Reassessing U.S.-Azerbaijani Relations

The U.S.‑Azerbaijan re­lationship remains im­portant to both countries, but it is time to reevaluate and up­date how they engage with each other. The Second Karabakh War is the most visible of the reasons for such a reassessment, given Azerbaijan’s military successes, Russia’s headline role in securing the No­vember 2020 agreement that halted the fighting, and the need to under­take the extremely difficult work of avoiding a new war and building a peace. But China’s high profile eco­nomic, diplomatic, and security activities across Eurasia, coupled with the results of the November 2020 election in the United States, have also significantly altered the diplomatic environment. Lastly, multinational challenges—such as the economic, social, and other ramifications of the COVID‑19 pandemic or the realities of climate change—make the need for reval­uation, dialogue, and mapping out new directions in the two countries’ relations even more apparent.

Basic, long‑standing factors in the two countries’ engagement cer­tainly remain valid, but that does not obviate the need for tough, crit­ical analysis of where their dealings stand and for recalibrating how to engage in the time ahead. Sticking to how Baku and Washington have worked together or talked to each other in the past serves nei­ther country, given changing re­gional and global pictures. While conducting such an analysis pres­ents challenges, developing new patterns in the two countries’ re­lationship presents a strategic op­portunity to build up ties that can become both more mutually bene­ficial and effective.

Thirty Years of Partnership

Washington has long char­acterized its relationship with Azerbaijan as a triangle based on three specific points or vectors: security issues, energy and other economic interests, and support for good governance and the rule of law. At the same time, Azer­baijan has sought and valued a stra­tegic relationship with the United States, leveraging it to strengthen its independence and well‑being. The overriding interest for Azerbaijanis—officials as well as citizens—has been to build Amer­ican understanding and support for its position vis‑à‑vis Armenia in the protracted, painful conflict over Nagorno‑Karabakh.

For U.S. policymakers—and for those in other capitals as well— Azerbaijan’s unique geographic position is a critical consideration. Azerbaijan is the only country in the world that borders both Russia and Iran. It occupies a central place in a dynamic part of the world where global and regional powers’ interests can collide and where con­flict and instability are frequently possible. The region’s hydrocarbon and other resources have been key additional factors.

Geography makes Azerbaijan, together with Georgia, the bridge that connects Western and Central Europe with Central Asia and further onwards to East and South Asia. This reality makes Azerbaijan essential to the Northern Distribution Network, the pathway from the Black Sea, across the Caucasus, Caspian, and Central Asia, which provides essen­tial, timely access to and from Af­ghanistan for the United States and NATO. Likewise, the Georgian‑ Azerbaijani trans‑Caucasus route has been important for U.S. allies’ and other partners’ commercial links with Central Asia and coun­tries both further south and east, providing them with the only path that avoids transiting through Russia or Iran.

This geographic reality means U.S. policymakers should factor Azerbaijan—along with the Greater Caspian Region of which it is an essential component—into a range of foreign policy consid­erations. The Trump Administra­tion, for example, identified five overriding concerns in its 2017 National Security Strategy: competition from Russia and China; the dangers posed by Iran and North Korea; and threats of terrorism and criminal activity, narcotics, and human trafficking. Azerbaijan is an essential component in America’s efforts to deal with every one of the concerns listed in this strategy, with the possible exception of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Indica­tions are these issues will be among those of deep concern to the in­coming Biden Administration.

Coming back to the triangle of strategic interests characterizing U.S. relations with Azerbaijan, it is critical to stress that while each is important in and of itself, each of the three vectors are inter‑related and mutually re‑enforcing. Success in one is needed for success in the other two. From an American point of view, success in these areas also benefits Azerbaijan, strengthening its own independence, stability, prosperity, and well‑being in a dif­ficult part of the world.

