Special, Exceptional, and Privileged

The bilateral relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey is special, excep­tional, and privileged. Both coun­tries assign the highest value and importance to their relationship at both the state and non‑state level. The motto “one nation, two states” has been used quite frequently in this context, and it rings true. First pronounced by Heydar Aliyev, it is frequently used by the political and intellectual elites of both countries and strongly supported by the public in both nations.

A strong pattern of friendship, fraternity, brotherhood, and unity characterizes the bilateral relationship

A strong pattern of friendship, fraternity, brotherhood, and unity characterizes the bilat­eral relationship, which presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan defined in September 2010 as that between “two fraternal countries bound to­gether by bonds unseen elsewhere in the world” and Ilham Aliyev described minutes later as having “reached the level of alliance.”

In this essay I will analyze the nature of the multifaceted bilateral relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey while focusing on the content, quality, and meaning at­tributed to this special partner­ship. I will start by identifying the sources of the bilateral relationship and continue with a discussion of its political contours. I will then follow up with an examination of the state of inter‑societal dialogue and level of cooperation in culture and edu­cation. Next, I will turn to an ex­amination of the only period of tur­bulence in the relationship, which was caused by Turkey’s ultimately unsuccessful outreach to Armenia more than a decade ago. Finally, I will explore Turkey’s position vis‑à‑vis the Second Karabakh War and show how it exemplifies the ex­ceptional and still deepening level of strategic cooperation between Ankara and Baku.

The Azerbaijan‑Turkey bi­lateral relationship is im­portant, perhaps crucial, for se­curing stability and security in the South Caucasus. It is based on mu­tual trust and relies on mutual inter­dependence. The mutuality in both support and soli­darity that the two countries extend to one another is un­conditional.

This strategic relationship also has a significant economic dimen­sion, particularly in the field of energy and transportation, which continues to provide both coun­tries with opportunities to get well‑integrated into wider networks of economic relations through projects such as the Baku‑Tbili­si‑Ceyhan pipeline and the Trans‑ Anatolian gas pipeline as well as the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Kars railway line. In­vestments in both directions have also been strong and are growing. This creates a mutual dependence in both countries for the represen­tation of economic interests and profit maximization.

Economic cooperation supports significantly the foreign policy priorities of both countries. They should therefore not be understood as a mere trade and investment re­lations, but as a constituent part of a common, forward‑looking vision to connect future generations.

Thus, their emotional and histor­ical bonds correspond seamlessly to their shared secu­rity and economic interests. This in fact goes beyond interests: Turkey and Azerbaijan have common de­velopment and se­curity agendas.

For Azerbaijan, the image of Turkey is well‑rooted in his­torical memory. Atatürk famously said, “Azerbaijan’s joy is our joy; its sorrow is our sorrow.” And in the immediate post‑Soviet period, two cornerstone decisions taken by Ankara at the time continue to resonate particularly well in Baku, at both elite and popular levels: first, Turkey was the first country to recognize the mod­ern‑day independence of Azer­baijan; second, Ankara’s refusal to build‑up diplomatic relations with Yerevan until the Karabakh conflict is resolved to Baku’s sat­isfaction. This was soon followed by Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan in both regional and international fora and organizations.

For Turkey, the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up the way to determine new foreign policy priorities, formulate new pol­icies, and develop new tools vis‑à‑vis the Turkic world to its east.

For Turkey, the collapse of the Soviet Union opened up the way to determine new foreign policy priorities, formulate new policies, and develop new tools vis‑à‑vis the Turkic world to its east. Through the rediscovery of commonali­ties—particularly in culture and lan­guage—between two close nations that had been al­most entirely cut off from one another for de­cades, Azerbaijan quickly came to be seen by Turkey as its closest ally in the former Soviet space. Azerbaijan also became, in many ways, a jumping‑off point for Turkey to seek opportunities to develop new economic relations in other Silk Road region emerging markets, including those centered on energy projects.

While the relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey was and continues to be enthused in emotional motives, grounded in historical ties, and rooted in both ethnic and cultural affini­ties, it has become institutionalized through official visits, the signing of agreements, and the provision of continuous mutual support in all contexts: bilateral, regional, or multilateral; political, security, or socio‑economic.

Patterns of cooperation coupled with large doses of strategic good­will dominated the immediate post‑Soviet period. By the time Azerbaijan was able to consolidate its statehood and sovereignty, this largely emotional basis was replaced by a more goal‑oriented approach that deepened the two countries’ stra­tegic alliance and partnerships. As of late 2020, both countries view the relationship as being one between equals in which both sides benefit from their mutual interdependence.

