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic and thus to establish a direct land link between two major global economic powers: China and Europe.

The construction of this inter­continental infrastructure system is being designed to serve as the basis for the creation of strong regional economic integration and enhance the free flow of goods, labor, and capital. All of this will create, in the long run, a single Eurasian market.

This unprecedented, China‑led free trade co­operation framework will certainly have an enormous impact on global economic development, forming the foundation for a new and more pre­dictable political and economic order.

This unprecedented, China‑led free trade cooperation framework will certainly have an enormous im­pact on global economic devel­opment, forming the foundation for a new and more predictable polit­ical and economic order.

Currently, 90 percent of world industrial production is concentrated in three geographic regions: North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Pragmatic con­siderations have driven Beijing’s approach to the design of BRI: connect by land two centers of the world economy: China and Europe. An unavoidable consequence of this logic is that the countries of the Silk Road region will themselves reap benefits from the Initiative. Thus the “win‑win” slogan heretofore popularized by BRI advocates will soon be transformed into a “triple win” formula.

The Initiative is likely to en­counter significant challenges along the way, not the least due to its vir­tually global scale.

The biggest risk for the Silk Road region coun­tries will not only be in figuring out how to deal with the enormous differences in the economic, political, cultural, social, and legal systems found amongst the countries along its routes. There also will be, as Alexis de Tocqueville put it, the “interests of the big.”

The biggest risk for the Silk Road region countries will not only be in figuring out how to deal with the enormous differences in the eco­nomic, political, cultural, social, and legal systems found amongst the countries along its routes. There also will be, as Alexis de Tocqueville put it, the “interests of the big.” With regards to the Eur­asian land route, China must deal with Russian in­terests, due to the latter’s historically strong links with Central Asia and the South Caucasus. The Initiative will face an additional challenge from the United States, the current global leader.

BRI should not be viewed as China’s “grand strategy.” On the contrary, the Initiative should be interpreted as a proactive Chinese response to the growing complexity of our world. In the positive scenario, this response has the potential to turn into a new concept of how international order could be organized in the future. Three points rise to the mind.

First, BRI is mainly about building up and strengthening cooperation among participating countries. It should be understood as a joint “road to prosperity, and a belt of peace.” Its goal is to create networks of cooperation in many areas and on many different political levels.

Second, BRI is likely to continue being flexible, inclusive, and open. Its geographic scope remains to be determined. Those who are willing to join are joining; those who are not ready still have some time to think through their options. The fact that the Chinese leadership still has not published an “official” BRI map further underscores its global openness and inclusiveness. And this is the right concept. Every country that has an interest in one of the institutions related to BRI can become part of it. And “invitation” really is the right word. The success of the establishment of the AIIB was related to the same flexible method of inclusiveness. In addition to this inclusive orientation, the success of BRI and its related institutions also relies on the diversity of the participating countries. This con­cept is truly a grand invitation; it is neither pressure nor enforcement.

Third, the main task remains the building up of a comprehensive economic and political network to promote the various connections between the countries involved in BRI, including those in the Silk Road region. In this regard, BRI comprises all sorts of actors both within China and well outside its frontiers: central, provincial, and city governments, certainly, but also private sector players, NGOs, think tanks, and universities—to name the most obvious.

Security considerations also inform China’s decision to ini­tiate BRI. In this essay we can focus on just one example: energy security.

At present, China imports from abroad about half of the crude oil it requires. Of this amount, more than a half is delivered from the Middle East by sea. Just from these two sen­tences, it becomes obvious that a key Chinese national security issue centers on being sure to have safe and reliable maritime transporta­tion routes between its seacoast and one of the world’s most unstable re­gions. In the best of times, the risks are high; in the event of a regional or global conflict, they are likely to rise significantly. For example, the great maritime powers can simply block the delivery of hydrocarbons by sea to China.

Thus, China needs to diversify oil imports with an obvious alter­native—namely Eurasia: the Silk Road countries. Chinese growth rates may not be what they were, but they are still quite impressive. And the nature of all that growth is likely to be such that energy con­sumption will increase at a higher rate than growth. This gap could be partly but not insignificantly cov­ered by additional imports from Central Asia and Russia. By 2030, these countries could supply an ad­ditional 30 percent of China’s addi­tional energy requirements.