On the security point, for example, Azerbaijan’s sup­port on the ground in Afghanistan as part of the international coalition has been important, as was its earlier support in providing peace­keepers in Kosovo. Azerbaijan’s role in the Northern Distribution Network remains key, but Baku has also provided valuable, direct bilat­eral support to Kabul in its fight to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan and bring to an end the decades of violence there. Moreover, Azer­baijan is an essential piece of the Lapis Lazuli corridor linking Afghanistan with the West, and providing a way to develop legiti­mate trade and foster Afghans’ eco­nomic well‑being.

Also within the security dimen­sion, Azerbaijan has been a valued partner in ongoing efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism. In addition to direct cooperation in international anti‑terrorism ef­forts, Azerbaijan’s example as a majority Shia Muslim state where religious and inter‑ethnic tolera­tion is a long‑established norm is also important. Azerbaijan’s strong, positive relations with Israel are very much noted and appreciated in the United States as well. On top of benefiting Israel, these relations may have provided something of an example as the Trump Administra­tion sought to build diplomatic re­lations between Israel and a greater number of Muslim countries in the Arab world.

Azerbaijan’s geostrategic po­sition has been especially pertinent in what may be the most widely known example of bilat­eral cooperation with the United States: the further development of Azerbaijan’s and the Caspian Ba­sin’s crude oil and natural gas reserves and the transport of those resources to parts of Europe and be­yond, which significantly boosted regional and global energy secu­rity. Azerbaijan’s energy resources, whether as exports of crude oil to Israel or natural gas to Europe, have been factors in helping countries stand up to those who would use energy supplies for coercion.

The United States was a visible, active partner with Azerbaijan in realizing the “Contract of the Century.” Signed in 1994, that historic agreement directly led to development of the Azeri‑ Chirag‑Gunashli oilfields in the Caspian as well as the construction of the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline.

The 2006 completion of BTC was followed by the Southern Gas Corridor project. That project cost about $40 billion to build and in­cluded the development of the giant Shah Deniz II gas field in the Caspian, the construction of one of the largest gas processing facilities outside the Middle East in Sangachal just south of Baku, and the building of a 3,500 km set of gas pipelines from Baku across the South Caucasus, Anatolia, and the southern Balkans to Italy. This project, which will be almost cer­tainly fully operational by the time this issue goes to press, will deliver 6 billion cubic meters (BCM) of natural gas annually to Turkey, 1 BCM to Greece, another 1 BCM to Bulgaria, 500,000 cubic me­ters annually to Albania, and up to 18 BCM to Italy. Moreover, the Southern Gas Corridor project can be expanded, which would en­able the trans‑Caucasus and trans‑ Anatolian portions to carry perhaps as much as 31 BCM of gas from the Caspian region annually while the Trans‑Adriatic Pipeline could be expanded to carry 20 BCM. Even in its current configuration, a link could be made across the Caspian to enable gas supplies from Turkmenistan to reach markets in the West.

Such expansions would further enhance energy security in the Balkans and elsewhere in Europe. For the United States, the European Union, and other European coun­tries, seeing the realization of the Southern Gas Corridor and the ear­lier oil‑related projects were stra­tegic keys to diversifying sources of energy and safeguarding against potential disruptions of needed oil and natural gas.

The third vector—the impor­tance of building good gover­nance and the rule of law—has been an area of contention as well as ben­eficial cooperation. Rule of law is essential to attracting and keeping foreign business and investment, to making a country more competi­tive internationally, and to helping keep capital at home and encour­aging private enterprises’ establish­ment and growth. Efforts against corruption and having courts and a legal system where companies— foreign or domestic—can be as­sured of fair recourse in a dispute are essential factors in business managers’ decisions on whether, and to what extent, to invest in a country. However, while there have been positive exchanges on these topics, matters of political prisoners and other pieces of Azerbaijan’s democratic development have been contentious and colored the overall relationship on many occasions.

For Azerbaijanis, a strategic re­lationship with the United States has been important in helping the country navigate the region’s com­plicated geopolitics, especially the threats posed by some of Azerbai­jan’s neighbors. They have deeply valued cooperation on energy secu­rity matters and greater economic and business ties.