Sources of Commonality

The origin of, and basis for, the “one nation, two states” motto that perfectly describes the Turkey‑Azerbaijan relationship lie in four commonalities. First, Azerbaijan and Turkey share common historical, cultural, re­ligious, and linguistic attributes. Although one cannot deny the ve­racity of shared cultural patterns and the mutual intelligibility of the dialects spoken by the two peo­ples, the underlying factors high­lighting these commonalities are to some extent constructed (but not imagined).

Both communities did not in­teract at all during the Soviet period (from the early 1920s to the late 1980s). As a consequence, both the perception and the image each has of the other is not the product of an organic, uninterrupted evolution. This is not to imply artificiality but rather a certain idealization.

The national memory of the Azerbaijanis thus glorifies the image of Turkey as savior, at least with re­gards to events that took place in the first decades of the twentieth century. Generally, the shared past is infused solely with positive connotations. There is much to be said for this narrative. For instance, the interaction between Azerbaijani and Turkish intellectuals during the fin‑de‑siècle period into the early 1920s, and the fact that they shared almost the same vision of a would‑be state—with particular emphasis on Turkism and mod­ernization—underlines the intel­lectual and ideological basis of the special relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan, especially from the latter’s perspective. Turks, on the other hand, without nec­essarily having substantial infor­mation, consider language as the main proof of common ancestry. In this respect, both countries’ perceptions are at once authentic and constructed—although loaded with meaning—in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Memory is there, preserved and revived, and has resulted in shared feelings, real bonds, and strategic depth.

Second, both countries share a common enemy. Armenians historically constitute the main Other for both societies. Histor­ical grievances that could not been overcome have been revived by the Karabakh conflict. In other words, the fact of a common enemy helped to bring Azerbai­janis and Turks closer together. Turkey’s unconditional support for Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict also has been tied to the issue of sharing a common threat. Although the level of threat per­ception is not the same both coun­tries, it has constituted one of the main challenges in shaping Tur­key’s relations with the West (both Europe and the United States) and Azerbaijan’s conception of terri­torial integrity and sovereignty, as well as both nation‑ and state‑building.

In this respect one could even argue that “shared memory” is less important than “shared enemy” with respect to forging and deep­ening commonalities. The fact that hostilities (or hostile intent) have continued provides the sense of “shared enemy” with a certain permanence with respect to both Turkey and Azerbaijan. The ac­tual conflict—un­derstood to refer particularly to the Second Karabakh War—has further contributed to the revitalization of a sense of shared memory, albeit con­verted into a sort of collective identity or collective con­sciousness among Azerbaijanis and Turks.

Third, Azerbaijan and Turkey share a common profit‑making interest that manifests itself pri­marily in the economic field. The initiation of energy and trans­portation projects, along with increased investment opportu­nities, have created a source of economic interdependence be­tween the two countries, which has reinforced their respective foreign policy priorities, as noted above, and thus represent a constituent part of a common, forward‑looking vision.

Fourth (and finally), the Turkey‑ Azerbaijan bilateral relationship goes beyond elite visions, initia­tives, choices, and policies. Rather, it has a strong societal basis, as evi­denced by the fact that the political elite’s preferences are supported by both publics, which in turn guar­antees its preser­vation, deepening, and consolidation. This implies that both countries’ societies would react in the event that one or both na­tions’ elites were to exhibit reluc­tance in pursuing common ground. The importance of the human dimen­sion is such that it is likely to remain a driving force behind the choices of both elites in the time to come.

These four sources constitute the basis for the bilateral re­lationship, which later evolved into a more privileged partnership that served to deepen the unity between Azerbaijan and Turkey and, more recently, has been transformed into a strategic partnership with com­monly developed security priorities buttressed by increased inter‑societal dialogue and achieved through an increase in both the depth and breadth of educa­tional exchanges, media linkages, growing trade, expanding tourism, and other tools of cooperation.

The Second Karabakh War has both accelerat­ed and deepened exist­ing trends in this most privileged of bilateral relationships, thanks to the unwavering moral and political support ex­tended to Azerbaijan by Turkey.

The Second Karabakh War has both accelerated and deepened ex­isting trends in this most privileged of bilateral relationships, thanks to the unwavering moral and political support extended to Azerbaijan by Turkey. The continuous dialogue between Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as well as their re­spective foreign and defense minis­ters, represents strong evidence of this new deepening. Turkey’s pres­ence in Azerbaijan will definitely increase through participation in what the November 10th armistice agreement called a “peacemaking center to oversee the ceasefire” as well as the likely role Turkey will play in helping to rebuild Azerbaijan’s liberated territories.