How have economic relations between China and Central Asian countries changed over the few years of BRI’s existence? According to data provided by China’s Ministry of Commerce, in 2018 FDI flows from China consisted of $3.8 billion to Kazakhstan, $1.98 billion to Turk­menistan, $412 million to Uzbeki­stan, $316 million to Tajikistan, and $47 million to Kyrgyzstan. There have also been what appear at first blush as dips: for instance, total Chinese investments in Kazakhstan fell from $19.7 billion in 2013 to $14.5 billion in 2019. But what is critically important to underline is that the struc­ture of Chinese investment to Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia has been changed for a better. Chinese businesses started to in­vest not only in the energy sector but in technology, processing, and manufacturing. As of July 2019, China had invested $2.16 billion in Kazakhstan’s industrial sector, whereas in 2013 the number was literally zero. Uzbekistan is also prioritizing Chinese investments in its industrial development. Most of the 46 projects agreed in 2018 between the two countries—worth a total of $6.8 billion—are focused on pro­cessing and manufacturing.

Exports from the Central Asia countries to China have also in­creased: they totaled $14.64 bil­lion in 2013; in 2019, they totaled $18.83 billion. China’s share of total exports from Central Asia grew from 17 percent to an impressive 23 percent in the same period.

The growing Chinese market has become increasingly important for the Central Asia economies, as well. That being said, over the past few years, imports from China to Central Asia have slightly declined, going from $15.42 billion in 2013 to $14.35 billion in 2019. China’s share in the region’s imports fell from 28 percent to 21 percent. This might be related to new tariffs and duties that were introduced in the Eurasian Economic Union coun­tries, as well as to the economic transformation of the region.

Demand‑driven Approach

BRI has been clearly explained in official documents as well as and numerous unofficial books, papers, and commentaries. One must admit that the main part of re­search regarding BRI has been con­ducted and published by Chinese and Western scholars. Due to a lack of capacity and fewer resources, much less analysis and fewer pub­lications have been produced by scholars from Eastern Europe, the Silk Road region, and Russia. One point of agree­ment within the scholarly commu­nity—irrespective of nationality—is that BRI is not a one‑way road but rather a multi‑ways one. This is a reflec­tion of the fact that live in a multipolar world, wherein the Initiative rose from one of the poles.

Until very recently, China needed to import knowl­edge, technology, and capital. And it did so suc­cessfully. Now the reverse is happening: it is China that is delivering knowl­edge, technology, and capital beyond its own borders to foreign soils near and far. And this is proving to be much more complicated.

Until very re­cently, China needed to import knowledge, technology, and cap­ital. And it did so successfully. Now the reverse is happening: it is China that is delivering knowledge, tech­nology, and capital beyond its own borders to foreign soils near and far. And this is proving to be much more complicated. Successful out­wards investment requires not only money, knowledge of foreign laws, regulations, and business practices; it also requires understanding and recognition of diversities, appre­ciation of differences in cultures, ethics, habits, customs, and so on.

One of the “must‑do” charac­teristics of BRI as it is coming to be understood is going to have to be a thoughtful acknowledgment of those differences. The Chinese way of thinking and doing busi­ness differs from, for example, the Western or Islamic way. One should not automatically bring or apply any preconceptions while acting in a new political and economic envi­ronment. And one should never auto­matically insist on the application of previously known norms, rules, or principles. Practical steps must be adjustable and made to be compat­ible with different environments. All actions should lead to deep­ening trust, building bridges, and constructing a sense of joint own­ership. BRI should not divide but unite people and nations.

How will the Initiative be re­ceived by others—China’s neigh­boring Central Asian countries, for example?

The key question to be answered is the following: what to do and what not to do while planning, acting, and communicating between potential partners during the im­plementation of a given project.

BRI should be considered by the countries and their communities as a respon­sible and demand‑driven process, which would build a profound sense of owner­ship at the local level.

The key advice here is that BRI should be considered by the countries and their communities as a responsible and demand‑driven process, which would build a profound sense of ownership at the local level.

Building trust between new partners should come first and become the highest priority. As Confucius famously said: “I wouldn’t know what to do with someone whose word cannot be trusted.”

This will not be an easy task. For example, the Soviet Union tried to harmonize its multicultural and multiethnic societies within its own boundaries for three‑quarters of a century. In some cases, there were successes, but in others, there were failures. China also knows that this is not an easy process.