However, what Azerbaijanis wanted most from the United States was its understanding and support in the protracted conflict with Ar­menia over Nagorno‑Karabakh and the seven surrounding regions. As one of the Minsk Group Co‑Chairs, along with France and the Russian Federation, the United States was charged with helping the parties find a way forward. Frankly, pa­tience increasingly wore thin—both within the Azerbaijani public as well as among figures in the country’s leadership—over the years due to a lack of progress. Moreover, factors such as Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act passed in 1992, which sought to constrain U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan, raised questions of Washington’s impartiality even though successive U.S. administrations used a subsequent amend­ment to waive its restrictions.

Changes Are Necessary

By the end of 2020 changes in the regional and broader internation­al fabric underline the need for American and Azerbaijani policymak­ers to examine and re‑direct aspects of relations.

By the end of 2020 changes in the regional and broader international fabric—some were gradual, others appeared to be sudden, tectonic shifts—under­line the need for American and Azerbaijani policymakers to examine and redirect aspects of relations.

One especially important change is China’s broadened, more active engagement across Eurasia. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the pri­mary, overarching framework for increasing the network of con­nections between China and East Asia with the western portions of Eurasia, and in­cludes new trans­portation infra­structure together with other com­mercial and eco­nomic activities, often financed by China and pri­marily involving Chinese compa­nies. For Beijing, BRI represents a strategic means for strengthening China’s influence and security by, for example, cir­cumventing potential chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca.

In some ways, BRI parallels and complements initiatives cham­pioned by the United States and others to build a New Silk Road for the purpose of reestablishing trans‑Eurasian transportation and trade routes and with the intent to boost the economic activity and stability of, in particular, the greater Caspian region. The new road and rail links, for example, can cut travel time for surface transport from Shanghai to western European commercial centers from six weeks to a fortnight.

However, as BRI moved forward concerns arose that arrangements for obtaining Chinese investment funds and other support could come with hidden or higher than expected costs and with terms that translate into Chinese control and ownership. There have also been instances of heavy‑handed Chinese political engagement ac­companying BRI projects. Moreover, China has injected a military se­curity dimension into how it has engaged some countries in Central Asia within the framework of BRI. The United States and other governments have become particularly concerned and outspoken on the dangers of such predatory lending and business practices, and there are instances in which countries’ politicians and domestic popu­lations have opposed or demon­strated against deals reached with Chinese entities.

Azerbaijan’s own successful focus on developing its own transport and communications in­frastructure and furthering connec­tions with the rest of the Caspian region and beyond is a second im­portant development. Connected with, yet separate from, China’s BRI, Azerbaijani efforts over the past decade have also yielded positive results in its relations with the United States.

Especially noteworthy in this regard has been the new port of Alat and its associated free trade industrial zone located about 75 km south of Baku on the Caspian Sea, as well as the construction of the new Baku‑Tbilisi‑Kars railway that was inaugurated in October 2017. Their realization, along de­velopments on the eastern side of the Caspian in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, advance the vision of a modern Silk Road and significantly help overcome the Caspian region’s poor interconnectivity. To date, the Caspian region has been one of the least interconnected areas of the world, a factor holding back its economic growth and prosperity.

The Alat and related transpor­tation infrastructure works are also key to the country’s efforts to diversify its economy and to create industries and jobs. Another Azerbaijani‑led project to boost re­gional connectivity is the laying of a new fiber optic cable across the Caspian and the Caucasus that will increase and strengthen Internet and international telecommunica­tions capacity across Eurasia.

Reducing dependence on hydro­carbon exports is a longstanding, necessary goal for Azerbaijan. Es­tablishing new companies and busi­ness sectors are even more critical given the country’s growing popula­tion and youth bulge, with perhaps two‑thirds of the population born in 1990 or the following years—a situation Azerbaijan shares with many others in the Caspian basin— and the fact the hydrocarbon sector is highly capital intensive and em­ploys comparatively few workers. Seeking to create around 200,000 jobs annually means encouraging the fostering of new enterprises and the growth of existing ones.

