While You Were Sleeping

The flaring up of active combat in the Southern Caucasus in late Sep­tember 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia initially seemed to catch many by surprise. An im­mediate upside of this turn of events was seen in the rekindled interest it generated in the three decade‑old conflict in and around Nagorno‑Karabakh, which was often misleadingly labeled as being “frozen.” It also acted as a crude re­minder of the need for consistency in advocating respect for a rules‑based international order.

Numerous analysts and experts old and new scrambled to explain the reasons behind the military escalation, seemingly driven by a quest to identify the culprit or the perceived instigators. While they focused mostly on the timing of the events and the broader geopolitical dynamics, they failed to notice that the crux of the matter lay elsewhere.

The clock in Nagorno‑ Karabakh had, in essence, been ticking increasingly loudly for some time, and for good reason.

The clock in Nagorno‑Karabakh had, in essence, been ticking in­creasingly loudly for some time, and for good reason. This unfortunately went unnoticed. The convenience of a mistakenly reassuring assump­tion that this was a “conflict on ice” was consequently shaken up as a new reality dawned on those who were not paying sufficient atten­tion, in the form of active combat between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The continuing occupation of Azerbaijani territories and the consequential plight of one mil­lion displaced civilians has been a longstanding simmering sense of frustration not only among the Azerbaijani leadership, but also for ordinary citizens in the country. I personally bore witness to these rising emotions while serving as the Turkish Ambassador in Baku for four years, between 2012‑2016. Regrettably, this understandable resentment never caught enough attention in international eyes.

In practice, all efforts, including those of the OSCE Minsk Group Co‑chairs, mostly prioritized the “management” of the conflict, and thus fell far short of facilitating a just, durable solution. This greatly un­dermined trust in the mediation process which, as was often stated by President Ilham Aliyev, “had led to nowhere.”

In fact, the perpetual lack of prog­ress through negotiations bolstered the perception that the opportu­nistic use of force by Armenia in the early 1990s that resulted in its occupation not only of Nagorno‑ Karabakh, but also of adjoining Azerbaijani territories, had yielded concrete results for Yerevan. As a corollary to this argument, four UN Security Council resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884), as well as a subsequent General Assembly resolution (62/243) calling for Armenian forces to withdraw were relegated to nothing more than empty words on paper.

This stark contrast cast a shadow on what should have been the uni­form application of international law, and, by extension, undermined confidence in the notion of a just international order. Moreover, this suboptimal situation did not sit comfortably for an increasingly aspi­rant and self‑con­fident Azerbaijan, justifiably yearning to liberate its occu­pied lands. Mean­while, challenges emanating from the Armenian side in the context of this dispute were left unaddressed. It was clear that, as things stood, Yerevan believed it held the initiative and did not feel the urge to work constructively to­ward a peaceful and lasting solution on the basis of established norms and principles of international law.

This stalemate had been tradi­tionally further burdened by the fact that Armenia is beholden to a self‑inflicted entrapment, so­lidified through a strict national­istic narrative both on this issue and more broadly in relation to Azerbaijan and Turkey. The Armenian mindset, prevailing po­litical discourse, and the defining sentiments of its influential dias­pora are all heavily tainted in this regard and as time has shown, Prime Minister Nicol Pashinyan is no exception.

Despite the fact that when he first assumed office on a popular tide Pashinyan was heralded as a po­tential breath of fresh air in com­parison to the traditionally intran­sigent “Karabakh clan,” he too did not tarry in joining the same nationalistic bandwagon. He manifested this vividly through ir­redentist rhetoric toward Turkey, as well as by advo­cating the recogni­tion of Nagorno‑ Karabakh as an independent entity. He went even further during a visit to Khankendi (Stepanakert) in August 2019, where he notoriously declared, “Nagorno Karabakh is Armenian. Period.” Meanwhile, his equally unconscionable (now former) de­fense minister outlined the updated Armenian strategic doctrine as “new war, for new territories,” os­tensibly aimed at ridding Armenia of a constant state of defense and projecting military action further into Azerbaijan. Among other ad­venturist implications, this was a clear rejection of the Madrid Principles developed under the aus­pices of the OSCE Minsk Group, and mirrored Pashinyan’s attitude on the matter.