One must be prepared for the fact that in many BRI countries there is a more than even chance that “resistance groups” will pop up— factions whose interests are in contradiction with those of global­ization and BRI’s ideas and goals. Among them will be nationalist, pop­ulist, ethnic, envi­ronment, and var­ious other lobbyist forces. Such groups are political or economic beneficiaries of status quo poli­cies and rhetoric.

Only openness, inclusiveness, and efficient communication will improve exchanges and mutual understanding between peoples and ethnic groups, which will in turn lead to a lowering of the tempera­ture of historical, economic, envi­ronmental, and political disputes. As BRI drives countries towards prosperity—and ordinary people’s wellbeing continues to improve— the anti‑BRI lobbying groups will find it more difficult to influence the population; this will threaten the basics principles of not only their support but also their exis­tence. With the success of BRI, their social influence will decline.

Thus, upon working in foreign soils one must avoid any careless step that could potentially ignite nationalistic, ethnic, or environ­mental hysterics under the expected common slogan “Chinese invasion.”

Artificial Tensions

The apparent lack of readi­ly‑available, reliable informa­tion about China’s real plans and intentions in Central Asia has created a favorable ground for specu­lation and provocations among var­ious interest groups.

I will cite several cases of unrest in Central Asia, caused by completely artificial and far‑fetched reasons. Pure speculations and the falsifica­tions of facts produced by contro­versial nationalist groups were the main reasons for each of the cases elaborated below.

I begin with an example from the Kyrgyz Republic. Not so long ago, Kyrgyz villagers entered the site of a mine operated by a Chinese com­pany and fought with its Chinese workers. The source of a conflict was minor and artificial. But it did take place and it caused significant damage to the investment climate in the country. Another source of conflict? The frequent speculation that Chinese workers are marrying Kyrgyz women in large numbers. How large are those numbers? Only 60 such marriages were recorded from 2010 to 2018.

Many critics of China speculate on a large influx of Chinese immi­grants to Kazakhstan, although the actual numbers in this example are also quite low. According to offi­cial data, between 1995 and 2014 Kazakhstani citizenship was granted to 73,800 individuals from China in total. Of these, only 13 percent were Han Chinese, which make up 92 percent of China’s overall population.

Another example from Kazakhstan. At the end of May 2016, the country experienced unexpected protests sparked by proposed amendments to the Land Code that was originally adopted in 2014. The amendment was about to enter into force in June 2016 when the tumults started. The proposed changes would have allowed for­eigners to rent agricultural land for 25 years, instead of the previous ten. Following protests, the Kazakh government postponed the amend­ment’s introduction. But how large was the size of this great peril? According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Regional Development, at the time only 32 Chinese citizens had rented a total of 4,750 hectares—that comes out to 0.0002 percent of the country’s agricultural area.

To stay on this last example: there was some misunderstanding as well with regards to the false pro­paganda of interest groups over the assumption that the amendments would allow foreigners to own land, which the officials did not explain properly. Then the protests erupted. Everyone understood that these proposed changes weren’t the real cause of the protests. They in­stead reflected underlying discon­tent with the state of the national economy, income and social benefit reductions, and a sort of popular, general fear of growing Chinese economic influence in the country.

Naturally, the main blame for a case like this is to be placed at the feet of those in the central and local governments—as well as the intel­ligence services—who had been unable to explain to the public the real ideas behind the proposal. It was not done properly, and the “opposition” used these cases quite skillfully.

A conclusion to be drawn from this case is the following. Amend­ments to the national law that were made in the interest of the country were artificially and opportunisti­cally used by unscrupulous interest groups and political forces to build resistance to a valuable initiative.

Another example, also from Kazakhstan. A few years ago, people began to read in the local press about inter‑governmental consultations on the transfer of factories from China to Central Asia—a way to deal part of the excess capacity that exists in the Chinese manufacturing sector. The press published this news without any description of what it would all mean, and without informing the public which sort of enterprises were expected to be transferred.

Immediately after that announce­ment, some lobbying groups and media outlets started to spread misinformation about “environ­mentally dirty, dangerous, and un­healthy” industries. Finally, thanks to the government’s idleness and ignorance, public opinion turned against that initiative.

Many such examples harmed the status and image of Chinese companies—both in Central Asia and around the world. The short conclusion from those cases: disregard of problems, lack of transparency, and ignorance of key details creates an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion.