By completing these infrastruc­ture projects, Azerbaijan is shaping an environment that can create and grow new productive activi­ties as well as strengthen regional connectivity. These infrastructure projects; the associated efforts to digitalize operations, eliminate reg­ulatory, and processing barriers; and the region’s economic expan­sion also mean opportunities for American manufacturers and services providers.

A third factor changing the context of U.S.‑Azerbaijan relations has been the overall tenor of American foreign policy under President Donald Trump. Although much less engaged in many as­pects of international relations than its predecessors, the Trump Administration’s focus on Iran and its maximum pressure campaign drew attention to the need to engage Azerbaijan. Then National Security Advisor John Bolton’s visit to the region in October 2018 underlined this point. The Trump Administra­tion also continued American engagement on energy matters, sup­porting completion of the Southern Gas Corridor and seeing it as a means to provide a broader range of countries in the Balkans with needed natural gas and thus in­creased energy and national se­curity. Moreover, the Trump Administration strongly sup­ported the project to build a Trans‑ Caspian pipeline, which would enable Turkmenistan to develop and sell its immense natural gas re­sources to Western consumers while also diversifying its slate of customers.

To its credit, the Trump Administration developed and published a policy on Central Asia—one of very few such policy statements it produced. The doc­ument focused on the five former Soviet states east of the Caspian plus Afghanistan, with an eye on the roles of Russia and China there as well as having in mind the im­portance of reaffirming American support for the independence, sov­ereignty, and territorial integrity of the countries of the region.

The document, however, failed to spell out the necessity for the South Caucasus to be factored in if the U.S. strategy were to be fully successful. The geographic realities of the South Caucasus as the bridge to the region were not appropriately addressed. At the same time, Trump’s focus on drawing down in Afghanistan and a general pullback of America’s international commit­ments raised concerns over where the United States might be heading. Human rights dropped off the agenda, except where the overall context of bilateral relations was worsening or difficult, e.g., in the case of statements over the treat­ment of China’s Uighurs or abuses in Iran. Empty chairs in federal agencies made high‑level contacts more difficult and disrupted formu­lating policies and messaging.

Recent Game‑changers

Two especially important game‑changing develop­ments in 2020 further altered re­alities in the region as well as the framework of U.S.‑Azerbaijan re­lations. The first was the outbreak of the COVID‑19 pandemic and its social—and especially its eco­nomic—impacts. The second was the renewed warfare between Armenia and Azerbaijan that began with a limited conflict in July 2020 and culminated in early November with Azerbaijan retaking Shusha and other territories Armenia had occupied since the early 1990s, which resulted in a Moscow‑brokered armistice agreement with Yerevan.

Moving across countries with differing intensity and returning at different times, the COVID‑19 pan­demic has forced shutdowns and disrupted travel, trade, and supply chains. The resulting global eco­nomic slowdown—which came on top of a fight between major oil ex­porters Russia and Saudi Arabia— produced substantial global sur­pluses of crude oil as well as severe drops in oil prices for other pro­ducers, including Azerbaijan. Countries instituted strict restric­tions on entry to control the virus’ spread. Trade and distribution systems were disrupted worldwide and citizens working abroad found themselves either unable to return home or to their jobs. At the same time, health systems were severely strained, education was disrupted, tourism dried up, and families suf­fered income losses and other pres­sures as necessary lockdowns were instituted.