The increasingly radical mes­saging from Pashinyan (and his team) came to exceed even those of his hardline predecessors and was ultimately seen in Baku as a clear sign that Armenia had crossed the Rubicon. This tar­nished what were at best modest expectations in Azerbaijan that Pashinyan could in fact turn out to be a respon­sible partner on the road to peace. It severely under­mined any hope that the conflict could be re­solved through negotiations. Azerbaijani indignation was evident in the words again of President Aliyev during the first days of the Second Karabakh War, when in an address to the nation, he reminded listeners of Pashinyan’s provoc­ative declaration in Khankendi and after citing the territories lib­erated by Azerbaijani forces at the time, went on to meaningfully ask, “Where is Pashinyan now?”

The reasons behind Pashin­yan’s hardening stance are probably multifold and can be at­tributed, among other things, to his reading of political realities within Armenia, as well as to overbearing pressure from the Armenian dias­pora. For an unorthodox political actor like Pashinyan, lacking a tra­ditional, hardcore base to confi­dently rely on, it is quite possible that the obligation to revert to a na­tionalistic and unrelenting rhetoric was the only path to political sur­vival—or so, Pashinyan thought.

Irrespective of the reasons, though, as time has shown, his in­flammatory discourse accompanied by occasional acts of military esca­lation proved to be a fateful miscal­culation. It eventually created the conditions under which Azerbaijan was able to take the initiative and level the playing field for the first time in the history of the Karabakh conflict. In a matter of six weeks, Azerbaijan was able to reclaim most of its occupied territories and oblige Armenia to agree to a cessation of hostilities, mostly on Baku’s terms.

The armistice was noth­ing less than a decisive capitulation of Armenia that marked the begin­ning of a new geostrate­gic chapter in the South Caucasus

The ensuing armistice that the par­ties signed together with Russia was nothing less than a decisive capitu­lation of Armenia that marked the beginning of a new geostrategic chapter in the South Caucasus, and one in which Armenia seems to be lacking in leverage.

Rules‑based International Order?

A theme of growing interest for scholars of international re­lations has for some time now been related to the notion of a rules‑based order, both with respect to its nature and the perceived challenges affecting it.

A Hobbesian international secu­rity landscape is certainly not some­thing to which one should aspire, given the risks and challenges that rule‑less competition and a poten­tial state of endless confrontation could inflict upon even the stron­gest of state actors. Therefore, while its contours may vary, the premise of the need for a rules‑based order, as well as the logic of defending it, are sound and clear.

But the sustainability of any such endeavor hinges first and foremost on the uniform application of its basic principles. It is incumbent upon responsible state actors to ad­vocate and uphold these principles without exception, and to do so in each specific context, in a standard and balanced manner.

The steadfast support that the international community over­whelmingly provides to Georgia and Ukraine, for example, by unequivocally standing up for their territorial integrity and sovereignty has been consistent, correct, and meaningful. It serves as a perfect example of how the international community at large can and should stand united in the face of egregious violations of international law. Turkey has been at the forefront of these efforts in both cases and has energetically displayed its sol­idarity with both Tbilisi and Kyiv, including through enhanced bilateral cooperation and unwavering support for their Euro‑Atlantic in­tegration aspirations.

Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has faced a different reality as far as the degree of international sup­port to its territorial integrity is concerned, with Turkey’s unwav­ering position being the exception. And this despite four UN Security Council resolutions dating back to the early 1990s wherein, among other things, the occupation of Azerbaijani territories had been identified as a source of con­cern and calls had been made for the immediate evacuation of Armenian forces, with responsi­bility attributed to Armenia, and open support voiced for the territo­rial integrity of Azerbaijan. The fact of the matter is that it has mostly fallen upon Azerbaijan to remind the international community of this historically important legacy, and the ensuing need to restore its territorial integrity by ending the ongoing occupation. This con­tinued to be the case in the run up to the outbreak of hostilities in late September 2020.