In all the examples outlined above, the public did not get the sense of real ownership. In each case, it was as if someone was in­sisting on making it happen. The whole approach was not designed to be a demand‑driven process. Good intentions led to the opposite result, and, at the end of the day, public opinion turned against perfectly healthy investment opportunities. These examples also show how easy it is to capitalize on “anti‑Chinese sentiment” in some places. This is dangerous and could lead to a po­tentially destructive output that may, sometimes, destroy not only the particular project in question but even cause harm to the entirety of a bilateral relationship.

Can such artificially‑created tensions be avoided? Surely yes, but only by applying seriously, and in advance, full and trans­parent public consultations. Three ideas spring to mind.

First, a government should launch transparent public debates on each subject. Second, a govern­ment should organize tailor‑made public‑private dialogues on what is required by the relevant country and its economy; to consult with society on the kind of potential ben­efits and challenges each particular project could bring to the country or region in question. And third, only upon reaching full public consensus on a particular matter should the government in question place an open request on a specific and targeted investment. That way, these “artificial problems” can be outflanked.

Avoiding Various Traps

Perhaps it would be a good idea to create a special educational institution that would teach and train businessmen on how to work in foreign countries with different political and economic environ­ments. That is what already hap­pening in China on a large scale.

“Think globally but act locally” is a business slogan that is fully valid in such cases. Local people and so­cieties must be fully included and involved in all processes—from initial planning to final practical realization. Each phase and every action should be well‑planned with weighted tactics, precise strategies, and well‑executed implementation steps. Of course, these must be ac­companied by transparent commu­nication, with full inclusiveness and connectivity.

The real goal of these steps is to build a sense of local ownership. Again, a fully responsible demand—not supply‑driven actions—is what is required.

The real goal of these steps is to build a sense of local ownership. Again, a fully respon­sible demand—not supply‑driven actions—is what is required.

In other words, we all must work more closely with each other on “what to do and what not to do” matters. In official BRI documents, it is clearly stated that China will pro­mote cultural, ac­ademic, and indi­vidual cooperation and exchanges, which would make its contribution to building the public trust and mu­tual understanding and would re­duce the risks of public discontent.

It is also clearly stated that China will work not only at the official levels but also on the “experts to experts” (E2E) level. The aim? To offer not only scientific advice but also deliver straight‑to‑the‑point recommendations to policymakers. Such an approach is required to build trust and avoid sometimes costly mistakes and errors, which can lead to opposite results.

Each policy discussion should have inputs from both re­searches and practitioners. That is why in the final part of this essay it would be important to comment on connections between funda­mental and applied research and development.

As a professor of physics, I was an active scientist in the former Soviet Union. At that time, the country was strong in fundamental research. The country had sur­vived the arms race with the United States even though its military budget was vastly lower. However, everyone knows that the Soviet Union could not compete economically with the West, partly because of a poor ca­pacity to implement the results of fundamental research onto prac­tical and commercial applications.

Though our subject belongs not to natural but to social science, we all must first acknowledge that the problem I have discussed exists, and, secondly, we all must work in concert on figuring out how to avoid the various traps that may be laid.

We have—both here, in Cen­tral Asia, and in the outside world—an enormous amount of fundamental studies, which creates great foundations for practical follow‑up projects. Now it is critically important  to focus on the details of the practical implementation of such recommendations—and of course, as always, the “devil will be in the details.” An expert com­munity should be prepared so that this process can become more than just general, mainly theoret­ical research. Not only in gener­ating papers, but practical, prag­matic, and “straight‑to‑the‑point” policy recommendations, which will be actively used by both pol­iticians and practitioners in their daily work. This must be the goal. The time is now to focus on over­coming challenges for the execu­tion of the idea of better coopera­tion and greater connectivity.

Politicians and policymakers are similar everywhere. For instance, as a rule, they do not read pa­pers—even brilliant ones. But they sometimes listen. Let us get them to listen. More multicultural de­bates between expert communities and policymakers—with the direct involvement of Eurasian, Chinese, and European scholars, thinkers, and politicians—should target the creation of very specific “road­maps” from the initial planning of various projects to their final implementation.

Surely, this can help all of us in the Silk Road region grasp the meaning of the Belt and Road Initiative.