While almost every country ex­pects to end 2020 with negative GDP growth numbers, the uneven nature of the pandemic’s impacts and the differences in impact mean countries will emerge from the pandemic and their economies will return to pre‑coronavirus levels at different times and at different speeds. For Azerbaijan this situa­tion may mean challenges resulting from, say, Turkey recovering at one point and Russia at another. Different countries recovering at different paces will also have im­pacts on oil and natural gas mar­kets—again with potential impacts for Azerbaijan and other hydro­carbon exporters. Moreover, while advanced industrialized economies can draw on reserves or incur na­tional debt increases to institute large fiscal stimulus programs to help their citizens and business sectors, emerging and developing country economies generally lack such capacity. Furthermore, emerging economies and devel­oping countries may be hit with the need to repay or reschedule international loan commitments even as their economies remain in recession. A further reality is that economic recovery will follow vaccines and medical advances in treatment, enabling individuals safely to resume their activities. At this writing, many of the vac­cines that show promise require ul­tra‑cold storage measures and two injections to be effective.

These factors, which in addition to costs and the logistics of pro­duction and delivery to hundreds of millions of people worldwide, suggest global recovery from the virus remains some months out, while its harmful social, economic, and health effects continue. Like other countries, Azerbaijan will need to navigate this situation and make conscious policy decisions on how best to shape and rebuild systems; post‑coronavirus realities will not simply snap back to what they were before the onset of the COVID‑19 pandemic.

The final and most dramatic factor necessitating new thinking regarding U.S.‑Azerbaijan relations is Azerbaijan’s successful military campaign to regain con­trol over most of Nagorno‑K ara­bakh and the surrounding terri­tories Armenia occupied since the early 1990s.

In less than two months Azerbaijan achieved militarily much of what it had long sought diplomatically for more than two decades.

In less than two months Azerbaijan achieved militarily much of what it had long sought diplomat­ically for more than two decades. It pushed the Armenian forces out of most of the territories surrounding Nagorno‑Karabakh and regained control of much of Nagorno‑ Karabakh itself. Although each of the heads of state of the three Minsk Group co‑chair countries called for a ceasefire, and their foreign ministers repeatedly engaged Armenian and Azerbaijani coun­terparts, it was Russia—with Pres­ident Vladimir Putin’s direct in­volvement—that brokered the November 10th statement that ending the fighting.

The November statement halted the kinetic conflict; left Azerbaijan’s government in control of the areas it had recaptured; and provided for Armenia to vacate Kelbajar, Aghdam, and Lachin. How­ever, it also included provisions for 1,960 Russian peacekeepers to be present in the region for five years, with a provision for them to remain for an additional five years provided neither Armenia, Azerbaijan, nor Russia oppose ex­tension. In addition, Russia will monitor the Lachin corridor between Armenia and a portion of Nagorno‑Karabakh that falls within the Russian security zone and previously occupied by Armenian troops.

The surface route between Azerbaijan’s mainland and its Nakhchivan exclave will also be re­opened for the first time since 1992, but with Russian FSB personnel monitoring the four crossing points.

United Nations agencies were charged with overseeing the return of refugees and the internally dis­placed. Turkey, which sent F‑16s to Ganja following Armenia’s mis­sile attacks on the city and strongly supported Azerbaijan diplomati­cally, was recognized as having a presence in the headquarters of the Russian monitoring mission.

The impacts of this Second Karabakh War and the Russian‑brokered ceasefire are still emerging and various necessary follow‑up arrangements are being worked out. However, some points have al­ready become apparent. One is that Azerbaijan showed effective mil­itary planning and warfare capa­bilities. Azerbaijanis were also able to reassert sovereignty and control over portions of its territory that Armenia‑backed forces had occupied since the early 1990s. Another is that once again Russia showed it is not afraid to capitalize on op­portunities to take an assertive role and to show itself an influential actor on the global stage. Azerbaijan was long proud of the fact that, unlike others in the former Soviet space, there were no foreign troops on its soil; now Russian troops are on Azerbaijani territory as peacekeeping monitors while also looking to be seen as guarantors of Armenian security.

Russian troops, as General Ben Hodges recently wrote, are now in all three countries of the South Caucasus. For Armenia, the sit­uation represents an unforeseen defeat on the battlefield. Yerevan will need not only to reappraise its situation but also to determine how best to ensure its long‑term security. Finally, Turkey showed both a willingness and the ability to advance its own interests in the South Caucasus, strengthening its image as a rising regional power to be taken into account.