Of course, as experts often rightfully point out, finding a mutually acceptable solution to this complex issue through negoti­ations has proven to be easier said than done. This objective reality has plagued the Minsk Process, as a result of which the conflict passed the thirty‑year mark with no visible inertia toward a solution.

It is against such a backdrop that the Second Karabakh War began and where Turkey, traditionally an outspoken advocate for Azerbaijan, was seen to be even more vocal in its support for Azerbaijan’s legitimate aspiration to end the occupation without further delay. The nature and degree of Turkey’s support was immediately put under intense scru­tiny, accompanied by a clear effort on the part of Armenia and some other actors to depict a concocted version of Turkey’s involvement. Ironically, these targeted efforts at times inad­vertently unveiled flagrant inconsis­tencies in other quarters.

A clear case in point was Armenian President Armen Sarkissian’s press conference at NATO Headquarters with Secretary General Jens Stolten­berg at the height of the conflict. In his assessment of the situation, Sarkissian squarely blamed Turkey and then went on to enthusiasti­cally endorse the idea that there could be no military solution to the problem. This was quite an act, given the fact that Armenia itself is the recognized cul­prit for the occupa­tion of Azerbaijani territories through the unlawful use of force in the first place. The same el­ement of irony was evident in asser­tions that Turkey is biased due to its kinship with Azerbaijan, that at the same time conveniently overlooked the special interests and affinity that Russia, France, and the United States enjoy with Armenia.

That said, even if, for argu­ment’s sake, one were to single Turkey out and debate its eligibility as an honest broker, it has always been difficult to chal­lenge Ankara’s longstanding insis­tence on the need for meaningful action to end the occupation of Azerbaijani territories on the basis of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Indeed, experience has shown that in the absence of a strong po­litical dynamic guided by the re­quirements of international law and aimed at achieving a just and lasting solution, fragile cease‑fire attempts between Azerbaijan and Armenia have at best deferred the problem. They have in most cases been short‑lived, as we witnessed again during this latest phase of the con­flict, where three such futile ceasefire attempts were all promptly broken by Armenia and immediately ren­dered meaningless.

It has always been clear in Ankara’s view that if any peace‑oriented attempt is to be durable and successful, it cannot afford the luxury of complacency in calling for the enforcement of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

The need to end the oc­cupation of Azerbaijani territories and to restore its internationally rec­ognized territorial in­tegrity has always been paramount

In other words, the need to end the oc­cupation of Azerbaijani territories and to restore its internationally recognized territorial integrity has always been paramount. The inter­national community, and most no­tably the Co‑chairs (and members) of the OSCE Minsk Group, carried the moral and practical burden of taking a clear stance on the matter. It was up to them to make it known beyond any doubt that the forceful and illegal occupation of Azerbaijani lands could not stand, much in the same way that the in­ternational community had over­whelmingly done in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. In the absence of such international push‑back, Armenia grew comfortable with the prevailing circumstances, whereby it believed to hold an advantage. This false sense of achievement, which has always been nurtured by the Armenian leadership, cap­tivated the Armenian population at large. The utter sense of dis­belief and anger that was seen in the streets of Yerevan after Armenia conceded to the armi­stice and agreed to withdraw from the remaining occupied Azerbaijani territories was in many ways a function of this mindset. Pashinyan, it seems, had also been swept away by this al­ternative reality that led him into grave miscalculations.

Two States, One Nation

The Second Karabakh War triggered a great amount of interest, accompanied by a near sense of surprise in some circles about the enhanced degree of bilat­eral military and defense industry cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Having been directly involved in the diversification and overall deepening of bilateral relations be­tween the two countries, I found this to be a belated revelation, and one that I could only attribute to a lack of attention to critically important historical realities, as well as to prevailing trends in Turkish‑ Azerbaijani relations.