Societal Dialogue

The backbone of the bilat­eral relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey is the so­cietal dimension. The perceptions and feelings among both coun­tries’ publics are extremely positive, which is why they are most likely to endure well into the future. The level of mutual awareness is also un­commonly high. This is exceptional for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that it developed and blossomed largely without gov­ernmental incentivization.

The reasons informing this ex­ceptionalism for Azerbaijanis and Turks are different. For instance, the level of knowledge of, and first‑hand experience in, Turkey or anything Turkish is much higher among Azerbaijanis than vice versa. Azerbaijanis follow domestic and foreign policy issues in Turkey, watch Turkish news and television programs, support Turkish foot­ball teams, and travel to Turkey quite frequently either for busi­ness or touristic purposes. In this respect, societal literacy about Turkey is Azerbaijan in not com­parable with that of Turks about Azerbaijan.

In contrast, Turkish attachment to Azerbaijan is more emotional and, one could even say, intuitive. Turks are neither very aware nor follow Azerbaijani domestic politics. Their strong sensitivity and support for Azerbaijan’s position regarding Nagorno‑Karabakh is likely due to perceptions of Armenia and Armenians. In opinion polls, the Turkish public considers Azerbaijan its closest and most reliable ally, year in and year out. Although most Turks have neither first‑hand knowledge of, or experi­ence in, Azerbaijan, notions of col­lective memory, cultural affinities, and linguistic proximity condition these perceptions. Thus, Azerbai­jani and Turkish public opinions share both joy and sorrow—to refer back to Atatürk’s famous formulation.

A further increase in soci­etal literacy on Turkey in Azerbaijan would open even greater potential for further collaboration. But improving the other side of the ledger is more pressing: increasing Turkish societal literacy with re­spect to Azerbaijan. Turkish public opinion’s sympathy with Azerbaijan originates in the notion of shared memory, largely constructed with reference to a common enemy. Thus, it is highly responsive to emergency situations and becomes highly visible and vocalized when the need arises. During the Second Karabakh War, media coverage in Turkey was comprehensive. However, Turkish encounters with Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan remain limited, since its South Caucasus neighbor is not a popular tourist destination.

Increased cultural interaction will not only contribute to an increase in familiarity between the two societies but also consolidate the societal dimension of the bilat­eral relationship. The Yunus Emre Institute and the Atatürk Center of Turkey can play critical roles in this process.

Educational and Cultural Cooperation

The field of education is one of the liveliest domains illus­trating both the political and soci­etal aspects of the patterns of co­operation between Azerbaijan and Turkey. In 1992, Turkey initiated the Great Student Project, which provided young people from the Turkic world of the former Soviet Union with the chance to study in Turkey at the undergraduate level. This visionary project aimed to provide an opportunity for the first post‑Soviet generation to receive a quality education in a time of polit­ical uncertainty, societal transition, and economic turmoil that largely characterized the early years of independence.

In the first decade of the Great Student Project program, more than 17,500 scholarships were offered to students from Turkic countries, including to more than 3,650 Azerbaijanis. These students represented a core cultural link be­tween the two societies, having had the opportunity to form a realistic picture of what Turkey was truly about, which allowed them to elab­orate an informed perception of its culture, society, politics, and much else besides.

Ankara also worked hard to the building up of a pro‑Turkey polit­ical, intellectual, and business elite in Azerbaijan. This soft power inte­gration model has helped to foster a sense of commonality by estab­lishing a shared social background in which trust, sympathy, and affin­ities are considered as given. The very presence of a large Turkish university alumni community in Azerbaijan is a critical niche for the further consolidation of the bilat­eral relationship.

A Period of Turbulence

The exceptional ties be­tween Azerbaijan and Turkey were challenged, for a time, by Turkey’s attempt to normalize diplomatic relations with Armenia in 2008‑2009.

The exceptional ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey were challenged, for a time, by Turkey’s attempt to normalize diplomatic relations with Armenia in 2008‑ 2009. Although Turkey’s relations with Armenia have been (and con­tinue to be) conditioned to the full restoration of the territorial in­tegrity of Azerbaijan, the issue of Turkish‑Armenian relations has become occasionally a topic for pressuring Turkey in international fora.