Five Points of Reappraisal

Azerbaijani and Amer­ican officials need to re­evaluate and recalibrate both what they say to each other and how they say it.

Given these changes as well as their long‑term interests, Azerbaijani and American officials need to reevaluate and recalibrate both what they say to each other and how they say it. Again, each country has long­standing interests that remain valid and sit at the core of their respective national security and foreign pol­icies. However changes in the region, the ma­turing and growing self‑confidence of Azerbaijan and other states that emerged (or re‑emerged) out of the Soviet Union thirty years ago, and the range of contemporary issues the world faces all require Wash­ington and Baku to reappraise how they approach each other and es­tablish a different tone in their bi­lateral dialogue.

Given the nature of the U.S. pol­icymaking apparatus, these reap­praisals on the Washington end in the context of the incoming Biden Administration will most likely take place within the interagency frame­work of broader strategic analyses of, say, Russia or Asia, although some bilateral recalibration may take place in specific Azerbaijan‑ or Caucasus‑focused discussions.

A reappraised bilateral relation­ship should—at least from a U.S. point of view—include at least the following five points: actively en­gage with Azerbaijan in addressing Russian, Chinese, and Iranian ambitions; build peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan; harness Azerbaijan’s capacity to serve as a key to greater regional connec­tivity; build on years of coopera­tion on energy matters; and address governance concerns through more effective dialogue. Each will be ex­amined in turn.

First, actively engage with Azerbaijan in addressing Russian, Chinese, and Iranian ambi­tions. Azerbaijan’s geostrategic im­portance remains great as does the country’s need to navigate the com­plications arising from bordering Russia and Iran, along with China’s push for trans‑Eurasian transport, economic, and political linkages. President Putin has frequently said he sees Russia as having a privi­leged position or a special sphere of influence over the former Soviet space, a claim the United States has continued to reject as it fosters the independence, sovereignty, territo­rial integrity, and prosperity of the states of the Caspian region and elsewhere that were once part of the Soviet Union. Contemporary Russian ambitions on this front, however, include utilizing pro­tracted and other conflicts to ad­vance its stature and influence. China, which is challenging freedom of navigation and other long‑standing U.S. interests in the Pacific, is pursuing an ambitious agenda to its west that aims at boosting its prosperity and global stature. Iran’s nuclear program, support for terrorism, and his­tory of meddling in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and elsewhere mean it will be a continued challenge to inter­national stability and security. As we have seen, Azerbaijan’s location and interactions with each of these players makes it a key piece in a broader puzzle for constructively dealing with these geopolitical re­alities.

Besides appreciating Azerbaijan’s stability as an important asset in advancing U.S. interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia and also to keep the region from becoming an arc of crisis, the United States should continue to help Azerbaijan act as a needed partner in fighting international drug trafficking, traf­ficking in persons, and other mul­tilateral threats. This cooperation must include combatting the prolif­eration of weapons of mass destruc­tion, a program which has been highly successful. While there may be calls at home to cut back on U.S. security cooperation—which has long included America’s refusal to supply military support that could be used in a war with Armenia— pulling back on security cooper­ation in areas where Azerbaijan is a needed partner would be a mistake.

The incoming Biden Administra­tion should also boost direct con­tacts between Washington officials and Azerbaijani partners at all rel­evant levels. Russia and others have often bested American diplomacy in the frequency, intensity, and effectiveness of direct contacts be­tween capitals. The frequent phone calls, congratulatory messages, and high‑level visits between Moscow and Baku—and between Moscow and other capitals—pay off in terms of increased influence. Washington has been comparatively stingy in terms of such contacts. However, COVID‑19 has shown effective conversations can take place elec­tronically. Yes, there are security concerns, but 2020 proved offi­cials can engage comfortably and with needed effect using electronic media. These conversations should not just focus on bilateral issues, but should also look at informa­tion‑sharing and advancing en­gagement on broader regional and multilateral issues for a number of good reasons, including the fact that Azerbaijan currently chairs the Non‑Aligned Movement. For ex­ample, Azerbaijan could be useful in developing a new relationship with America’s key NATO ally and growing regional player Turkey.