One must remember first that Azerbaijan is the eternal resting place for more than 1100 Turkish servicemen. These soldiers made the ultimate sacrifice while helping their kinsmen in their quest for independence in 1918. Their cemeteries, scattered all over the country, including in Nakhchivan, serve as a testa­ment to the eternal bond that tie Azerbaijan and Turkey together, as reflected in the often‑quoted dictum, “two nations, but one people.” And this legacy goes both ways, in view of similar sacrifices and displays of support made by Azerbaijanis during Turkey’s de­fense of the Dardanelles in 1915 as well as its war of liberation in the aftermath of World War I that led to the birth of the modern day Republic of Turkey.

The sense of unqualified and absolute solidarity between Azerbaijan and Turkey is not the simple function of a political choice but is rather the outcome of natural and mutually felt grassroot sentiments.

The sense of unqualified and absolute solidarity between Azerbaijan and Turkey is not the simple function of a political choice but is rather the outcome of natural and mutually felt grassroot sentiments. Bilateral cooperation between the two countries have steadily been improving on the basis of such a unique foundation ever since Turkey became the first country to recognize modern‑day Azerbaijan in 1991.

During Azerbaijan’s fledgling first years of independence in the early 1990s, Turkey naturally pulled most of the weight in terms of investments and initiatives geared to developing these relations. But this changed over time as Azerbaijan consolidated its inde­pendence, accu­mulated wealth, and grew in eco­nomic strength. So much so that today Azerbaijan stands among the top ten leading sources of for­eign direct investments in Turkey. For its part, Turkey is the leading foreign investor in Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, transborder trans­portation and energy schemes, which also involve Georgia, have successfully been implemented and are operational with potential for future growth.

In their joint effort to develop their engagement in all fields, Ankara and Baku have also focused on enhancing their military and de­fense industry cooperation, as re­cent events have promptly brought under the limelight. With its strong credentials as a capable NATO ally, Turkey has from the outset volun­teered its support to Azerbaijan’s military modernization efforts and to its participation in NATO’s partnership activ­ities. This coop­eration has been comprehensive, ranging from facil­itating Azerbaijan’s contributions to NATO operations and missions to enhancing the in­teroperability of its forces with those of Allied nations.

An important dimension has had to do with enhanced training and exercise activities that have served to create a new and more capable defense and warfighting culture within the Azerbaijani armed forces. Joint exercises in dif­ferent formations and locations in both countries have arguably con­stituted the most salient aspect of Turkish‑Azerbaijani engagement, attracting attention in Yerevan and beyond. The spread of the COVID‑19 virus has posed a chal­lenge to the intensity of these ac­tivities but has not prevented them from being continued.

Meanwhile, concurrent advance­ments in Turkey’s indigenous de­fense industry capabilities came at an opportune time for Azerbaijan in helping meet its growing appetite to procure state‑of‑the‑art military hardware. While among numerous procurers, Israel has been credited with the highest volume of military sales to Azerbaijan in recent years, even surpassing those from Russia, Turkey has steadily matured into a competitive and maybe most im­portantly, reliable supply source.

Experiences in the opera­tional domain during the Second Karabakh War suggest that Azerbaijan has been able to capital­ize on its quest to mod­ernize its military capa­bilities, including through intensified collaboration with Turkey.

Experiences in the opera­tional domain during the Second Karabakh War suggest that Azerbaijan has been able to capitalize on its quest to modernize its military capabilities, including through intensified collaboration with Turkey. The absence of in­ertia in the mediation process, cou­pled with escalatory trends with Armenia, seem to have been driving Baku to plan for the worst for some time now, and to be prepared for a worst case scenario. The active combat operations that took place in 2016, as well as the more recent clashes in July 2020, were in many ways manifestations of the slippery slope this so‑called “frozen con­flict” rested on, and, in hindsight, were clear precursors of what was to come.