Historical hatred fueled by the absence of bilateral relations con­stitute a hurtle for Turkish foreign policy to deal with internation­ally. The attempt at rapproche­ment (or even reconciliation, as some thought possible) between Armenia and Turkey began with football diplomacy. In September 2008, Turkish president Abdullah Gül visited Yerevan to watch a football World Cup qualifier match at the invitation of Armenian presi­dent Serzh Sargsyan. The Armenian head of state was later invited to the Turkish city of Bursa to watch the sequel match.

At the time, the symbolism was rather exaggerated, al­though it later came to be viewed as the first step in the attempt to normalize relations between Ankara and Yerevan: the outcome of these face‑to‑face presidential meetings opened the way to the signing up of the Zurich Protocols in October 2009 between the coun­tries’ foreign ministers. Of the two documents signed, one concerned the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey whilst the other focused on the development of bilateral relations. Although these Proto­cols were not been ratified by the legislatures of either country, they had a considerable impact on the Azerbaijan‑Turkey relationship.

It did not help Ankara’s case in Baku that the Zurich Protocols made no men­tion of Nagorno‑ Karabakh; prior to their signing, Erdogan appeared to indicate other‑wise. In April 2009, for example, he had announced that “unless Azerbaijan and Armenia sign a pro­tocol on Nagorno‑Karabakh, we will not sign any final agreement with Armenia on ties. We are doing preliminary work but this defi­nitely depends on resolution of the Nagorno‑Karabakh problem.” Four weeks later, during an official visit to Azerbaijan, he said that “there is a relation of cause and effect here. The occupation of Nagorno‑ Karabakh is the cause, and the closure of the border is the effect. Without the occupation ending, the gates will not be opened.” And yet, for a time it seemed as though they would—assurances to the contrary notwithstanding.

At bottom, the exceptional type of relationship enjoyed by Turkey and Azerbaijan is based on trust. Turkey obviously miscal­culated the potential gains of the nascent normalization process. It also underestimated its own domestic grassroots opposition to the Zurich Protocols as well as the extent to which these could potentially disturb both Azerbaijan’s elite and public opinion. Ankara did not do itself any favors by opting not to consult with Baku prior to initiating the normal­ization process. All this produced a real rupture between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Although constructive dialogue at high levels resumed—as did re­ciprocal official visits along with a resurgence of popular support in each country for the other—the damage had been done: the crisis was overcome, but not forgotten. For some period of time there­after, the Azerbaijani government embraced a more cautious stance towards Turkey: the restoration of trust was hardly instantaneous.

The breakthrough came about a year later with the signing of the Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support between Turkey and Azerbaijan and the establishment of the Azerbaijan‑Turkey High‑level Strategic Cooperation Council (and the holding of the first meeting of the latter mechanism in October 2011). This can be interpreted as symbol of the quick restoration of disturbed relations as well as a further institutionalization of the Ankara‑Baku alliance. What is also remarkable is that this new mechanism formally incorpo­rated a security dimension. Both countries pledged to support each other “using all possibilities” in the event of a military attack or “aggression” against either of them. The Joint Declaration that established the aforementioned Council also contained provi­sions to upgrade hardware for joint military operations, coop­eration in “military‑technical” areas, and joint military exercises and training sessions.

The Karabakh Conflict

Turkey’s refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia until the return of the oc­cupied territories of Azerbaijan is considered by Baku to be of funda­mental importance. One can argue that although Turkish moral and political support during the Second Karabakh War is a natural con­tinuum of the discourse, the latest developments provided yet an­other opportunity for the bilat­eral relationship to intensify and deepen.

Between July and September 2020, the two countries conducted joint military exercises that were qualitatively more serious in com­parison to those that had taken place in the past, which made their unconditional relationship more visible. This can also be interpreted yet another example of overlapping political, economic, security, and strategic interests.

Azerbaijan’s military opera­tions on its own territory were unequivocally supported by a very high‑level declarations. Erdogan stated that the Turkish nation stands by its Azerbaijani brothers “as always and with all its resources.” Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoglu declared that “Azerbaijan will, of course, use its right to legitimate defense to protect its people and territorial integrity. In this process, Turkey’s full sup­port for Azerbaijan is complete and its solidarity is unwavering. We will stand with Azerbaijan in any way it wants.” Çavuşoglu again: “We stand with Azerbaijan in the field and on the table.” Turkey’s defense minister, Hulusi Akar, added the following, for good measure: “we will stand with our Azerbaijani Turkic brothers and sisters until the end with all our means in the struggle to protect the integrity of their land.”