Second, build peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The November statement halting the ki­netic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is silent on the future of Nagorno‑Karabakh. Although the armistice ends the fighting, it does not establish peace. Moreover, in addition to concerns that Arme­nian anger over its defeat will lead to revanchism and future conflict, there is also the sense that Russia will want to utilize and benefit from further animosity between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as it has with other protracted conflicts.

It is important that the United States and other countries ac­tively engage both Armenia and Azerbaijan to help them build real peace. Emotions are high on both sides, but for the good of both coun­tries Yerevan and Baku will need to find ways to live together in peace, security, and prosperity. It will not be easy, but it can be done. After all, there was no guarantee in 1945 that there would not be another Fran­co‑German war and it is well worth noting that any list of close, strong U.S. allies includes countries like the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Japan—each of which fought bloody, vicious wars against the United States in the past.

The United States has consider­able experience, capabilities, and expertise in peace‑building around the world. Americans should bring these resources to bear in working with both Armenia and Azerbaijan in finding ways to rebuild under­standing, live together peacefully, and shape a future that benefits both peoples. Moreover, America has the capacity to convoke inter­national meetings to engage other countries in the peace‑building ef­fort, including to help encourage the investment and other economic engagement that will be needed. The incoming Biden Administra­tion should assume a substantial role, engaging Armenians and Azerbaijanis to solicit their input and buy‑in in moving forward to realize an effective, and greatly needed peace‑building process.

Third, focus on Azerbaijan as a key to greater regional connectivity. America’s Central Asia strategy document restates U.S. interests in the region’s devel­opment and prosperity, which in­cludes encouraging connectivity in Central Asia and between Central Asia and Afghanistan. The United States has also supported the Three Seas Initiative to facilitate interconnectivity on energy, infrastruc­ture, and digitalization projects in Central and Eastern Europe, seeing it as a way to reduce these coun­tries’ dependence on Russian and Chinese economic overtures. More­over, the United States has long en­couraged the Lapis Lazuli corridor to expand Afghanistan’s trade and other links with the west as well as construction of a Trans‑Caspian pipeline to enable Turkmenistan to expand the range of customers for its natural gas and also to boost further European energy security. A land bridge across the South Caucasus is crucial for the success of each of these projects.

The United States should en­gage Azerbaijan more vigorously in boosting such interconnectivity. In addition to the realities resulting from Azerbaijan’s geographic po­sition, there is also the fact that Azerbaijan takes the initiative in building such interconnections. The further expansion of the new port at Alat is one example. Another is Azerbaijan’s engagement with Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan in building the needed infrastructure and systems that are key to boosting the inter­connection the United States ad­vocates and that the region’s pros­perity and stability need.

Moreover, the focus on intercon­nectivity includes digitalization and expanding communications and internet links. Azerbaijan has worked with Kazakhstan and seeks to work with Georgia to realize a Trans‑Caspian fiberoptic cable that would connect to Germany as well as China. This would improve con­nectivity globally as well as within the region. The fact that Azerbaijan used its hydrocarbon dividends rather than turning to China for financing—as others in the region have done—is also noteworthy.

Each of the aforementioned proj­ects present commercial opportu­nities for U.S. firms. Thus, for com­mercial as well as foreign policy reasons, the United States should be sitting down with Azerbaijan and discussing efforts to boost interconnectivity.

Fourth, build on years of co­operation of energy matters, including to foster stronger U.S.‑ Azerbaijan business and economic ties. Strong U.S.‑Azerbaijan com­munication and cooperation in the energy sector—and the important contributions to energy and re­gional security they have pro­duced—should be broadened into a more vibrant and mutually bene­ficial set of economic and business relationships. Strong business ties not only promote prosperity, they also produce constituencies in each country interested in and looking to further build stronger bilateral relations.