The nature and depth of the mil­itary and defense industry coop­eration between Azerbaijan and Turkey, which is being scrutinized with intensity today, is neither a new paradigm, nor is it a sudden outcome. It can be better explained and understood in the context of a long‑term strategic vision shared by Baku and Ankara that represents linear growth in collaboration. A striking charac­terization of its current state of play has been made by military analyst and expert Can Kasapoglu, who aptly recoined the traditional dictum defining the relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey in this context as “two states, but one smart power.” It is clear from state­ments coming from both sides that authorities in Baku and Ankara are equally satisfied with the mutually rewarding nature of their coopera­tion and can be expected to further deepen it in the years ahead.

Nakhchivan

Maps say a lot when it comes to geostrategic realities and a quick glance at Nakhchivan’s lo­cation clearly shows its importance for Turkey as well as, obviously, for Azerbaijan. It also displays the ad­ditional challenge it most probably constitutes for Yerevan in terms of military planning and strategy.

Nakhchivan has historically been referred to as “the path to the Turkic world,” which is why the rupture of continuity between this autonomous republic and the rest of Azerbaijan during Soviet times has always been the source of considerable debate among strategists and scholars.

Another reason that makes Nakhchivan unique is the fact that in the past Turkey has been associated with the status of the autonomous re­public, by virtue of various interna­tional instruments which have also defined the eastern borders of Turkey.

It is against this background that ever since the onset of hos­tilities in and around Nagorno‑ Karabakh, Turkey has been sensitive to their potential implications for Nakhchivan. This was again ev­ident in the prompt reaction Ankara showed to an Armenian at­tack on the settlement of Ordubad in Nakhchivan in mid‑October 2020.

As an autonomous republic that is an integral part of, yet geographically separated from, the rest of Azerbaijan, Nakhchivan constitutes the only land border between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This makes it politically and strategically important for both sides.

Under the terms of the armi­stice, Armenia has committed to enabling transport links be­tween Nakhchivan and the rest of Azerbaijan. This is a milestone de­velopment that will serve not only the interests of Azerbaijan and Turkey, but also bears the real po­tential of contributing to regional prosperity and well‑being by stimulating economic and com­mercial activity.

Time for Sustainable Peace

The November 2020 armi­stice marks the end of an anomaly: the illegal occupation of Azerbaijani territories is fast becoming a thing of the past.

While the way ahead is fraught with numerous challenges, the focus now needs to be on consolidating the opportunity for a peaceful and stable future for all. This process will need to be consistent with the re­quirements of international law and be guided by a proper mindset that aspires for a new and mutually bene­ficial state of affairs in the region.

The South Caucasus holds an untapped potential for regional co­operation schemes. These could in turn enhance interconnectivity and catalyze a shared sense of interest in continued stability in the region. Azerbaijan and Georgia have made great strides in this regard through cooperation involving Turkey. Under the right conditions, the same can hold true for Armenia, which could in turn help its embattled leader­ship address the many challenges burdening the country’s economic livelihood.

Importantly, this is a prospect that has not been ruled out by Baku or Ankara. During a press conference in Baku a few days after the signing of the armistice, Turkish foreign min­ister Mevlüt Çavuşoglu stated that the process that had been put in mo­tion for lasting peace on the basis of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity under international law will help re­store peace and stability in the region, and benefit the people of Armenia as well. He went on to highlight the im­portance of the opening of transport corridors which would be of rele­vance for all countries of the region, including Armenia.

A negotiated, peaceful, and lasting solution is the right way to end the prevailing history of conflict and humanitarian suffering in the region. This prospect, along with the need to uphold universally recognized norms and rules, re­quires energetic action on the part of the international community.

The basic parameters of such a sus­tainable solution will have to meet the requirements of international law, as reflected in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and further elabo­rated within the context of the negoti­ation process under the auspices of the Co‑chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. Now is the time to seize the moment and find an honorable and mutual­ly‑acceptable solution.

Such an occurrence could po­tentially set in motion a broader positive momentum in the South Caucasus. This is not destined to remain a lofty dream that is be­yond reach. All difficulties notwith­standing, the fact is that seemingly unattainable goals can only be reached through visionary persistence, and by aspiring towards them with a sense of realistic determination.