During one of his war­time visits to Baku, Çavuşoglu said that Tur­key and Azerbaijan can even be “counted as one state when necessary.”

During one of his war­time visits to Baku, Çavuşoglu said that Turkey and Azerbaijan can even be “counted as one state when necessary.”

The Turkish public was glued to their screens, watching the news coverage of the war that was more extensive of Azerbaijan in comparison to any other period since Azerbaijan’s independence. Even a cursory examination of Azerbaijani social media ac­counts lead to the realization that Azerbaijanis frequently use the Turkish flag emoji alongside their own. The number of Turkish flags hanging side by side with Azerbaijani ones in cities and town across the country would be impossible to count, so great is the number. Public celebrations after the armistice was signed on November 10th were held with both Azerbaijani and Turkish flags. And Erdogan was the guest of honor for the Victory parade that took place on De­cember 10th in Baku.

Turkey has already been sup­portive of Azerbaijan in all re­gional and international fora, in ac­cordance with the strategic nature of the bilateral relationship. There was nothing new in this. But by the start of the Second Karabakh War, Tur­key’s stance had become more proac­tive, assertive, and involved. Ankara in effect made a total commitment of support for the war effort (Azerbaijan reportedly drew the line regarding Turkey’s offer of direct military in­volvement on the battlefield).

It should be noted, however, that the Turkish army and its mil­itary academies have been pro­viding training to their Azerbaijani comrades in arms for a couple of decades. This has obviously con­tributed to the formation of a well‑equipped and strong Azerbaijani military, which has vastly improved in comparison with the 1990s. And generations of the military elites of the two countries have trained side by side.

The postwar pe­riod represents a test for Turkey— especially in the context of its immediate neigh­borhood. Ankara has what may be a truly historic opportunity to strengthen its role in the region while becoming a more promi­nent security actor.

The balance of power in the South Caucasus will largely be determined by the nature of the relationship between Russia and Turkey that has aptly been defined as a compet­itive partnership.

The balance of power in the South Caucasus will largely be determined by the nature of the relationship between Russia and Turkey that has aptly been defined as a competitive partnership.

Further Consolidation

The bilateral relationship be­tween Azerbaijan and Turkey remains exceptional and has been further deepened as a result of the Second Karabakh War. The will and policies of the ruling elites are fully supported by the publics of both states. With respect to the ques­tion of further consolidation and enhanced institu­tionalization, important initiatives can be considered—particularly in non‑political fields. The diversifi­cation of policies and tools would eventually contribute to the further strengthening of a unique set of bi­lateral ties. Three will here be men­tioned briefly.

First, civil society dialogue, which is one of the least developed dimen­sions of the bilateral relationship. Although Turkish civil society or­ganizations are neither donors nor fund‑generating entities, they still have the capacity to transfer their knowhow through jointly‑created initiatives. This can be very in­spiring for Azerbaijani civil society, given the considerable experience of Turkish NGOs in voluntary activism.

Second, developing and strength­ening relationships between univer­sities and research centers. Almost all the first‑ and even many sec­ond‑tier universi­ties in Azerbaijan and Turkey—both public and pri­vate—signed coop­eration agreements with each other years ago, but rela­tively few have sat­isfactorily fulfilled their stated aims in practice. Faculty, student, and staff exchanges, along with joint research initiatives and the organizations of workshops and conferences, would significantly contribute to the de­velopment of an interactive aca­demic milieu. The establishment of Turkish and Azerbaijani studies cen­ters and academic departments, op­erating under relevant institutional frameworks, would not only con­tribute to knowledge production but also to heightened scientific analysis of the multiple dimensions of the bilateral relationship. Supporting such new academic initiatives would necessitate an investment on the part of both governments.

Third, alumni organizations should also be supported. States can support their activities when doing so would make sense, certain in the knowledge that university graduates are the best potential representatives of each na­tion in terms of entrenching the con­tinuity of an exceptional and deep­ening bilateral relationship.

The Second Karabakh War brought the relationship be­tween Turkey and Azerbaijan to an even higher level. In the time ahead, its contours will remain the same whilst the substance will con­tinue to grow and deepen. One can therefore easily expect more insti­tutionalization, a diversification of joint initiatives, and stronger com­mitments by both sides. Based on historical ties and cultural prox­imity, and inspired by common interests and benefits, the bilateral relationship will continue to be supported and preserved at the so­cietal level in both countries. This rare asset—this true alliance— should be not taken for granted so that its true potential may be revealed.