Even as much of the discussions in international fora, government agencies, and various think tanks focus on climate change and the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Azerbaijan’s oil and nat­ural gas reserves will remain im­portant to Israel, much of Europe, and other regions home to U.S. al­lies and partners. Action to address climate change is crucial, but at the same time, the world will con­tinue to depend on oil and oil‑derived products in the coming years as well as look to natural gas as a needed, cleaner energy source. The latter, in particular, is seen as a tran­sition fuel for electricity generation as well as feedstock for needed chemical products.

In other words, a transition will take place, but not overnight. The United States will almost certainly continue to look to Azerbaijan as a source for diversified, secure en­ergy for Italy, Turkey, the Balkans, and others, even if this topic is not the headliner it was in previous years. Moreover, another Russian move to cut off Ukraine or others could quickly catapult European energy diversification and security back into the forefront of regional and global diplomatic and security discussions.

The growing populations of the Caucasus and Central Asia, these countries’ mineral and other re­sources, and the development of the region’s economies all mean commercial and other economic opportunities. Washington has had a history of good bilateral discus­sions with Azerbaijan on economic and business matters, including on what is needed to build a stronger, more attractive commercial envi­ronment. Those talks should con­tinue, but with heightened direct input from the business community and other stakeholders. Sparked by concerns over Chinese intentions and examples of predatory business practices, in the past few years the United States reenergized agencies such as the Export‑Import Bank (EXIM) and created the new De­velopment Finance Agency (DFC). These agencies should keep a focus on Azerbaijan and others in the region.

A further area for bilateral en­gagement is supporting economic reforms. Reforms in Azerbaijan, based on sound free‑market prin­ciples, remain essential for diver­sifying the country’s economy; fostering innovation and the estab­lishment and growth of new busi­nesses; and enabling Azerbaijani businesses to attract capital in an increasingly competitive global financial environment and market­place. American and other poten­tial foreign business partners will be watching Azerbaijan’s efforts to fight corruption, strengthen the integrity and fairness of its courts and legal environment, and how it looks to reshape and strengthen its economy as it emerges from the COVID‑19 pandemic with the eco­nomic contraction it has induced, and brings into motion plans to re­build its newly‑liberated territories.

Finally, address governance concerns through more ef­fective dialogue. It is premature to speculate in much detail on the new administration’s foreign policy, but U.S. experts generally agree that the Biden Administration will again have a strong focus on human rights and democratic development. The President‑elect, for example, has already talked about a democracy summit, with more initiatives likely to follow.

The human rights component of the bilateral relationship does not have to be handled as it was in the past; rather, both Baku and Wash­ington should learn from that ex­perience. Each side knows where the problems lie. As in other areas of effective bilateral engagement, quiet and reasoned discussions, in which each side shows respect for the other, have had—and will have—greater beneficial impacts than “naming and shaming” or “billboard diplomacy.”

Better Engagement

For the United States, a presi­dential transition traditionally represents an opportunity to re‑ex­amine issues, review priorities, and design new approaches. Events— ranging from the challenges to the rules‑based international system and the revived competition among some key global actors to the COVID‑19 pandemic, the Second Karabakh War, and the need to ad­dress the new situation in the South Caucasus—make this a time ripe for both re‑evaluation and deliber­ation on new ways for the United States and Azerbaijan to engage.

For the United States, this re­view will probably take place in the course of examination of the numerous broad challenges the Biden Administration will need to address. However, even without a specific U.S.‑Azerbaijan policy re­view, U.S. officials should step back, look at where relations stand, and consider how we can better engage one another.

Baku, too, should use this mo­ment to revise how it engages with the United States, including in light of recent developments and extant challenges in its region.

Both sides could also use this moment to identify some long‑standing matters of little strategic importance and sweep them out of the way. Doing so would allow each to concentrate on matters where cooperation can considerably ad­vance both countries’ interests in ensuring stability, prosperity, and a peaceful, secure region.